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ABSTMGT
This study Is designed to present a complete picture of the de­
velopment of China's monetary system from about 1122 .8* C* to 1957 
A* D* However, th© main emphasis is on the recent development from 
about 1851 to 1S37• Therefore, the background of th® country around 
1898, th© important creation of th© Government after 1898, and th© 
important proposals for currency reform, between 1895 and 1928 are 
traced in much greater detail than for earlier periods*
The materials used are, in the main, col lee ted from the govern­
mental documents in this country, th© periodicals, and the books in 
the English language, sine© ther® is a lack of the original Shines© 
materials*
Generally speaking, China, in the early period, had once used 
cowries, pearls, gems, and other articles as money, but she maintained 
th© system of copper coins for several thousand years* Th© Chow 
dynasty (1122 to 220 B* C*) first coined and the Tan dynasty (A* B* 
618-917) improved th© round copper cash* The Tang copper coins re­
mained th© standard of coinage for many succeeding centuries until 
around 1900, when the modem copper cents took their place*
Even though silver was used a® money as early as the days of th© 
Ssia dynasty (2205-1818 B. C*;, silver was not recognized as legal 
tender for th© payment of taxes until 1055 A* D, by the government of 
the Sung dynasty* After a considerable amount of silver bullion and 
foreign silver dollars had flowed into ^hina from Europe and Mexico 
after the nineteenth century, silver cam® into general us® as money
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sid® by side with} copper coins * The Chinese started to coin their o*sa 
silver dollars at the Canton Mint in 1889* later on several provincial 
mints began to tuna out their owi local dollars*
The first Chinese paper money, governmental notes, m s  issued under 
the reign of Emperor Hien-tsun (A* B* 8G6-82Xj of the Tang dynasty*
Later on each dynasty used paper money to finance m r  or in times of 
extreme financial difficulty* Luring the last few decades of the Tslng 
dynasty (A* D* 1644*1911) native batiks, firms, and foreign banks issued 
notes freely*
Bnminted gold was used in china as early as 1818 B* C* and gradually 
came to be used as a storage of value and as one of the minor mediums 
of exchange * But gold coin as a national currency has never yet been 
adopted in China*
China* s monetary system after 1851 ran into serious difficulty*
In the years around 1898 it became worse* The taels, the unit of silver, 
were counted differently, depending or places, business, and tradition* 
The seme was true regarding the "purity" of silver* Th© foreign 
dollars circulated by weight and discount* The Chines© provincial 
dollar, with different appearance, circulated by weight Instead of face 
value* Copper cash, worn and new, genuine and counterfeit, was accepted 
by the people* An un-uniform currency system had been existing in 
China at that time*
China's political and social condition around 1898 had added more 
confusion to the complicated monetary situation* For instance, China's 
government was inefficient and decentralized, both from the standpoint 
of organisation and personnel* The financial difficulty forced China’s 
local governments to abuse the currency policy, and the huge amount of
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foreign g©14 loans directly exhausted the financial sources and in­
directly pat China In a position that w s  dependent on foreign help 
to reform her currency system.
Under the serious condition, China’s government from year to 
year took: various steps to reform the currency system* For various 
reasons these steps were unsuccessful* For instance, a movement of 
preliminary monetary reform to unify China’s currency occurred in 
1395* From 1901 to 1904 some rain attempts were made to Improve the 
existing situation- The "Ten Peculations" and th© Act of "coinage of 
Taels" of 1905 were never put into effect* The "Ecgulatiens for the 
National Coinage” and th© supplementary articles of 1910 helped very 
little* The coinage of the Tuan Shl-kai dollar was the only tangible 
result of the "Bat i one. 1 Currency Hegulotions" of 1914* In 1918, 
although th© "Regulations of gold currency motes” were granted, they 
had never been put into act* From 1918 to 1928, a period of ten 
years, under the series of civil wars, both government and monetary 
reform virtually ceased*
From 1895 to 1928 th© proposals devised either by China’s officers 
or by foreign experts piled mountain high, but non© of them had ever 
been put Into act*
After 1928, under China’s mew National Government, the situation 
took a turn for th© better* For instance, in 1928 a Central Bank was 
set up; in 1950 the system of "Custom Gold Unit** was established; the 
abolishment of th® Haikwan tael began in 1930 and was completed in 
19331 the Central Mint m s  created at Shanghai in 19331 th© "tael” 
system ■was entirely abolished in 1953; and China’s standard dollar was 
coined in the Central Mint In 1933* These were the steps necessary for
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the completion of a uniform natioml-monetary system*
On November 5, 1935, as a result of the changed condition of the 
international standard, the intensified world depression and th© 
critical situation caused by raising the price of silver in the world 
market, the Chinese government announced the abandonment of th© silver 
standard and set up a managed currency system* Under th© managed 
currency system all silver in China was nationalised and th© banknotes 
of the government banks were made full legal tender* For the purpose*, 
©f foreign, exchange, the Central Bank of China pegged the prioe of 
the Chinese standard dollar at th© fixed price of the British Sterling 
and th© American dollar* This new currency policy of China * s brought 
her into closer and more intimate contact with th© modem economic 
world*
CHAPTER I
TBS DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MONETARY SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1898
I* Chines® Background— China, through her scaas four thousand 
years’ history, was a monarchy* The Emperor enjoyed th© sovereign 
power* Hie powers were neither enumerated nor residual* They were 
rested In him as the sovereign throughout th© various dynasties*
The origin of the Chines© ran© remains one of the unsolved prob­
lems of history* It m s  said that the Chinese r&oe earn© from some­
where in Western Asia and settled near the hanks of the Yellow River* 
From generation to generation they moved southward down the area of 
the Yangtse River and the Pearl River and developed into one of the 
countries with the oldest culture in the world*
Chinese historians begin their story with th© age of the Five 
Rules (6* C. 2852-2205), bust the detailed record in Chinese history 
can only be traced to the Chow dynasty (B* C• IX22-220) • This dynasty 
was established in B. C* 1122 and lasted for nine centuries* Through­
out the whole period China under an Emperor m s  really ruled by the 
feudal chieftains* During this period lived th© famous scholars, 
Confucius* Mencius, Laotss* Hotse, and others who set up the founda­
tion of every branch of the political* philosophic* and other doctrines* 
At th® close of th© Chow dynasty, the Emperor Shih Huang-ti (th© 
founder of* the Tsin dynasty— B» C* 220-206) abolished th© federal system 
of th© Chow dynasty in order to centralise th® power in the central 
government and divided th© whole country into thirty-six provinces*
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Ha attempted to destroy the ancient literature in order to weaken the 
conservative influence* He also built the famous Great Wall to prevent 
the Inroads of the Northern Barbarians*
The Han dynasty (B* C* 206-A* D* 251) extended the boundaries of 
the Empire much more* Its education system m s  bant on the preserva­
tion of olassioism, and turned away from the study of nature* Owing 
to the influence of governmental policies th© farmers occupied the 
second place of honor only next to the scholars and the mercantile 
class was next to the laborer* This was probably one of the important 
reasons why commerce was not extended on a larger scale in the past in 
China*
At the close of th© Han dynasty, there was a period of civil war 
fought by the Three Kingdoms* The Three Kingdoms and th© Chin dynasty, 
tinder which there was & long struggle between the Chinese and the North­
ern Barbarians, lasted from A* D* 251 to A* D* 618*
Under the Tang dynasty (A* D* 618-907), the I&npir© was once more 
united and the country entered a period of great prosperity* The civil 
service examination system took on a form which lasted until the over­
throw of the Mane hue dynasty in 1911, and officials were recruited from 
the successful candidates* The Empire was still further enlarged and 
the extent of China proper became approximately what it is at th© 
present day*
At the close of the Tang dynasty cam© another period of internal 
disorder under the five minor dynasties, Liang, Tang, Chin, Han, and 
Chow, lasting from 907 to 960 A* X>*
The Sung dynasty (A* D® 960—1230) followed th© Chow* During th©
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earlier period (about 960*1126} of this dynasty, peace and unity existed 
in tbs whole country* But at tbs last period (1127*1230) the Kim or 
the "Golden Hear da11 occupied the north of China, and the Sung Emperors 
ruled over only the south* During the Sung dynasty there lived a well- 
known social reformer, Wang An-shih, who was the prims minister and who 
nade soias significant proposals in regard to the nationalisation of 
commerce, governmental loans to farmers, income tax, and compulsory 
enrollment of militia* The unpopularity and failure of hie plan were 
due to the deep-rooted conservatism of China at that tine*
After the Sung dynasty, the Tuan or Mongol dynasty (A* D* 1280- 
1363) was established* Owing to the invasion of Russia, Hungary, and 
Poland by the Mongols, the mutual introduction of civilisation and 
the Journeys of travelers and merchants were undertaken on a consider­
able scale • Among the earliest visitors of whom we have authentic 
records were the Polos, especially Marco Polo*
The Ming dynasty (A* 0* 1368-1644) assumed the throne left by 
the Mongol dynasty* The oivil-service examinat ions were revised and 
the government of China assumed the form which it held up to the time 
of the Revolution in 1911* The Emperor had the appointment of the six 
boards of administration, and of the viceroys and governors of the 
provinces* All officials in the provinces down to the district 
magistrate were appointed by the central government* Th© provinces 
were free to administer their local affairs in detail, provided that 
they paid the necessary tribute and followed the general policy of the 
central administration* In the village communities, however, the 
village elder or wtlpaoB was appointed with and by the advice and 
consent of the villagers, represented them In all official and govern-
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menta1 affairs* and was the channel of communioat ion between the offi­
cials and the Tillages.
During the Ming dynasty, adventurers and merchants from Europe 
began to com® by the new sea route (through the Indian sea) recently 
discovered, instead of by the former overland routes (across the Himara 
Mountains and Tibet)•
Owing to a rebellion in China caused by internal dissension*
M&nchus* who earns from the northeastern provinces of China* captured 
Peking and established th© Tsing dynasty (1644*1911)* In the Tsing 
dynasty the Inner Cabinet of the Central Government* the old Council 
of State* was charged with the discussion of state affairs* the promul­
gation of imperial orders* and the conduct of great ceremonials attended 
by the Emperor. The Military Counoil primarily was created for the dis­
cussion of military affairs. The important departments of the Central 
Government were the six boards* one of which was the Board of Revenue. 
Each board was presided ever by two presidents* one Chinese and one 
Hanohu* each with the same authority.
Zn the Board of Revenue (Hu-Pu) there were seven! bureaus and 
committees. However* the re was no special office to take care of the 
imperial currency policy* Subordinate to the Imperial Government were 
the provincial governmente* each with & governor at its head. The 
governors were subject to the will of the Emperor. The heads or the 
imperial governmental departments made the laws which the governors 
wore bound to obey. The governors were appointed by th© Emperor and 
remained in service unless relieved by promotion* retirement, etc* 
Besides th© governors* there were th® Executive Department* and the 
Judicial Department and the Circuit Governor appointed by the Contra!
Government to eo-operate with or assist governors•
The head of the local ga vermnent was the Magistrates seam of who® 
were appointed on the nomination of the governor * some of whom were 
selected by the Department of Civil Service* After the expiration of 
a ter® of ten years the magistrate was usually promoted) otherwise he 
remained in service as long as conditions did not arise* such as pro* 
motion* retirement* etc*
The searching for new markets and opportunity for colonisation of 
new areas by European countries after the industrial revolution brought 
China into more frequent contact with the rest of the world* and made 
more friendly commercial relationships with the outside necessary*
It was in the year 1793* in the reign of Kien-lung of the Tsing dynasty* 
that the first commercial mission to Peking* then the capital of China* 
was sent by King George 111 of England * A consent was officially 
granted for carrying cm trade at Canton by British merchants* Fro® 
then on constant friction arose between the British merchants and the 
provincial officials of China* Finally the first war between China 
and Great Britain* known as the "Opium War*** occurred in 1841-42* A 
second war occurred in 1856-60 between China on one side and France and 
Great Britain on the other* The anti-foreign spirit manifested itself 
in Tientsin in 1870 and on the borders of Yunnan in 1376* In 1884 a 
war broke out with France over a dispute in regard to Tonkin* The 
results of these wars were the signature of unequal treaties* the 
opening of the trade ports* and ceding of territories* As a conse­
quence of the Sin©-Japanese War (1894-95), China gave up Korea*
Formes a and the Pescadores Islands* and opened more trade ports*
Realising China*s weakness, a policy of further aggression m s  pursued 
by the Western Powers* In 1697 Germany seised Kiaoehow, Russia forced 
the Chinese Government to lease Port Arthur, Great Britain obtained 
the lease of Weih&iwei and Frame that of Kwanehow* Italy put in a 
demand fhr Sanman Bay in Chekiang in 1698* It began to look as if the 
partition of China mere ins Tit able*
Awakensd by the strength that Japan had acquired by adopting 
western education and military science, and alarmed by the dangers of 
partition, a band of young reformers persuaded tbs Emperor Kw&ngshu to 
issue the famous reform edicts of 1396* Bub the Empress Dowager by a 
coup d9etat seised the government, put th© reformers ̂ to flight, insti­
tuted a reign of terror, and restored the conservative regime*
XX* Survey of Chinese Monetary System prior to 1898— According to 
the record of the development of China's currency, several instruments, 
which were or are employed by other countries in the world, had been 
adopted in China within the past four thousand years* Generally speak­
ing, even though in the early period of China's history people had once 
used eewries, pearls, gems, and other articles as a medium of exchange, 
copper coins had formed the principal instrument of circulation in 
China for thousands of years* Until the ©lose of th© Tsing dynasty 
and the beginning of the Republic of China, copper still played an 
important part in China's monetary system*
Silver money had existed in China as ©arly as the days of the Hsia 
dynasty (2205-1818 5* C.), but it was not until a considerable amount 
of silver foreign silver dollars flowed into China through th© 
channel of foreign trade from Europe end Mexico, that silver cam© 
into general use as a medium of exchange* Later the improvement of
Chittft’s trad®, both inter regional and international, from year to year 
naturally led to the result that silver money gradually took the plae© 
of copper money as the standard of curreney.
As to paper money, an invention of the Chinese people, the first 
Chinese governmental notes of record were issued under the reign of 
Saparor Hi on-1 sun. (A* B* 806-821) of th© Tang dynasty* Later e&eh 
dynasty used paper money to a great extent for the purpose of financing 
ear or in the time of financial difficulties, but seldom during normal 
peace time* During the last fee decades of the Tsing dynasty, some 
native banks, firms and foreign banks used to issue notes % neverthe­
less* they were limited in extent to & local area*
Cold standard, car the use of gold coin as a national currency, 
never has occurred in China in the past, though gold coin has been 
circulated for short periods by some of the local governments*
Apart from the above brief statement, more detailed information 
regarding each type of money and the development of its us® is still 
needed for the purpose of understanding the monetary situation of 
China up to the year 1898*
A* Copper Money
As to the origin of metallic money in China, several records 
show different dates. In th© Historical Heoord® of Ssu-Ma Chien, it 
is stated that the media of exchange of th© Emperor Shun (3255 B* C*) 
and of the Hsia dynasty (3205-1818 B* G.) were three kinds of metals 
yellow (gold), whit© (silver), and red (oopper). The author of the 
Pen Tsao Kang Mu maintains that the origin of money in China was the 
casting of Pi by the Emperor Yu, who ruled 2205-2197 B* C* Mr* Ma Tuan
s
Lin, in his well-known Wen Helen Tung Kao (polished in A* 0* 1321) 
maintained that money first oem into exist quo a during th© reign of 
Tai Hao, vis*, from 296& B* G* onwards* According to Terrien da 
Laeouperi© ( Catalogs© of Chines© Coins, London, 1392) the first at­
tempt to introduce metallic cuarreuoy in ancient China dates back to 
about 1100 B* C* From these sources, any one of wfrioh is considered 
an authority in its field, it appears probable that China was the
1first of all the countries in the world to create a metallic currency.
There Is no doubt that Hi® copper coins, either round or in other 
shapes, were very popular and have been used for a long time in China« 
Through their development for some four thousand years, a great variety 
of them issued from dynasty to dynasty are described in several books*
"It is probable that no nation has had & greater variety of coinage 
than China, as the total number of Imperial* State, and private issues
gamounts to about ten thousand*" Therefore only the important ones 
will be described here*
The original metallic ourrency of ancient China appeared at first 
as articles of utility, such as spade money, primitive ornaments, and 
rings, and was by natural growth gradually transformed into inscribed 
copper money* la China’s currency development the Invention of the 
inscribed money was Hie first progress in her money system* The first 
round coins with inscription were turned out under the rule of Cheng 
Wang (1315-1079 B. C.), of the Chow dynasty* The inscribed spade money 
dates back to 600 B* C. Th® Pu money mad® its first appearance 476 B<* C«
^sTiCann7 Tte> Currenoioa of China, 1926, Shanghai, p. 673*
2J. H. 8* Lockhart, The Stewart Lockhart Collection of Chinese 
Copper Coins, Shanghai, 19115, p. iv*
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5The introduction of inscribed knife money dates back to 680 B. 0. th© 
round mousy, although it did not gain a© ©xtonjslv® a circulation as th© 
others (pu, knife, and spade money), flourished during the feudal era 
in China under the Chow dynasty, ’most probably because it m s  in appear*” 
u s e  more fiduciary than th© latter, whose shapes were those of imple­
ments of daily use* Various attempts to promote use of th© round money 
proved unsuccessful.**4 The detail regarding the ”Purt will be found in 
"Catalogue of Chinese Coins*” The second step in the development of 
China's currency was mad© by the first Smporor ©f the Tsin dynasty
sag, second king of th© Tohow dynasty, by th© advice of Tai 
Kung of Ts*i, established in 1032 9* G» (it is Bamboo Armais; accord­
ing to common scheme it is 1103 B« C*) certain rules for currency, and 
enacted that metallic pieces should henceforth be exchangeable accord­
ing to their weight**#*Tbe rules were put in force in th© seventh cen­
tury (B* C* 686-646) by th© Duke Hu an of Ts’i (Shantung), then Leader 
Prince of the Chinese States, acting under th© advice of th© celebrated 
Kwan-tse, his Prim© Minister* These rules led gradually to the habit 
of easting regular shapes and siees of constant weights* It is supposed 
that the spade-money was issued by the State of Ts’i*
It is supposed with great probability that the Weight Mosey was 
the regular outcome of the laws enacted by the Leader Prince of the 
Chinese States, circa B* C. 680* The Weight Mosey was found under the 
ground of these towns all of which had been included within the old 
states of Wei and Tchao which arose in 403 B* C*, on th© ruins of the 
former state of Tsen*
The Pu Money was in circulation, for a long period, v Lk *, from the 
sixth to th© third centuiy 3* C*, inclusive..» .The shapes of th© Pu 
Money are distinguished by th© squareness, roundness, or sharpness of 
the lower double parts, or th© roundness of th© upper sides* These 
characteristic a form a convenient means of classification*
The intro duo t ion of the Knif© Money in th® state of Ts’i coterminous 
with Shantung peninsula, is attributed, in a rather legendary way, to th® 
following circumstances, circa 680 B* C* On the eve of an expedition, 
idie soldiers of the Duke Tfwan, of Ts’i, proved dissatisfied with the 
stringent regulations on weights and money which had previously been 
enacted by the Prime Minister Kwan-tse* Thsir General, afraid of their 
being disloyal, granted to them the authorisation of making us® of their 
metal knives for barter* The people were delighted with the innovation, 
which was giving them a more convenient medium of exchange, and adopted 
it eagerly* (Terrien be Lacouperie, Catalogue of Chines© Coins, London, 
1892, pp. 4, 18, 31, 213*)
*Ibid*, p. 319*
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which succeeded 13a© Chow dynasty in the control of China* 1© prohibited 
tbs us© of oowries* tortoise-shells, pearls, gems and tin for currency 
purposes* A new and more convenient; bronze coinage* Inscribed "Ban- 
liang” (meaning half a tael^ in weight) in round pieces with a square 
hole* was introduced instead* Th© issues of th© "half-tael* or "Baa­
lisms* coins must have been very large since they were by no means un­
common in th© market a few years ago* Under th® Western Hen dynasty—  
206 B* C* to A* D* 24 (the early part of th® Han dynasty) th© "Ban 
Xiang currency in circulation had* through excessive debasement* been 
deteriorated to such on extent* that it was decided by the authorities 
to withdraw all the metallic cur rone y from e iroulation* in order to 
replace it by a uniform coin* In 113 B. C* the famous Wu-tschu cash 
(5/24 of a tael) was created* They remained in circulation* side by 
side with all other Issues* for upwards of 700 years* The Wu-tsohu 
oash cams to an end at the beginning of th® Tang dynasty (A* D» 618)* 
Another change was made by the Tang dynasty (A* D. 018-607) which began 
the issue of the coins inscribed in square modern character a# Further­
more, the coins issued by th© Tang dynasty were inscribed with th® title 
of the ruling Emperor* The type persisted through th© Sung dynasty 
(A* B* 960-1126}* varied by occasional Issues of coins of larger si as, 
but generally were of standard size* These issues also were made in 
sufficient quantities for th® needs of the people* Th© Southern Sung 
dynasty (A. X>« 1127-1280) and th© Golden Tartars (A# D* 1116-1234} which 
then controlled Korthem China Issued fiew coins; and the Tuan dynasty*
®Th© *taelff of th© Han dynasty is about th© sixth of th® tael in 
the close period of the Tsing dynasty. (Terrien Do Laoouperie, Cata­
logue of Chinese Coins* London* 1892, pp. xlii-xliii) '
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"th© Mongols (A* D. 1260-1366), issued still smaller quantiti©s of th© 
copper coins, because they mainly issued fiduciary paper money. After 
the Yuan dynasty, the Ming dynasty then came Into power (A* D. 1368- 
1642) and under the early rulers were one® compelled to continue th® 
paper issues and put out-some is sties of copper token coinage. But 
■ later the finances were restored to a normal condition and th® cur­
rency established on a sound basis. For two and a half centuries th© 
Ming Government kept the people fully supplied with circulating media 
of standard sis© and weight.
When the Manchus came to the throne, they continued to adopt the 
financial and monetary systems of th© Mngs. The earliest issues of 
coinage by the first Mamohu Emperor, Shen-ohih (A. D» 1644-1661), bore 
inscriptions only in Chinos®, the first issues having on the rovers® 
only the mint name, the second having in addition th® value on© 
thousandth of a tael of si Ivor. Toward th© end of his reign th® coin® 
bore th© saint name in Chines© and Manchu* His successor Kang-hi (A. D. 
1662-1722) continued the bi-lingual inscriptions through the whole of 
his reign, but toward th© end of the reign the two mints at Peking, 
those of the Board of Revenue (fiu-pu) and th© Board of Works (Kung-pu), 
issued coins bearing on th© reverse the mint name and the word, ^cur­
rency" in Manchu only. Th© coins of Yung-ohmg (A. H. 1723-1736) are 
inscribed on th© obverse in Chines® awd on the rovers© in Manohu only, 
and this practice continued to the end of th® dynasty. ** it is in this 
reign that the coinage of China may be considered to have reached it® 
highest point, in size and weight, in quality of metal and in elegance 
of inscriptions previous dynasties and previous reigns had ©quailed it
It
in some one or more of these qualities, but not in the combination of 
all* The Sh«i~chih coins wor® generally 0*95 to 1*05 inches and those 
of Kang-hi 1*00 to 1*10 inches in diameter, mad© of a rich light-brown 
bronse*"^ Later under the reigns of Ohien-lung (1735-1795), Ghia- 
ching (1795-1820), end T&o-Kuang (1820-1860), the cash coins issued 
were inferior to the issue of the previous reigns, both in si 2 0 and 
In weigit* Bub the currency system was still of normal shape* From 
1851, when the Taiping rebellion broles out, the money situation gradu­
ally got out of control* Later (1898) the series of conflicts within 
the country and with foreign countries made the confusion much more 
serious•
B* Silver
1* History of China * s Silva r--In the Book of History it is stated
that during the Hsia dynasty (B* C« 2205-18X8) silver overflowed from
the hills* Silver with gold and copper wore used as money as early a®
Sthe dynasties of Hsia and Bhang, It is safe to say that silver was 
known to exist in China as a medium of payment nearly four thousand 
years ago* But silver became the main instrument of exchange and 
standard of value in China only during the past century* Owing to th© 
small quantities of silver produced within the borders of old China, 
its uses were rathe r limited during th© early years* For instance, in 
the Tang dynasty Chines© native silver was found in several locali­
ties* But during the three centuries of the Tang dynasty, the produce
®H* B • Morse, “Currency in China* '* Journal of the or th-China 
Branch of the Boyal Asiatic Society, ShaugKaT7~Vol» 38, XsUS’, pi 7*
^Eduard torn. The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p. 352.
®Wen Pin Wei, Th© Currency Problem in China, 1914, p* 2*
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of Chinsse silver mass was not more than the fifteenth part of th®
amount of silver now reoeivad from foreign ©amitries by China in on©
9year*
Furthermore the working; of silver mines in China was always sub­
ject to permission from the Emperor* Such permission was granted* but 
often withdrawn again* For ins tan®©, in X44D9 1520* and X584 a general 
prohibition of silver mining was declared for the country; in 1463* 
1473* 1511 and 1568 partial interdiets were declared in certain 
provisoes* In 1430 the mines in Yunnan proviso© were reopened* In 
1556 the government encouraged silver mining* In fact th© silver 
deposits in China were not capable of contributing any appreciable 
proportion of the country1® silver requirements* and the hopelessly 
small quantities of silver produced were obtained mostly as a by­
product from the refinery of lead or sine*
Silver coins occurred in early years in China at many different 
times* But for several reasons they were never widely distributed 
and continued for a considerable period* For instance*
In ths fourth year of the period Yuen-show (119 B* 0*) in 
Han dynasty & currency of whits metal and deer-skin was mad©*.** 
The whlte-metaL currency consisted of three types of pieces of a 
different sis® and form, made of tin and silver melted together, 
and of a nominal value, far beyond the intrinsic *
The end of this medal-like currency was sad* They were coun­
terfeited on a great scale by th© people* Their value diminished 
rapidly, th® Emperor ceased to issue them, and before th© end of 
a year after they had boen first omitted, they were no more ac­
cepted in circulation.
^J* Edkixis, Chinese Currency, Shanghai, 1901, p* 52.
•^Terries D© Lacouperi©, Catalogue of Chines© Coins, London, 1892, 
pp. 556-359*
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At the end of the West Han dynasty, Wang Mang in A. B* 10 brought
about radical changes in the currency* He suppressed 'th© Wu-tohu oash,
the standard currency of the Han dynasty, and replaced it by new
monies in gold, silver, tortoise-shells, cowries and copper. The
silver currency was made in unit® of a liu, having a weight of eight
liangs, and their value varied according to the purity of the motsd * ^
The silver coins went out of favor at th© end of Wang Maag * s reign,
after A* S>* 26* From then until about A. D. 1183, during the reign of
Hiao-tsung, the second Emperor of the Southern Sung dynasty, China
misted silver coins again* There were five kinds weighing 1, 2, 8, B,
and 10 taels respectively, each tael passing for 2,000 cash* They
could be used as official and commercial currency, and served equally
12as metallic reserve for the paper notes* After three year® * trial
the coinage of silver in China was abandoned, and it remained dormant
13for about eight centuries* Th© abandonment of the coins mentioned
above was due to clipping and counter fitting by some people, and to
the manufacture of inferior imitation coins by others. In A. B. 1200
an edict declared that the co ins referred to would cease to b© legal 
14tender* nA silver coin, an exact model of the cash of th® reign,
was issued during the reign of the Ming Emperor ft anil (A* D. 15Y3~
1619), but this was probably a mint sport, much like th© English
„16silver pennies issued to-day*
^Ibid., p. 381.
B. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, London,
1913, pp. 143-44*
Kama, The Currencies of China, 1926, Shanghai, p. 176.
^Ibid., p. 237.
16H# 0# Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, London,
1913, p. 144.
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Besides these meationed above* there were several local silver 
coins round in China within the past two centuries. In Tibet (on© of 
the Chinese provinces)* silver coins were minted in 1793# by order of 
the Chinese Government representation. These coins were directed to 
be east of pure syoee silver in two denominations; 1 chien and 6 fen#
i.e.# l/lQ and 5/100 of one tael. In Hsin-kiang (Chines© Turksstan) 
tael coins of silver were minted In Urumchi in denominations of one 
tael* five* four# three* two and one m e ©  coins. As early as 1335 in 
Fukien province there was an attempt to produce a silver coin for cir­
culation in that provisos. It was said to have weighed 617 grains.
One side showed the image of the God of Longevity and an Inscription 
denoting that it was a cake of pure silver weighing seven mace and two 
candareenc (that is# 0.72 kuping tael) and that It had been oast during 
the reign of Tao-kwang (1820-1850). At the same time another silver 
coin was issued for the purpose of paying the troops stationed in 
Fukien and Formosa. The coin bore the inscription *pur® silver for 
current use from tbs Changohcw Commissariat; seven mao©* two oanda-
reens •* At that time China had no dollar piece of her own* all such
16coins circulating in the ports being of foreign origin. These local 
issues had no important Influence on Chizia*s monetary system. It was 
not until 1887 that the first attempt to establish a mint with proper 
organisation end machinery was made at Canton. This will be considered 
in detail later.
As to the inflow of silver Into China* It may be said general ly
v g —£. Kami# The Currency of China# Shanghai# 1926* p. 238; and 
S. R. Wagel* Chinese CurrenoyHmd Banks* Shanghai, 1915* p. 64.
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that before the opening of maritime trade with European©,, silver came
from India, Burma and so forth, after maritime trad© from Europe and
America* As early as ”000 A* D* gold and silver were in circulation
about Canton* Tribute and commerce from Cochin China and Cambodian
cities brought silver to China, as it was produced abundantly in
17Burma and was a familiar circulating medium in India*” After a con­
siderable amount of silver flowed in, through the channels of commerce 
and from contributions from local to the central government * it gradu­
ally spread over the country* In 1035 silver was recognised as legal 
tender for the payment of taxes in a decree under the Sung dynasty 
which provided that "Fukien, Kwang-tung and Kwangsl provinces might 
send silver, and Chekiang could contribute silk, while most portions 
of the empire could pay in copper cash*"^
Silver in China became a general medium of exchange after 
1225 A* D., when it became sufficiently plentiful in North China to
displace the paper money of the Golden Tartars* Probably ” four-
19fifths" of the silver "came from Western Asia*” The opening of 
maritime trade with Europeans, first with the Portuguese in 1517, 
then the Spaniards in 1575, and later on with other countries, brought 
in large quantities of foreign silver, mostly Spanish pieces of eight, 
generally spoken of as "pesos" or "Carolus dollars*” "This Spanish 
coin, made from silver taken from the mines of Mexico and Peru and 
generally minted at Mexico city or Potose, was the coin that the
^Toloatt Williams, "Silver in China," Armais of the American 
Academy, May 1897, p* 45.
% M d * , p. 46*
19Ibid*, p. 48*
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Yank®* sailing ships carried to the Far East in th© trad® that laid
9 f Vthe basis of many a Eew England fortune «75
After Mexico won its independence, the Carolus dollar was no 
longer coined; "but it remained the only coin widely us®d in whole­
sale business in China until the 1850*s» when it was replaced by the
new dollar of the Republic of Mexico9 known as *eagl® dollar* from the
21figure of an eagle holding a snake in its mouth* u It had enjoyed 
prestige among many other foreign dollars circulating in China, since 
the passing of the Carolus dollar* A detailed discussion regarding 
the foreign coins in China will be found in the following pages*
low the questions should be considered? T0iy does silver flow into 
China? How much silver has already flowed into China? In answer to 
the first question, three main causes oan be noted? (1) In the early 
years of foreign trade, even as late as 1880, China’s exports of tea 
and silk were always more than the imports of foreign goods* The 
balance was, in most cases, paid in silver* In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century the balance of trad® was uniformly unfavorable to 
China* Owing to political and. other causes, China started to borrow 
heavily from foreign countries; therefor® export of silver became un­
necessary in spite of the le.rg© increase of imports over exports*
(2) The sums spent on the construction of railways, ©to*, were obtained 
by borrowing from foreigners, and the sums invested by foreigners in 
business have settled the unfavorable balance to no less extent*
W* Fetter, "China and the Flow of Silver,T? Geographical 
Review, Vol. 26, Jan*, 1926, p* 34*
^Ibid*, p. 34*
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(3) Another point is that a stuĉ y of th© statistics of trad© retums 
will show that the larger portion of the exports of treasure from 
China goes in gold* ©speoi&lly leaf gold*2S
In answer to the second qu© sti on, there is no available informa­
tion, even in the form of estimates* beo&use before th® development of 
maritime trad© no official record had been left regarding silver 
which flowed across the borders* After th® beginning of maritime 
trade* even "down to the second half of th® nineteenth, century* the 
actual amount of silver imported can only be estimated* ’’With the 
establishment of the Imperial Maritime Customs* imports and exports 
of silver were regularly checked and tabulated* But a certain amount
of treasure has always escaped Customs notice* so that the actual
23movement has been greater than that recorded*" Some incomplete 
figures are cited here in order to throw li^ht on th© importation of 
silver into China. Mr* 15* B« Morse estimated that the total importa­
tion of silver into China from 1700 to 1830 was not less than |600*- 
000*000* With the expansion of th© opium trad® th® favorable balance 
disappeared because of the large quantity-of opium imported* In 1837* 
shortly before the opium war, opium constituted 5? per cent of th© 
total value of th© imports at Canton* While there are no aoourat® 
figures available immediately after th® opium war, Sir Robert Ciffen 
held that there was an excess of imports over exports of' silver in 
China* This excess was of ii6*300*000 in 1877* the largest balance of 
th© twenty-so van years h© studied®^ Mr* C* &» Remer estimated and put
*Z3. R. Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking* Shanghai* 1915* pp. 
45-46._̂°Tang* Leang-le, China9e Row Currency System* Shanghai, 1936, p. 97* 
2%en Pin $io, ”The Currency Problem in China*’1 1914* p. 35*
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180,000,000 Haikwan taels as the total amount of silver imported into 
China from 1871 to 1898*^®
2* Foreign Coins in China— ‘Tbs replacement of th® irregular pieces 
of silver of different purity and the heavier copper coins by the 
machine-made silver coins of regular appearance and uniform touch is 
■fee natural tendency in the history of social development of nations* 
Since China did not have her own silver coins before 1890, she had a 
great deal of trouble in using oopper coins and piece® of silver^ with 
the development of domestic and foreign trade the inflow and prevalence 
of foreign silver coins and the coining of her own silver were logical 
results* It is said that the Portuguese and th® Spaniards brought dol­
lars into China as early as -the seventeenth century* But according to 
one record, it was the Carolus (Spanish) dollar, also called the "Pillar" 
dollar, that first came to China* For many years this was the only 
foreign coin accepted by th® Chinese in th© eighteenth eentury— even 
up to the early decades of th© nineteenth oentuiy* the introduction 
of the foreign dollar was also mad© easier by th© fact that Canton was 
the central seaport open to th© foreign trad® for nearly a century after 
1757* During the succeeding decades these coins cosmianded a premium of 
30 or even 40 per cent* over their bullion value, until the Mexican 
dollar flowed in and took their place a© the coin widely used In whole­
sale business in China about 1854* The Mexican dollar, known as th® 
"eagle dollar,'1 began to be coined in 1824, and in a few decades was 
the most widely used coin in th© world# It reached China in 1854, when
£• Remer, The Foreign Trad© of China, 1928, pp* 222-23*
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the shortage of Carolus dollars (the minting of which had ceased in 
Mexico about thirty years previously) in China was being keenly felt*
ogThe Mexioan dollars spread rapidly in the country. Many other foreign
dollars have circulated in China, but non© since th© passing of the
Carolus dollar has ever enjoy©d th® prestige or the popularity of the
Mexican dollar. Among th® other foreign dollars the United States of
America in 1873 authorized a "trade dollar" for us® in the Far East,
especially in China* The French, British, and Japanese took similar
action* The American trad© dollar containing a weight of 378 grains
of pure silver as compared with 3??4 grains of pur® silver contained
in the Mexican dollar, gained wide cirdulation in the principal Chinese 
27trade ports. It soon became a serious rival to the Mexican dollar.
Later on the serious decline in the price of silver (©specially in
1877) reached such a point that the silver in a trad© dollar was vjorth
not only less than a gold dollar, but also less than th© depreciated
paper dollars of th© United States. As a consequence, large numbers
28of th© trade dollars moved back to America. Besides th© decline of
the price of silver, another cause leading to the disappearance of th©
American trad© dollar is that the superior weight of th© Amerioan trad©
dollar, as compared with th© Mexican, induced th© people of the Orient 
29to melt it. It was said that the total amount presented for redemption
26«3y. X911 the number of Mexican dollars circulating In China had 
reached some 500 millions, and th© liang of silver, as a unit, was begin­ning to disappear." (Tang, Leong-1®, China’s Hew Currency System, Shang­
hai, 1936, p. 23) ~  ~ ~ ~
^"Nearly 30,000,000 pieces had gone to China." (Hall Carothors, Fractional Money, Hew York, 1930, p. 280.
^A.Vsatt And res, "The End of the Mexican Dollar," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. May 1904, pp. 329-331.
E. Kann, The Currency of Hhirn, 1928, p. 300.
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Aggregated. 7,689*036 dollars, and th© balance of the entire amount
produced in the United States, vi a 128,276,888, has never been re-
SOturned to the homeland.
The French authorities, after Jndo-China became a French colony 
in 1362, decided to strike their own silver dollars with a view to dis­
placing th© Mexican and the American trade dollars. From 1886 to 1898 
on© kind of the Saigon dollar containing 378 grains of pure silver was 
issued to a sum of more than 13,000,000 Saigon piastres. Owing to 
their superiority over the Mexican dollars, they were cither hoarded 
or melted down* In 1895 smother Saigon piastre containing 375 grains 
of pur© silver was struck. Between A. B* 1895 and 1903 over 55 million 
dollars of the new series were struck* The Yunnan province of China 
has adopted it as part of its medium of circulation*
Th© Japanese Government *s Mint at Osaka, by a law of May 10, 1871, 
started to coin the "Yen4* which were 374 Z/b grains of pure silver* 
Owing to th© inferior weight of the yen, th© Mexioan dollar still con­
tinued to circulate freely throughout Japan* In consequence the 
Japanese Government raised th© weight of th© silver yen from 374 2/6 
to 378 grains in order to make it harmonize with, th© American trade 
dollar* But in 1878, Japan discontinued th© heavier trade yen and 
reverted to the production of the lighter coin. This latter was to 
be legal tender throughout Japan* Between 1871 and 1897 more than 166 
million silver yen were produced, of which over 110 millions had been 
shipped abroad. Gradually it had succeeded in ousting the Mexican 
dollar from Japan and in becoming its serious competitor in th© prin­
cipal ports of China, Korea, French Indo-China and Siam.
^°Ibid.,~p. 301*
As to the British trads dollar * in 'A. I>* 1866 it was coined la 
Hongkoqg* Its contents of pur© silver were three grains less than the 
standard of th© Mexican dollar* For this reason it circulated in China 
only at a discount• In 1868 Hongkong authorities sold th© entire Mint 
machinery to Japan* Altogether only 2,000,000 British dollars were 
struck at Hongkong* In 1896 th© British Government authorised th©
Mints of Bomb8̂* and Calcutta to mint British dollars* Th© new coin 
gained wide circulation In the Straits Settlements, Hongkong, ©to.
It oireulatsd in certain ports of South China and Uorth Cina* But it 
was sewer current in Shanghai*
Other foreign coins, such as the Spanish Philippine dollar of 
1897, Austrian Maria Theresia Thaler of 1781, Bolivian, Chilean and 
Peruvian dollars, ©to*, have at times been found in circulation in 
China* But they had played minor parts in that theater*
C. Paper Money
The employment of paper or th© skin of animals as one kind of
implementing medium In China goes back for many years* According to
the historical record, in the reign of Wu-ti (119 B. C®) of th© Han
dynasty, th© printed squares of deer skin worth 400,000 cash ©piece
were issued* For the deer-skin pieces feudal princes and noblemen
had to pay 400,000 copper cash, as they were compelled to wear them
as badges of honor, without which entrance to Court and audience by the
31gmperor could not be obtained* Thus they were just a sort of token 
or badge made in view of a narrower circulation*
3 1 D* Laoouperi©, Catalogue of Chinese Coins, London, 1892, p*
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The earliest period in which paper money is known to have been 
issued is about 806 A* D* The causes that led to th© adoption of the 
paper money seres
(l) In the latter part of the 8th. century and also in the 
beginning of the 9th. oentujy coinage m s  irregular. Th© supply 
of cash was insufficient due to want of mstal to coin with as 
also the very slow process of minting* (II) Th© iron coins in 
Szechuan were very inconvenient on account of th© weight. People 
soon found that some method must b© adopted. The authorities 
wer© approached and an understanding was arrived at that the 
government office would give a certificate of deposit in ex­
change for coins, and that such certificate should have the same 
value as mosey** ..An ancient Chinese historian said that "Because 
the merchants could travel or carry on trade relations is distant 
places with light equipment, this new currency cam© to be called 
the flying money*32
The Emperor Hien-tsung (A* P. 806*821) on account of th© scarcity 
of cash, in about A* B* 821 issued an edict prohibiting th© manufacture 
of copper utensilsj and, to provide for th© monetary stringency, opened 
offices at the Capital at which merchants could deposit their coin* 
receiving in exchange government notes called b̂onds'* or "flying 
money*j th© offices represented the different provinces, and th© notes 
were redeemable at the proper provincial Capital*33
The next occasion on which paper began to have currency value was 
in 960 A* B. In the Sung dynasty which adopted the system of "flying 
money* these notes, which wer© Issued by th® provincial offices in the 
Capital and redeemed in the proper provinces, beoams generally current 
and very popular, and the Government of the Sung dynasty began to make 
issues expressly for general circulation* Th© Government made every
**S. R. Wage 1P Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p* 63. 
^E* 8* Morse, "Currency in China," Journal of the Morth-Chlna 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. $8, 19067 p. 18} J. Edwins, 
Chine se~urreno y, 1961, p<T~251 aid S. E* Wagal, Chinese Currency and 
Banking, 191S, p. 63*
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effort to secure these notes against depreciation. According to 
Mr* M& Tuan-lin, the amount in actual circulation at any period 
during the early years of the Sung dynasty never exceeded 2,830,000 
Kuan (the Kuan being nominally worth 1,000 cash)* These notes were 
called in Chinese nPi©n-ohienn (as the term denotes ’’convenient 
money") * ^
The later period of the Sung dynasty (from th© reign of the Kao* 
tsung in 1130 A* B* till the conquest of the whole country by the 
Mongols) saw China divided into two partes the Sung Court holding th© 
Southern part and the Chin Tartars ruling over th© North* They were 
constantly at war with each other and both of them had to issue in­
controvertible paper money for the purpose of revenue*
The Kuan-tse or Frontier Bills were is sued by the Southern Sung 
dynasty to pay the troops stationed on the frontier* These bills had 
to be forced into circulation and consequently were heavily discounted.
Besides the Frontier Bills the Government also issued tea notes, 
grain notes, and silk notes, exchangeable for tea, grain, and silk*
In 1159 the Government invented th© Hui-tz© in order to replace 
all other notes in ciroul©tion* Th© Hul-ts® of several denominations 
were again practically forced on the people*
In about 1263 A* P. th© Hui-tse was everywhere utterly discredited? 
so th© Government revived the Kuan-t z© which were of two denominations-- 
silver copper* About sixteen years after th© revival of th© Kusm- 
t*©, the Southern Sung dynasty cam© to an end*
R. Wagel, Chinas© Currency said Banking, p. St.
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The Chin Tartars ruled Barthern China and issued several kind® of 
cash notes of both the large and the small denominations for use in 
both 11 large paymente" and ”small, payments,* But the currency of th© 
Chin Tartars was better controlled and centralised than that of their 
neighbors.
After the Mongols completely conquered all of China in 1279 and
set up the Tuan dynasty (1279-1567) they repudiated both the "Chao*
of the Chins and all th© paper currency of th© Southern Sungs. But
the Tuans continued their own issue and In 1287 the new series of
35Government notes called the Pao-Chao of Chin-Yuan were issued.
These notes were of eleven denominations from 5 to 2*000 cash. In 
1309 the Chin-ta-ohao was issued with denominations from 2 cash to 
2 taels of silver. During the reign of Jen-tsung (1312-1321) there
interesting account of the paper currency of the Tuan dynasty 
by Marco Polo Is quoted as follows!
• .The thin rind between the bark and the interior wood is taken* 
and from It cards are formed like those of paper, all bl&ok. He then 
causes them to be cut into pieces, and each is declared worth respec­
tively half a liver, a silver grosso Venice, and so on to th© value of 
10 Bezants. All these cards are stamped with his seal, and many are 
fabricated that they buy all the treasures in th© world. He makes all 
his payments in them, and circulates them through the kingdoms and 
provinces over which he holds dominion* and none dares to refuse them 
under pain of death. All the nations under his st|ay (such as Persia, 
Russia, and almost all provinces of China) receiv© and pay this money 
for their merchandise, gold, silver, and precious stones, and whatever 
they tram port, buy or sell* The merchants often bring to him goods 
worth 400,000 Bepants, and he pays them, all In thsse cards, which they 
willingly accept, because they can raak© purchases with them throughout 
the whole Empire..•.When any of the cards are torn or spoiled, the 
owner Garries them to the place whence they wor© issued and receives 
fresh ones, with a reduction of 3 per eent....If a man wishes gold or 
silver to make plate, girdles, or other ornaments, he goes to th© 
office, carrying a sufficient number of cards, and gives thorn in pay­
ment for the quantity which he requires. This Is the reason why the 
Khan (Emperor of th® Yuan dynasty) has more treasure than any other 
lord in the World....* (Wen Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in China, 
1914, Columbia University., p. 26)
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was an over issue of notes* Not including th® issues of Kiao-cha© 
(1260)* & total issue of irredeemable paper money in sixty-four of 
the first seventy years of Mongol rule amounting to 47,611,276 ting 
or 2,580,565,800 taels nominal f&oe value was made, the tael being 
always taken as equivalent to 1,000 cash*
When the Ming, dynasty was establishing its power in the country, 
it followed th© example of its predecessors and repudiated all the paper 
currency that was issued during the reigns of the Mongols* Later on 
the first Ming Emperor found himself confronted by great financial dif­
ficulties and was compelled t© resort to the paper currency system of 
his predecessors* Notes were issued by th© Government, while at the 
same time steps were taken to place the country's finances on a sound 
basis* ffilh the help of an inflow of more silver through the channel 
of foreign trade, the credit of the Government was reinstated* But 
among the people there was no confidence in paper money* In the fol­
lowing reigns of the Ming dynasty efforts were often made to reestab­
lish paper currency} but practically everyone of them failed*
In the early period of the Tsing dynasty the paper is buss had been 
tried* At last they were condemned* It was not until the financial 
straits grew acute on account of the Taiplng Rebellion (1880-1864) and 
the general unsatisfactory economic situation that an attempt was made 
to resuscitate the issue of paper money. It was during the troubled 
times of Mem-fing (1851—1861) when the issue of tokon coins, iron 
coins, and the issue of paper money— nominally redeemable but in prac­
tice never redeemed— was made* Notes issued in this time to the value 
of 1, 3, 6, 10, arri 50 taels In silver, and also paper worth 500, 1000,
n
1500 and 2000 in e&sh, war© forced into circulation about 1356* After 
fir# years the notes depreciated very heavily and circulated at only 
three or four per oent* of th© face value * Th® Government was unable 
to redeem them, and as a matter of fact practically repudiated these 
notes*
6« Gold In China 
Chinese people, like people of other countries, understood and 
appreciated the superior feat\res of gold* The endeavors of people to 
extract the precious metal from Chinese soil continued for many thousand 
years, but all attempts to find appreciable quantities resolved them- 
solvoa into merely false ambitions* Recently the adoption of scien­
tific mining, methods was not capable of altering the disappointing 
results* Therefore from one source the following conclusions as to 
the production of gold were reached*
It is not at all unlikely that the early settlers in China had 
better returns from the same occupations (of washing gold) because 
the gold had accumulated in the river sands through countless ages 
before their arrival* The gold-washers of to-day, with probably 
very few local exceptions, earn less than the lowest wages which 
they ean get for ordinary labour, and take to that occupation in 
those seasons only when there is the least demand for field work*
We can therefore safely conclude that (with those few exceptions) 
the greater the yield in gold, the greater will be the poverty of 
any one province*
Gold was never declared legal tender in China* Bit gold, umalnted, 
was recognized in China as early as 1816 B* C« as a measure of values 
and subsequently as a suitable medium for circulation,^ Its use as 
such did not influ©nee copper cash from remaining th© principal eur~
*6S. K*nn, Th* Currsnoien of China, Shanghai. 1926. t'« 118.
57V. aopra, p. 7
rency; but gold was occasionally employed in setticausixfc of largo pay­
ments*
While gold coins war© nover actually issued for circulation through­
out the entire dominion of China, sine© 1850 th© following gold coins 
have been struck for circulation in a certain area and for certain 
periodst
1* the tael gold coins of the Taiping Rebellion, xrainsorlbedj
2* the Turkestan gold tilla is sued by the Mohammedan Rebellion 
and which bore the Mohammedan year 1292 on both sides, which means A* D. 
1874*
In China gold Is a favored form of investment because besides its 
favorable features, such as not deteriorating in substance, never losing 
its value through change of fashion, being easily hidden in case of 
danger, and offering the possibility of a chance to sell at a profit 
(in China gold is an article of trade toe and subject to wide fluctua­
tions in price), gold is a very preferable ornament;, ©specially from
58the viewpoint of Chinese ladies*
The principal forms in which gold money usually is found in China
are*
1* Chinese minor gold coins (such as Turkestan gold tilla)}
2* Foreign gold coins;
5* Jewelry;
^"Chinese jewellry made from gold is as nearly as possible 1,000 
fine and very soft* Like gold bars and gold leaves, gold ornaments 
(rings, bangles, bracelets, ©to*) bear th© inscription '•bsu-tsu* meaning 
pure gold, and have the name of the gold smith's shop embossed*••• They 
are acquired with the knowledge of their Intrinsic value and because they 
are easily hoarded in case of danger and quickly pawned or sold in the 
hour of need* The usual gold ornaments in China are purchased and sold 
by weight, the fineness being uniform end known* (£* Kenn, The 6urren- 
elea of China, Shanghai, 1926* p. 56)
m
4* Gold dust from the gold washers;
5* Gold leaves (at Canton gold leaves near 1,000 fine are Bad©*
Th© purpose for which gold in this shape is produeed is chiefly to 
enable people with small Beans to acquire gold in moderate quanti­
ties and to enable them to hide it conveniently or to carry it un-
39noticed on the person)§
6* Gold bars (gold in the shape of bars plays a most important
role in China* Gold bars have become of enormous importance to the
financial markets in China, notably to those of Shanghai* They are
sold for actual deliveiy by Chines© holders to banks, ■who will buy,
. 40whenever the parity permits it, for export abroad)*
The transactions in gold bar in China, ©specially in Shanghai 
(vhere the Shanghai Gold Stock Exchange, Ltd* Is located) are taking 
place with one of the following objects in views
1* Speculation (purely with the idea of either receiving or paying 
differences on the date due);
2* As a hedge against the fluctuations of foreign currencies con­
tracted for forward delivery;
3* As a hedge against goods to be imported or exported in gold 
currency, for whieh exchange has not been fixed with a bonk;
4* To deliver the gold bars with the idea of having these shipped 
abroad*
As to the value of the gold, in the Han dynasty gold was cheap, 
due In large part to the fact that Buddhist image worship had not then 
created a demand for this metal* In th© Tang dynasty on© unit of gold
Kami, The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p* 32*
^Ibid*, p. 40*
m
was worth 10 unit9 of silver or 1,000 units of copper.^ Bven to A* 0*
1375 gold was still mentioned as ten times the value of silver* In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the silver price of gold in China
followed the fluctuation of the silver price of gold In the world market*
During the last period of the eighteentiftsuad nineteenth centuries the
silver price of gold in China gradually went up* In 1892 gold was 25*3
times the prioe of silver* The following table shows the tendency of
43the appreciation of gold from 1892 to 1900s
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According to the quotations of the London market for forty years, 
beginning with 1833, the average price of bar silver remained at about 
60 pence per standard ounce* From 1874 to 1893 the average price was
50 pence per standard ounce* From 1893 the tendency of the gold price
A4of silver in London is shown as follows 1 ~
1893 average 35 9/4.6
1894 11 28 15/16
1895 " 29 13/16
1896 " 30 13/16
1897 tt 27 9/16
1898 K 26 15/16
Concerning China's foreign trad© in gold, gold exported from China 
was much more than gold imported by her from foreign countries* From
4iy> iafr<l> p# 48#
^ I n  1782 gold varied its price according to quality between 1§| 
and 20 times that of th© same amount of silver* (j. Edkins, Chinese Currency. Shanghai, 1901, p. 83).
*&Xbid., p* 83.
^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint (U. S.), 1939, p. 86.
a i
1688 to 1899 alone tor not exports of gold roootod 76 millions of
45Saikw&n taels of silwr*
M* Bratter, Sllrer Market Dictionary9 p® 18®
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THE BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION AROUND 1808
I* Th® Governmental Finance— Th© reign of the Tsing dynasty (1644- 
1911) oan be divided, on th© basis of the nature of the financial situa­
tion, into two periods* The period from 1644 to 1893 may be called 
normal, because the revenues of governments were generally sufficient 
to meet the expenditures in a systematic manner. The period from 1894 
until the end of the Tsing dynasty Is abnormal in the sense that the 
government was forced to increase expenditures at the same time that 
revenue from taxation remained constant* The government deficit was 
occasioned mostly by borrowing from foreign countries*
Among all classes of expenditures, the military stood In the first 
rank* Next cams the expenditures for civil administration* Third, the 
Emperor and his family were extravagant and thus were a great consumer 
of public revenues* The Board of Revenue made the permanent appropria­
tions, according to the order of importance, for various functions* In 
addition there were extraordinary and unimportant outlays* The finan­
cial difficulty in China after 1893 arose from the huge expenditures 
which increased to more than the permanent appropriations and also 
from the annual payment of the interest and principal on foreign loans.
The public revenues provided to meet th © appropriations were con­
e-
trolled partly by central and partly by local officials* First, th© 
land tax, which was levied in every province, was divided into two parts* 
One part of it was dedueted by the magistrate for the district expendi­
tures and was called the reserve fundi the other part which was collected
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by the magistrate and required to be sent to the Executive Department
in the provincial capital, was known as the transport fund* Owing to
the fact that the land tax maintained the district (Hsian) magistracy,
supported the prefecture administration, nourished the circuit governor,
and fed the provincial authorities, only a fraction of th© land tax was
1returned to the Central Government* All other sources of revenues,
such as salt royalties, maritime customs duties end regular customs
duties, were national in character and were administered by special
officers under the supervision of th© governor. These revenues, together
with the transport fund of the land tax, constituted the available re*
sources for meeting both national and provincial appropriations* As soon
as the appropriations had been approved by the Emperor, those provinces
whose revenues exceeded thsir expenditures were required to transport
their surplus revenue8 to Peking or to provinces in less fortunate cir- 
2cuastanoes*
The land tax was paid both in money and in produce, mostly rice*
Th© officers and troops in th© different provinces received a part of 
thsir pay out of the collected produce of their respective provinces, 
while those in Peking were entitled to get their respective partial 
payments in produce from th© Central Government which received the 
produce from certain great producing provinces* The quantity to be 
supplied by any particular province was legally prescribed, and no
----- T--------
C* 8* Li, Central and Local 1*inaneo in China, Columbia University, 
1922, p* 56*
^S* K. Chon, "The System of Taxation in China in the Tsing Dynasty, 
1644-1911,** 1914, p. 35*
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deduction oar commutation of money was permitted* {This system was eon*
tinusd until 1901 when the legal quantity of produce had been commuted
to money in order to save the extravagant cost of canal transportation*)
Owing to the existing conditions in China* such as the loose supervision
of the Central Government over the local collection of the land tax and
the system of appropriations of transfer funds* the revenue from th®
land tax was inelastic from the viewpoint of meeting the increasing ex-
peudituree of the Central Government* But In the financial history of
China* the land tax played an important role* For instance* before the
creation of the maritime customs duties and the wli-k±nw duties in the
middle of the nineteenth century* the land tax formed two-thirds or
store of the whole revenue; while in the last few years before the Sino-
J&p&nese War (1894), it supplied about three—eights of th© total amount
3of the annual return*
Generally speaking, in China the production and distribution of 
salt is an inherited occupation and is monopolistic* The tax on salt 
is very productive* It yields almost one-fourth of the annual tax 
revenue* The "salt gabelle" is levied at eveiy stage from production to 
consumption* Only licensed merchants may deal in salt or handle it and 
then only within limited and prescribed areas* But ths possibility of 
increasing the productivity of the tax for the government is very slight* 
In the first place* the demand for salt is inelastic* Second, in China 
ths smuggling problem* due to the salt tax* ims very serious* An in­
crease in the rate* while keeping the production quota at the same 
figure* would only Induce more smuggling* On the other hand* it is
" *lbld*, p, 68*
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impossible to increase the production quotas for the additional salt 
could not he disposed of because of the comp© tit ion of th© smugglers*^
In China* the regular customs were a general excise tax on user- 
chandise and go back to the early history of China* (They originated 
as far baok as the Chow dynasty, B. C* 1122-220.) During th© Tsing 
dynasty custom-houses were established on the seaboard* on rivers, inland 
water-ways, land routes and land frontiers* They are called the regular 
customs in order to distinguish them from the maritime customs* The com* 
modities carried by steamers pay their duties to the Maritime Customs, 
while commodities carried by sailing ships are taxed by th© Regular Cus­
toms. The regular customs were used to discourage the development of 
internal industries and internal trade, because commodities carried by 
the sailing ships were always native products and subject to the double 
taxation of several successive regular customs* Goods carried by steam­
ers and paying duty to the Maritime Customs once and for all were mostly 
import goods*
Another important tax* though a bad one, was the ”ii-kin.n It 
originated in 1850 when the Taiping Rebellion broke out, and from that 
time one city after another in the Kiang-su Province, the most produc­
tive of the provinces, fell into the hands of the rebels* The govern­
ment, therefore, could not levy the land tax in that province* This 
drove the authorities to devise a new form of taxation which is the 
^H-kin*" The "li-kin* contribution is a contribution of one-thousandth 
of one tael of silver charged as a transit duty on th© value of goods* 
During the period 1354 to 1874, it was adopted by th© eighteen provinces
4Ibid*, pp. 73-90*
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of China proper, end Feng-tien end Ki-rin in Manchuria. It has remained 
since the Taiping Rebellion as a local tax levied for the purposes of 
loo&l improvements. The administration of the "li-kinu belongs to the 
provinces. E&oh province establishes a chief collection bureau at its 
capital, a number of branch bureaus at the principal cities, and a 
number of stations* Later on the rates of ^li-kin” (which lost Its 
original meaning) differ from province to province and from time to 
time*
Looking over the whole financial system, it is obvious that almost 
all the revenue came from indirect taxes, and the whole system of taxa­
tion was inelastic* The administration of finances, especially on the 
collection of taxes, was against the principles of efficiency and eco­
nomy in the science of public finance* Owing to the fact that the in­
elastic revenue could not meet the expansive expenditures, China1 s 
governments were later on forced to seek foreign loans and to issue 
token coins*
II* Public Debt— All public debts are, to a great extent, of modem 
origin in China* Before 1842, owing to the smallness of military ex­
penditures, tie system of accumulating reserves, and the practical balance 
of expenditures and revenue, ths Chinese Government did not try to resort 
to public loans as a means of meeting her financial diffioulties* Begin­
ning in 1865 China started to employ foreign loans to a considerable 
extent, and in 1894, because of the Sino-Japanese War, she attempted 
for the first time to float a domestic loan* This loan, known as "the 
Merchants Loan11 of 1894, yielded only 11,020,000 taels (Ku-ping or 
Treasury)* The bad administration of the loan and the absenoe of a money
$7
market mere responsible for the failure of ths domestic loan*® As a 
result of the inelasticity of the tax system, th© urgent need of fund® 
and the difficulty of making a domestic loan, the Chines© Government 
resorted to foreign loans . From 1864 to 189S more than twelve foreign 
loans nere received by Chins.9a Government* Several of them were used 
for the purpose of miscellaneous expenditures and for building rail*** 
mays, while some of them wore military loans* Most of these loans were 
promoted and arrayed through French, Hussiaa, British, and German diplo­
mats at Peking, then the Capital of China* Almost all of these were 
gold loans,® bearing an interest rate of from six to fifteen per cent* 
and secured by customs revenue (since 1842 the administration of Chinese 
customs revenue mas practically under the British control)* As an im­
portant condition of the railway loans, the foreign lenders also used to
demand the right of sending the chief accountant and the chief engineer
7to participate in the administration of the railway*
III* Foreign Trade— The Portuguese and Spanish were the first among
the Suropean countries to establish trade relations with the Chinese
8after the start of the sixteenth century* Despite the growing competi-
®F. E. Huang, Public Debts in China (Studies in History, Economics 
and Public Law, Vol. LXXXY, Ho* 17 pV !&)•
®The payment of interest and the repayment of th® principle of these
loans mas customarily expressed in tern of foreign currency which was at 
that time based upon the gold standard*
detailed table containing the foreign loans to China before 1898
is shown in Hr* F* B. Huang's Public Debts in China (cited above),
Appendix, pp. @2-96*
®Varian Fry in his War in China says i "As early as the fourth cen­
tury B. C. ths ancient Greeks were receiving raw silk from China, and 
weaving It into luxurious and immensely expensive cloth..*.But when the 
first European, sailors of modern, times showed up at the port of Canton, 
in Southern China* in 1516*.•*w (p. 6).
33
tioa between the nations, major activity did not appear in historical 
records until the years of 1715, 1343, and 1370* The Bast India Com- 
pany of England started to establish a factory in Canton In Southern 
China in 1715* Since that time the merchants of other nations ©stab- 
lished factories from time to time in the port of Canton* ®Until 1834 
the two groups of traders at Canton, one a group of Westerners and the 
other & group of Chinese, -were the sole msans not only of trade but of 
communications in general between China and the countries of Europe and 
America.** In 1834 the charter of the British Bast India Company ex­
pired* The British Govornioent had refused to renew it and attempted 
to put its relations with China upon a m w  basis* But the attempts 
accomplished little. The Opium War of 1843 opened a new ©ra in the 
Chinese commercial and diplomatic record, between China and the Western 
Powers*
The development of the diplomatic relations between China and the
Western Powers will be described in the following pages. This section
is designed exclusively to treat of the foreign trade of China*
Prior to 1870 China*s foreign trage was simple and small in amount.
The foreign countries wanted Chinese silk, tea, and other go ods and paid
for them at first with silver and later with opium. As to China * s
foreign trade of this period, "China wanted Western goods less than
»1Qthe West wanted Chinese goods. After 1871 it may be said that the 
Chinese people began gem rally to use & few Western products. But the 
general course of the foreign trade of China until 1884 was still about
®C. P. Remer, Ths Foreign Trade of China, p. 2*
10Ibid., p. 28.
11t&e saw© from th® viewpoint of th© total trad© of th© country« With
th© year 1885, an Increase in th© total of foreign tr&do began and this
increase oontinu©d until th® close of 1898, It was 153*2 million Haikwan
12taels in 1885 and 368-6 million Haikwan taels in 1898, This inoreaa© 
of foreign trade was steady with no unusual and notable changes*, and th® 
increase in imports was at a more rapid rate than the inoreas© in ex­
ports • During this period, the excess of merchandise imports formed an 
unfavorable balance in China's international payments*
XT* Ths State of Affairs with the Western Powers and within Chinas
Am With the Western Powers 
In 1834 th© charter of the British S&st India Company expired* The 
British Government had refused to renew it end attempted to put Its 
relations with China upon a new basis* In the ©am© year three nsuperin­
tendents" of British trade arrived In China to pursue th© new British 
policy. In 1842, as a result of the Opium War, the Chinese Government 
was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking with Britain. From then on, 
either as a result of the war or by th© operation of th® so-called 
**most-favored nation" clause, a series of unequal treaties was made 
between the Chinese Government and the Western Powers* The important 
ones are the following*
1844 Treaty of Wanghia with the United States of Americas
1844 Treaty of Whampoa with Frances
1845 Exchange of notes with Belgium granting her th® right to trad®
under the procedure established by the existing treaties;
1847 Treaty with Sweden and Norways
1858 Treaties of Tientsin with the United State®, Russia, Groat 
Britain, and France;
1861 Treaty with Prussia for herself and the members of th® Gorman 
Zollverelnj
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1362 Treaty with Portugal, ratifioation refused by the Chinese
Government ;
1368 Treaty with Denmark;
1363 Treaty with the Netherlands;
1864 Treaty with Spain
1363 Treaty with Belgium 
1366 Treaty with Italy;
186? Treaty with Austria-Hungary 1 
1871 Treaty with Japan
These treaties determined the broad outline® of the relations of 
China with other nations* Among the important things in these treaties, 
the more significant ones ares
1* Extraterritoriality— Th© principle of extraterritoriality was 
implied is the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) with Britain*
By the twenty—first article of the Treaty of W&nghia with the United 
States in 1844, the principle was clearly stated that citizens of foreign 
countries who commit any crime in China shall be subject to, tried and 
punished only by the Consul or oiher public functionary of Hie foreign 
country thereto authorised according to the laws of th© foreign country* 
The extraterritorial jurisdiction that has been granted to the 
treaty powers in their treaties with China and th® operation of the 
so-called "most favored nation" clause i® exercised by ©very foreign 
country* It has delayed th© development of national sovereignty and 
has had a bad result on th© unification of th© currency and banking 
systems of China*
2* Treaty ports and others— In the "Treaty ports," the foreign 
merchants have th© right to trade and residence* In addition to this, 
there are certain places that have been ceded outright to foreign 
powers* These places are Hongkong, Macau, and others. Th#r© are 
certain leased areas which are foreign territory for tho duration of
the lease, such as Kiaochow, Dai ran, &wang-chomnua ®nd Weihaiwoi«
There are Gonoaasioxis whiah ar© areas undar the control of a single 
power# There are international settlements such as that in Shanghai# 
These had a very bad influence on the unification of th© currency 
systems by hiding of counterfeit coinage in these areas*
3* The tarif f— Article Ten of the Treaty of leaking (1842) with 
Great Britain provided that China was to establish a fair and regular 
tariff of export and import customs and other duties, which tariff
13"shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information#1* 
This tariff was proclaimed at Hongkong in 1843* It was upon th© general 
principle of a five per cent* ad valorem duty upon both imports and 
exports» According to th® treaty China *& administrative powezs over 
the customs duties were surrendered to the British*
The systoR of commuted transit dues (another of the by-products 
of unequal treaties) gave to foreign merchants the right to send im­
ported goods to any inland city in China upon th© payment of a single 
charge end to bring Chinese produce which is to be exported from any 
city in China to a port upon th© payment of a single oharge• As th© 
result of the system, the foreign goods have been subjected to a smaller 
amount of taxation than Chinese gpods transported from place to place 
within th© country and subjected to several internal taxes of Chines© 
local governments*
Here it is worth while to mention the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1896) 
with Japan, in Article 6 of which it is provided* *Japanese subjects 
shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing Industries in all 
the open cities, towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to
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import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only th© stipulated 
duties thereon***
The rights granted to the Japanese by th© operation of th© most- 
favored-nation ©Ians®, contained in th® treaties between China and 
the other powers, become immediately available to the nationals of 
those powers* China.fs international situation during the years im­
mediately after the close of th.® Japanese War (1895) r® characterised
by such unrestrained foreign aggression that the partition of China and
14the break-up of China ware freely predicted.”
B. Within China
During th® Tsing dynasty (1644-1911), when Chian Lung’s power 
(1756-1796) was at its height, China was one of the sup rams countries 
in the world in wealth, area, population and fighting strength* Unf or- 
tunately his successors failed to improve the internal affairs and 
defense against the foreign aggressors* From 1842 to 1898 a series of 
rebellions and famines within the country and the defeat by foreign 
aggressors resulted in the end of the dynasty. The events occurring 
within this period, particularly the ‘Pulping Rebellion (1350-1864) 
had devastated a dozen province s. Trie Taiping Rebellion only had 
directly killed in battle by massacre and f'amina twenty millions of 
human beings; it had reduced the country to extreme) poverty, and had 
brought th© dynasty near extinction* Th© great famine of 1877 to 1878 
checked th© progress of restoration and reconstruction. It is estimated 
that no less than nine suad a. half million deaths were due to the famine 
alone•
iW T p .  72.
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Is 1888 "the Yellow River broke Its banks and flooded nearly the 
whole of Homan province. The loss of life Is estimated at two mil­
lions* During the winter of 1892-1893 and th© year 1894, the -whole 
of northern China suffered from drought and famine® The loss of life 
is estimated at one million. Th® Mohammedan Hebei lion (1894-18955 in 
•fee province of Kansu oost th® lives of about a quarter of a million.
By this time Turkestan had regained its Independence, Japan had taken 
the Loochoo Islands, the French had made their position secure in Indo- 
China, the British had assumed a like position in Burma, and Russia was 
fighting for Korea and the Hanohu*
During the period of the Taiping Rebellion the Emperor of China 
was Hsian Feng (1850-1861). He died immediately after th© time (1861) 
when the troops of England and France took his capital and burned his 
palace* In fact, fro® that time on th© executive control of China’s 
government passed into the hard s of fee Empress Dowager. In th© period 
fr&m 1889 to 1898 the young emperor, Ku&ag-hsu (1875-1908) took over 
the actual government. China was defeated In the Sino-Japaneee war In 
1895* During the years 1895-1898 a reform party led by a group of young 
Chinese from Southern. China succeeded in bringing the young emperor, 
Kuang-hsu, under their influence* Th© result m e  a succession of reform 
edicts in 1898. In the eame year the press Dowager brought fee reform 
movement to a close by making th® emperor a prisoner in th© palace*
After 1898 th© Empress Dowager actually assumed authority of fee govern­
ment again until she died in 1908.
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V* Th® Monetary Situation!
A. Copper Money
The status of oopper money about 1898 in China was as follows3 
1* Token coins in Peking (the Capital)*—About 1898 a kind of token 
coin was circulating in Peking, then th© Capital* The token coins cir­
culated in Peking only and were constantly fluctuating in value* This 
bad situation was later one of th© main causes which led to the movement 
of th© old oopper cash reform*
The origin of these token coins goes back to the Taiping Rebellion 
(1851-1864)* At that time, the Central Government faced serious diffi­
culties, among which was a shortage of copper cash owing to greatly 
reduced government revenues and to tbs imp os s ib 1 1 i ty of obtaining suf­
ficient supplies of copper, especially from Yunnan province which is 
located in the far southwest of China* The Treasury of th© Central 
Government had to issue token coins for the first time in China * s his­
tory* They were cast in the following denomination's 5# $, 10, 30, 50, 
1 0 0 , 2 0 0 , 500, and 1 ,0 0 0  cash*
Besides the shortage of th© supplies of new copper, the existing 
cash became scarce for the following reasons ”Th® cash shops on account 
of the higb price of copper ©specially at Tientsin have disposed of
large quantities (heavier cash) to surreptitious coiners, who have made
ISthem into small cash of inferior value*” Th© surreptitious coiners 
operating in the foreign concession of Tientsin have boon safely out 
of the control of th© Chines® Government and secretly shipped th©
J* Edkins, Chineze Currency, Shanghai, 1901, p® 48.
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inferior cash into the interior* Another cause responsible for th© 
scareity of cash was ihe hoarding of th® copper cash* When th© price 
of oopper oash rises, and silver is falling, the temptation to hoard 
copper cash is great* The rich men used to receiv© their rents and 
interests in cash, and pay out in silver, and th© poor attempted th© 
reverse*
The idea of using token coins was strange to the Chinese people*
The several denominations of th© token coins soon disappeared from cir­
culation* Only the 10 cash coin survived and became the principal 
medium of circulation in Peking till 1898 and after nT@t the 10
cash piece was never accepted there at its inscribed value, but instead
17at its intrinsic worth, which is subjected to constant fluctuation®*"
Zm lAdk of uniformity of oopper cash— Oopper cash coins were, 
around the year 1898, circulating in different weights, finesses, and 
designs•
The causes which led to the lack of uniformity are several* From 
ancient times until the close of th© nineteenth century China maintained 
the crude practice of casting the coins in moulds* It was easy to obtain 
a copy of the mould and for a clever counterfeiter^® to go on making 
exact copies of the government's coins* The crude casting and the coun­
terfeiting to a great extent were th® main causes of the lack of uni­
formity in China's currency system during th© time*
Ths circulation of different forms of cash issued by different
ldjg# Kaon, Th© Currencies of China, 1926, Shanghai, p« 385*
*?Ibid*
H* Stewart Lockhart, The Stewart Lockhart Collection of 
Chinese Copper Coins. Shanghai," " m ^ T p T I C  —  —
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dyn&stie s and by different reigns within the same dynasty was another 
cause of the lack of uniformity • Du® both to physic al depreciation and 
different weights used in different regions, there existed some differ­
ence between cash of different regions in both quality and weight* The 
oopper ooin ims made to weigh one tenth of a tael by the Tang dynasty, 
and made in value one thousandth (1 11} of & tael of silver* During 
the first reign of the Tsing dynasty the weight of oopper cash was l/lO 
tael, afterwards raised to 126/1,000 tael* Under Kang-shl (A* D* 1684) 
of the Teing dynasty the weight was again reduced to l/lQ tael, to be 
again raised in A* D* 1702 to 14/100 tael, and again reduced to 12/100 
tael* This continued to be the weight: through the reign of Yung-cheng 
and Into the beginning of the reign of Chi on-lung {A* D. 1736), when it 
was again made l/lQ tael* The cash, coins of the period of Chi&-ching - 
(1795*1820 A* D.) were of light weight, but ordinarily were well minted* 
In the following reign, Tao-kw&ng (A* D* 1820*1880), th® rough crude 
Issues of the mints made their first appearance* According to record, 
coins oast In the mints in some provinces weigh S/lOO tael and some 
still weigh 5/l0 0  tael* In explaining this situation of degeneration 
Mr* H* B* Morse says 1
During this long reign of sixty years degeneration made progress, 
in appearance and in quality, and in th© size and weight of the 
coins 3 the Government was still vigoroits, with no sign of dry rot, 
and we may assume that it was the struggle between the mints and 
the illegal me Iter down of too-full weight coins, end that, to keep 
the currency from the melting crucible, the mints were driven to 
reduce the intrinsic value more and more •
*^H* B# Morse, ’’Currency in China,” The Journal of N* C* B* of
B. A* 8 *, Vol* 38, 1906, p. 9.
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Another o&use leading to lack of uniformity was that th© cash 
mints wore not under th© control and m&nageijsnt of on® uniform central 
authority* From 1644 a few mints were set up in Peking and some im­
portant provinces* Gradually (till 1862) the number of mints increased 
to some thirty-eight, owing to the poor transportation and the high cost
of carrying the heavy cash, operated in twenty-two different provinces 
20and cities*
Still another cause was the practice of accepting counterfeit coins* 
Almost always after the reign of Tao-kuang (1820-1850) counterfeit coins 
were accepted without question and the Government hardly mad® any suc­
cessful attempt to cheek this practice. The result usually has been an 
inflation of prices in proportion to the extent of the activity of coun­
terfeiters.^
5* The fluctuating exchange~rat© between cash and silver tael— How 
such copper cash can people change for a tael of syce© silver or how 
such silver can be changed into a sum of 1*000 copper cash? To this 
question, around the year 1898, the possible answer was that th© fluc­
tuating change-rate was circulating from place to place and from time to 
time. From "the following brief description one can get soma idea of 
the formation of this situation*
Sarly in the Tang dynasty a trimetallic system (although gold 
formed no part of the currency) was introduced* The relative value of 
each by weight was:
^Th© detail of the mints are shown in th© Appendix of Mr* Kami * s 
The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p® 430.
^Won Pin-woi, "Th® Currency Problem in China," Columbia Univ.,
1914, p. 31s and S. R, ftegal, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 
p« 41 *
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1 gold * 10 silver s 1,000 oopper 
The copper coin of this system was made to weigh one tenth of a tael of 
copper, making it in value "1 II,” one thousandth of a tael of silver.
Later on the rati© was theoretically held to by the rulers* But in 
fact th© ratio of one tael of silver to one thousand of cash coins fluc­
tuated from year to year* "Attempts were made, however, from time to 
time to regulate the value of a tael at a thousand times that of the cash 
coins it was found impossible to bring about such regulation as th© ex- 
change between the oash and ihe tael depended very largely and generally 
upon their values as metals in th© marks t.**22 Many valuable examples 
could be founds In A* I). 1726 on© tael of silver was equal to 900 
copper cash in Shansi. In 1741 in Shansi a tael was just 860 cash*
Even in 1851 by the Regulations of the Board of Revenue * it appears that 
the tael of silver was exchanged for a thousand oash in Peking, but for 
twelve hundred cash in Yunnan, because copper is that province was 
cheaper. During the years 1840 to 1880 silver was in great demand for 
paying for imported opium (from Groat Britain) in particular. Mr. Huang 
Chio—tss said in 1858 In a memorial that opium was th© chief cause of
th® rise of the value of silver from 1,000 oash a tael to 1,800 cash a
23tael*
Another fluctuation of the price of the cash cam® from th® differ­
ent quantity of the cash reckoning. As Mr* Morse says i
22Ibid., p. 41.
Joseph Edkins, Chines© Currency, Shanghai, 1901, pp. 67-69*
Cash are strang on strips, In rolls of 100, of afoieh 10 go to 
the string or ”ti©o," or "chiean,n formerly called Kuan*..•Th© 
moaey-changers have always charged for their trouble in stringing, 
sad for the cost of the string. This charge is made by deducting 
one, or tow, or three, or four cash from each hundred,• .with the 
result that the tiao of 1,000 oash contains in one place 970 and 
in another place 980 actual coins* the full tiao passing however 
for 1,000 cash.
In the Berth {Chili, Shantung province) one cash counts for two. 
The pries of an article being there quoted at 100 cash, you hand 
over 50 coins, at 2 tiao you give what in the South constitutes 1 
tiao, Th© same rule of deduction holds her® too, and th© tiao 
nominally 1,000 and nominally—actual ly of 980 cash contains ac­
tually 490 coins.
Still another fluctuation of the price of the cash comes from the
different quality of the oash itself. In the beginning of th© twentieth
century one could still find in actual circulation copper cash, th©
origin of which dates back a thousand years; and some of which, made
by counterfeiters, were bad in both sis© and quality, Th© money-changers
classified and strung oash into different kinds of tiao, and traded with
people using different prices of silver.
This Viral of complicated situation prevented the development of
internal commerce, and added an unfair burden on ignorant people to a 
25great extent• But it must be admitted that until 1398, none of th©
26Chinas© government authorities attempted to derive profits from coinage,
2*h , B, Morse, Currency in China, 1905, pp* 15-17,
25*If & Ran comes into a shop one day when 93 cash constitute a hundred, and of these 95 oash 70 per cent, should consist of large oash 
and 50 per cent* small oash, end he makes a 29 cash purchase, he will 
readily spend an hour or so arguing with the shopkeeper as to what 70 
per cent* of 93 per cent, of 29 is; and sine® th© Chines© h&ve no actual 
system of reckoning on paper, it must all be calculated with the ubiqui­
tous suan pan, or ”abacua-
"Is there any wonder, then, seeing that a hundred cash are not a 
hundred, nryi a thous and cash not a thousand, that th© Chines® say that 
if you take any given sum on th© street and convert and re-convert it ten 
times, you will have nothing left, even if you start with a million,” 
(William F, Spalding, Eastern Exchange Currency and. Finance2 London,
Fourth edition, 1924, p. 3ST)
2%duard Kann, The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p. 384; 
and S. S. We gal, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p« 38*
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B. Silver
Around th© years just before and after 1893, th© situation of
27silver used as a medium of exchange in China can be briefly described 
as followst
I. The complicated units (taels) were prevailing in different
places— the "tael" is the "ounce" of China, of which 16 make one catty*
or Chinese "pound." As to the tern ?tael" it is said that:
The word "t&el" is believed to com© from th© Portuguese (some 
claim it is connected with th© Hindu word "tola" or the Malayan 
word "tahil.") Th© Chinese word is liang, which might also be 
translated as "ounce." When general weight tael is meant, the 
Chinese tern is liangs when a currency tael is meant, th© expres­
sion is li&ng yin dse, meaning silver t&el*
In weighing the precious metals* however, th© tael is th© heaviest
29unit, and it has decimal subdivisions, each with it® own name, down to
tbs on© thousand-million-millionth /-j 1_ v part of avl,000,000,000,000,000'
t&el.®^ a detailed table is found in Mr. Morse’s Currency in China.
In China the tael is not a coin. Taels may be circulated in native
^Mr. H. B* 81listen, "China Dethrones Silver," foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 14, p. 355, says s "In China the metal has hitherto occupied a 
three—tiered throne— as a standard of value, as a medium of exchange, 
and a® a store of value."
^Herbert M. Bratter, Silver Market Diet!onary, Commodity Sxchang© 
Inc., Hew York, 1933, p. 174-
^"Tfae tael as a coin I© purely fictitious, no such coin existss 
the tael, or liang (as the Chinese term It), is actually a measure of weight, equivalent to 583.3 gr., but it is used also as a measure of value. The special divisions of th© tael for currency purposes area
10 cash a 1 Candareen 
10 Candareams » 1 Mace 
10 Mao© a 1 Tael
The Chinese way of expressing them is*
10 Li 2 1 Fen10 Fen s 1 Ch9ien10 Ch’len - 1 Liang
Just as there is no tael coin in circulation, neither are there tobe found any coins called mace and o&nd&reent they are all measures of
weight as well as of value." (W. F. Spalding, Bast errs. Exchange Currency and Finance. London, 1924, 4th edition, p. 412)
B. Horse, Currency in China," Journal of J3# 0* JR. of R. A. S.,
Vol. 38, 1906, p* 39. ~~
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orders, banknotes, or shoes'^ of silver of an approximate weight of 
from one to fifty taels* These shoes in practice never amount to an 
exact round sum of, say, ten, twenty-five, or fifty taels. Owing to 
reasons such as th© fact that no regulation® could be enforced, after 
the development of a long age, there was no uniformity in the several 
taels current in th© different parts of the country. For instance, 
the Chungking tael prevailing in Chungking City i® different from th©
Shanghai tael of the same weight* The T scoping tael is different from 
the Haikuan and the Raping t&els* Besides these relative popular taels, 
nib may be said that ©very commercial place (local market) has its half- 
doaen, or do sen, or score of local taels, all generally recognised and 
all our rent •” As to their weight it is said that ’’the weight ranges,
«34at different places and even in th© same place, from 540 to 533 grains.
There was no available figure* "Or* J* 0* Ferguson mentions seventy-
36seven distinct varieties of tael,” and Mr* H. B* Morse states that he
has notes of 170 different and well-recognised currencies, gathered
36mainly from the treaty ports and their immediate vicinity.
The non-uniformity of currency units in different places and even 
in the same place results in inconvenience to trade and to the individual 
to a great extent* The following quotation is a good example illustrat­
ing that complicated situation.
^G* Yis soring, On Oh in© so Currenoy. Vol. I, Amsterdam, p. 147.
33*Ibid ♦ » p. 150*
^Silver is most commonly current in oval ingot® called "shoes,” 
from their resemblance to a Chinese shoes but what may b© called frac­tional currency is in obovoid lumps weighing up to two or throe taels..** Shanghai shoes weigh close on 50 taels ©aoh. •• .Hankow and other Tangtg® ports also oast oval shoes close on 50 taels in weight, and Tientsin as well* Hewehwang shoes weigh from 53 to 54 taels***.Sxoapt to make change th© small lumps of silver are seldom seen at Shanghai, and when received from other cities are sent to be oast Into shoes. (H* B. Mors©, The Trade and Administration of China. London, 1913, pp. 146-147).
34h . B. Morse, Currency in China, p* 40.
®®G* Vessoring, On Chinese Currency. 1912, p* 146.36 b. Morse, The Trade and Admin is t rat ion of China, London, 1913, p, 166.
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On® town may V® taken to typify many*— th® tcro of Chungking, 
in tbs province of Saaehwan, in th© far west of China# Her® th® 
standard weight of th© tael for silver transactions is 565.6 
grains, and this is the standard for all transactions in which 
tha seal© is not specified* Frequently, however, a modification 
of the seal® is provided for, depending in some oases upon the 
plaoe from which the bs r oh act comes or with. which h® trades, ard 
in others upon the gpods in which he deals* A merchant coming 
from Kweichow, or trading with that plaoe, will probably, but not 
certainly, use a scale weight 548*9 grains i a merchant from Kweifu, 
a town on the Yangtze, a hundred miles from Chungking, will buy and 
sell with a tael 562.7 grainsj and between those two extremes are 
at least ten topical weights of tael, all "current” at Chungking*
In addition to these twelve topical "currencies,n there ar© others 
connected with commodities. One of th® most important products of 
Szechwan is salt, and dealings in this are settled by & tael of 
556*4 grains, unless it is salt from ths Tzeliu well, in which 
case the standard is 557*7 grains• A transaction in cotton cloth 
is settled with a t&el of 555*0 grains, but for cotton yarn the 
t&el is 566*0 grains, and for raw cotton the tael is 547*7 grains.
This seems confusion, but we arc not yet at th® end * TJp to 
this point w® have dealt only with th© weight on th© scale, but 
new cosies in the question of th© fineness of the silver with which 
payment is made* At Chungking three qualities of silver ar® in 
common use— "fin® silver" 1*000 fine current throughout th© empire, 
"old silver® about 996 fine, and "trad® silver" between 960 and 
970 fine; and payment may be stipulated in any one of these thro© 
qualities* Taking ths score of current tael-weights in combina­
tion with the three grades of silver, w© have at least sixty cur­
rencies possible in this on® town*
Besides th© local taels, there were three principal taels which it
is worth while to mention he ret th® Kuping or Treasury tael, the customs
or Haikusn tael, and the Tsaopiag tael. Th© Kuping tael may be taken as
a standard of taels in a certain sense* In it all Government taxes and
dues other than customs revenue, and th os & paid in kind or in oopper
oash, ar© calculated. In theory it is uniform throughout the Empire.
"The normal standard Kuping taal, 675.6 grains of silver 1,000 fin© is
th® receiving rata (th© paying rat© being 0.2 per cent lighter) at th©
Imperial Treasury, and th© several provincial treasuries vary from this
38standard in scme instance© as much as one per cent •"
370* Vessing, .Qn Chinas© Currency. 1912, pp. 148-160. 
^®H* B. Morse, Currency in China, 1906, p. 43.
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Th® Haikuan tael (from §81.6$ to 589 grains) is a purely arbitrary
standard of currency in the ImperiaL Maritime® Gustos® . In 1854 the
foreign-oontrolled Imperial Maritime Customs was set up in Shanghai.
Th® special "Haikuan tael” was established as th© Imperial Maritime
Customs unit instead of the Carolus dollars which had become common in
China* All of China*s trade passing through the Customs, and all duties
levied upon it* were figured in th® Fiaiku&n tassl * It existed neither as
ingots nor as coin* merely a certain weight of fine silver* As to the
exact weight of th® "Haikuan tael*” many different figures can be found
39from different sourcess
In the British Treaty of 1853* it is 583.3 grains*
In the French Treaty of 1858* it i & 583.1 grains*
Mr. S. C» Taintor (Statistical Secretary, 1873*78) fixed it at 
582.94 grains.
Mr. B. Kopsch (Statistical Secretary, 1891-93) found it 587.68 
grains.
Mr. Pascal Martin, in I860, decided on 531.47.
Other Commissioners estimate from 681 to 689 grains.
An independent test at Ganton (1906) gave a weight of 581.83 
grains.
The Statistical Secretary (1906) found it to be 881.56 grains.
Though all customs dues are prescribed in this non-existent and non*
uniform currency, they are collected in local money at rates of exchange
fixed by the Customs authorities. For instance, "The equivalent of 100
E&lkuan taels has always been 111.40 Shanghai taels end in Tientsin
105.215 Tientsin t a e l s I t  has always been 105.83 Teaoplng tael®
at Bingpo. In theory the equivalent of 100 Haikuan taels is 101*642395
41Kuping tael®. The Tsaoping tael is another unit of the value of 
curreno y* It is current throughout th® provinces contributing tribut© 
in kind (such as rice) which is sent to th® capital by s©a or the Grand
 H 5 E r : 7  pp. 40-41*
Vis sering, On drrinois© C u i * ^  p® 146^
B. Mors®, Currency in China, 1906, p. 44*
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Bo si da 8 ths local taels and the three principal taels mentioned
above* there was one kind of local tael called Shanghai tael* Although
the principal field for the use of the Shanghai tael is Shanghai* it was
also made use of in other ports* suck as Manchuria and Kw&ngtung, when
4:3& relatively stable unit is desired, for example, for contracts, Th© 
Shanghai was equivalent to 518„5X2 grains of fine silver.^4 Still 
another local unit, which should be noted in detail, is the Peking tael«
In Peking, then the Capital, the Kuping tael was the unit of all official 
transactions. However, besides the Kuping tael, there were three stand­
ards of tael weight (that is, (1) the "Kungfa" of 555,7 grains, (2) the 
"market" of 552*4 grains, and (S) the "metropolitan” or "two-tael 
scale of 541,7 grains), and two recognised standards of silver (that Is,
1,000 and 980 fine).
The foreign banks established there have within a few years past 
adopted the Kung-fa tael of 1,000 silver as their currency of ac­
count* Each of these currencies, ©accept the Kuping and Kung-fa, is 
further subject to a difference of 0*6 to 0*9 per cent, according 
as it is "equalised" or “empty" or "mercantile” or "complete”} thus 
100 Kung-fa taels are equivalent to metropolitan taels 102*80 if 
mercantile, 102*70 if empty, 102,60 if equalised, but only 102,00 
if complete*
*2Th0 Tsaoping tael contain® 565*5 grains troy* For monetary pur­
poses references to the Tsaoping tael mean 565*5 grains of silver, 0*944 
fisc, Kuping basis. Since Kuping fineness considers 0*987 to 0*989 a® 
equivalent to 1.000, the 0,944 fineness referred to above becomes actually 
about 0*933, (Herbert 'U, Bratter, Silver Market .Dictionary, Commodity__ _ * _ . _ _ _ . .. M 1*1 I*g*a «| *i  .. mmrnmtm *n>i*in m» ' *iiwiw*jb» vExchange, Inc*, New York, 1933, p, 180)
P. Young, “Shanghai Tael," American h'conomio Review, 7oX, 21,
1931, p* 682.
^D* H, Leavens, "Chines® Money and Banking,” The Anna Is of th® 
American Academy of Political and. Social Science, Nov. 1930, pp* *206-207*
^®wThe addition of 2 taels In the hundred, Z%9 will bring this to 
the value of th© Market tael; he no© probably th© name," (Footnote of H. 3, Morse* The Trad© and Administration of China, pp, 155-156,
4%. B* Morse, The Trad© and Admin 1b tration of China. tendon, 1913, pp. 156-166.
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2* Variability of purityt
(a) Ths ideal standard— In European countries the standard of
1,000 fins represents silver chemically pure, with no admixture of gold 
or of oopper and lead, but the merchandise of silver is little differ** 
eat from the pure silver* Far instance, American quotations of bar 
silver are .reduced to a basis of S99 fine and British quotation to a 
basis of 926. "In China the standard of 1,000 seems to refer to a 
silver eoanreroially pur© as shown by the crude methods of th© touch-
,,47stone or of crucible assaying. This is th© standard of Kuping* It 
was ascertained that the "pure silver” of the Kuping tael touch is ac­
tually 987 fine when It was reduced to the Western standard of chemically 
46pure silver.
(b) The local st and ar d«?*-T he standard of the Kuping tael men­
tioned above is the fineness with which all local standards ar© compared.
For instaras©, at Tientsin all silver is reduced to a theoretical local
49fineness of 992 s at Ghefoo, to one of 976j at iiaukow, to on© of 967.
There was an exception, at Shanghai, and in the countries subordinated
to it silver is rated, not by fineness of a "pure silver" standard, but
by the addition, to each shoe of about 60 taels weight, of a quantity
to indicate the degree of superiority of quality over a presumed fine­
st)ness which is 944 of the China standard of pur© silver."
(c) The local convention— It was merely a tradition in th© 
commercial world in a certain number of ports. For Ins tame, in Shanghai 
the convention was that 98 taels of Tsaoping tael on a standard of 944
4?Ibid.. p. 148.




fine on ths ICuping basis of 1 , 0 0 0  fin© settle a liability of 100 taels 
"Shanghai convention currency*” Th® convention w&s very important on 
the exchange from on® tael into another also* For instance, on© who 
wished to convert Kuping taels into Shanghai taels first considered th& 
weight, i*e«, one hundred Kuping taels (by weight) wore equivalent to 
101*80 Tsaoping taels (by weight) 3 next, for difference of touch, on, 
say, two shoes (100 taels), 5*6 taels were added, which made 107*40*
Third, by the Shanghai convention, this sum was divided by 0*98, which 
increased it to 109*592• To this 0*008 was added for melting fees, and 
the value of 100 Xuping taels was then found to b® Shanghai taels 109*60* 
This kind of convention varied from port to port* For Instance, at 
Tientsin a "premium" was added instead of dividing by a "convention" 
ratio* In sosne ports there was no convention at all*
(d) Varying purity caused complicated system of remittances^-* 
There existed variability of purity between small pieces of silver by 
which people in China made payment for the daily retail price as well 
as "shoes" of "sycee" of about 50 taels each* In the daily business, 
most people did not know a reasonable method by which to test the touch 
of a piece of silver. If they wished to ©hang® cash by th® irregular 
pieces of silver in order to meet small payments, th® judge of th© 
masters of the cash—shop or cash-st&nd from which they changed cash 
by their silver was th© only "touchstone" for both parties of the 
transaction* Naturally the cash-shops have always nm.de a living and 
yielded big profits from their unfair judgment* In th© payment of 
wholesale and th© settlement of transactions between the native banks 
and concerns, if the transfer of a sura of T! shoos" wore neoessary, ths 
process of testing and calculating would be operated much more reasonably*
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The practice in Shanghai is chosen as an examples
Let ns assume the simple case where our Shanghai merchant wishes 
to remit th© contents of a box full of silver (if he wishes to make 
up an exact ©urn in Shanghai currency* certain comp lie at ions are 
added)* the silver in th© box will be in the shape of "shoe®" of 
"sycee" of about 50 taels each* and of varying "touch** (degrees of 
fineness}* If th? $© shoes are marked* In ink* with th® results of 
a previous assay at ths Assay Office for the Foreign Settlement, 
the preliminary stage becomes unnecessary * but if they have come 
in the course of trade from another port* or if their last previous 
assay was made by th® Assay Office for th© Chinese City* then all 
existing marks are washed off and th® silver must b® sent to th© 
proper office* Hare ©aoh shoe is weighed and th® result written 
on on© side* It is then "touched" and the difference (usually an 
addition) from a certain standard* as indicated by the colour on 
ths touchstone* is written on the other side* This difference for 
touch is so much for the shoe irrespective of its exact weight* 
which is anything between 49 and 54 taels* but an allowance of 
0*05 tael is added for each tael by which the weight of the shoe 
exceeds 50 taels % thus if the quality of the silver is 2*70* th© 
addition for a shoe weighing 49*75 or on© of §0*05 tael® is 2*70* 
for one of 51*25 taels is 2*75* for on® of 52*15 taels is 2*30* 
and so on* Let us take two such shoes weighing 60 and 51 taels 
and having 2*60 and 2*40 respectively added for touch* making for 
the two 501 2*60 1 511 2*40 - 106*00; this result, divided by 0*98 
(th© Shanghai "convention"), gives 103*163 as th© number of Shanghai 
taels in our two shoes* If th© transaction is on© in Shanghai cur- 
renoy only, this ends it****
From the example mentioned above it is obvious that even within one 
port, say Shanghai, th® trouble from th® transfer of silver in order to 
settle transactions was too much for a business man* Th© practice of 
settlement of transactions between ports by transferring silver, from 
ths point of view of different taels, different touch of silver and 
different conventions, must be much more complicated*
3* The situation of foreign coins in China around the yo&r 1898 
can be briefly described as followss
a* Different foreign coins prevailed In different area©— Among 
the foreign coins, first the C&rolu© dollar and then the Mexican dollar
6*Ibid*, "pP* 160-161*
58
had for many years been accepted as th® currency of the foreign banks 
and merchants and for th© sal© of import© and purchase of exports and 
for exchange quotations* in most ports of Chins* especially in Shanghai 
at one time and in th® Yangtze basin* The French trade dollar has had 
its greatest circulation in the province of Yunnan adjoining French 
Indo-China* Ths Japan6s® silver yen has been much used in th© province 
of Fukien* Th© Hongkong dollar has been popular in a art a in parts of 
liorth China* where for a time it was at a slight premium over other 
dollars* The American trade dollar seems to have been rapidly drawn 
into the interior through the Yangtsa River trade*
b. The exohang© value between local foreign dollars and local 
taels fluctuated considerably— Various foreign dollars were in circula­
tion in different parts of the Empire* Various reasons caused a certain 
kind of foreign dollar to become popular over a large or small area and 
to appreciate in value to 30 or 40 per cent* above its bullion value*
In some of th© smaller treaty ports* such as Mmgpo* Hangchow or Wuhu* 
the Spanish dollar was most in favor* Though lighter than th® Mexican 
dollar* it was in suoh demand as to fetch 11*40 Mexican* A very interest­
ing and well-known record can be cited as an example of this situations
The ravages of the Taiping rebellion restricted the consump­
tion of imports* and notwithstanding increased importations of 
Carolus dollars* collected from all parts of th© world, they were 
soon driven to a premium* which by 1858 amounted to 50 per cent*, 
and in 1856 to over 80 per cent* of their intrinsic value| and 
the curious spectacle was seen of exchange quoted at Canton at 
4s * 11 d« per dollar (Mexican) and on the a am© day at Canton at 
7s* per collar (Carolus)* The situation beoaaas intolerabl®, 
and on a fixed day merchants* accounts at the banks were trans­
ferred* unit for unit* from a currency (th© Carolus) containing 
374J grains of fin© silver, to a currency (the Shanghai taol) con­
taining nominally 526 grains of fine silver per unit*
®^H* B* Morse* The Trade and Administration of China, London, 1913* 
p• 165 *
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Q«» Chopped dollar*-**Chines® people accepted the varlous foreign 
dollars for what they were worth, not according to their face Talus but 
according to their weight of pure silver* The first banker or merchant 
into whose hands th® foreign coin came used to Kehopn it with an im­
pressed ideogram about an eighth of an inch square, ^thereby giving th© 
tradesman and the private individual his certificate of bona f ides 
of the guaranteeing government. This was repeated by each succeeding 
banker, until the chopped dollar resembles a disc, or rather a cup, of 
hammered silver work** This resulted in th® situation tbs.t the same 
weight in a coin (the silver dollar) with the same inscription was worth 
at one port, say Shanghai, from 5 per cent* to 5 per e@nt, more than at 
another port, say Canton, whether the valus is expressed in gold, in 
silver taels, or in commodities! but at Shanghai th® coin remained as 
it cam® from the mint, and at Canton it was chopped* As to the origin 
of the chopping of th® foreign dollar, it is ©aids
The Chinese officials, towards the close of th© eighteenth cen­
tury, desired to halt the further inflow of foreign coins* They 
induced some of the Chinese silversmiths to manufacture dollars, in 
every respect similar to th© Carolus dollar* In order to reap 
bene fit s£>r themselves the silversmiths added alloy up to 5Q^ in 
some provinces* This is the origin for thf$ exohang® shops to im­
press every genuine dollar handed out with a tiny ideogram in order 
to give guarantee to the public*
d* Variable bullion value between foreign coins— As stated 
above, Chinese people accepted foreign dollars for what they were worth. 
Because of the variable bullion value existing In th© foreign coins much
”  ^Ibid*. p* 164*
Kann, The Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p* £97j and Wen 
Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in China, p# 41*
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more trouble was added to individuals and bankers g whan they sett lad 
the payment and received funds through the transfer of foreign coins.
For instance* at Canton on July IS* 1842* in order to pay 100.00 tael®
gg
of fine silver it was necessary to pay by weights
111.458 taels in Peruvian dollars#
111.900 11 " Mexican w
112.150 w " Bolivian *
112.520 • M Chilian
109.790 ** ” Indian Rupees #
113.207 ” ©hopped dollars.
In a word* instead of th© convenience of adopting & coin of unifom 
touch and regular appearance* the employing of foreign coins has offered 
the same type of compile at ions as that of China*® old system# i - ©* * the 
d iff© rant taels and variable purity of si Ivor *
4. China*s local silver dollar and fractional silver coinage—  
Although there were neither national silver dollars nor national frac­
tional silver coins in China prior to 1898# the un-unifora provincial 
silver dollars from the provincial mints and the fractional silver coins 
of local mints had added on© more trouble to the existing serious situa­
tion. Since 1887 the first modern mint was set up in Canton of Kwang* 
tuag province and turned out the Chinese dragon dollars* bearing the 
emblem of the dragon and the fractional silver coins* other provinces 
followed the lead to establish local mints* suoh as Wuchang Mint of 
the provinces of Hupei and Hunan in 1895 and the Tientsin Mint in 1896. 
For the purpose of understandIng the causes which 1©d to the situation 
of un-uniform local silver coins it is w.iso to describe briefly the 
development of these local mints and the coinage of these coins.
It goes back to the tine shortly before th© Opium ";ar (184 2) when*
R. bagel * Chinese Currency and Banking* Shanghai* 1915* p. 52.
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la 1336, a provincial treasurer sent a protest to Poking, then the
Capital, against the imporation of opium and declared that th© imported
foreign eo ins were of groat oomrenieno© to trad® ®tsd, imlik® the opium,
were producing not the slightest injury to China* Th© official showed
that the coins had then an extensive circulation in th© four coast
provinces in the southern part of China* After th© Opium 'filar (1842) all
the different' kinds of foreign silver coins in fact war© lawful money in
Canton* In 138? in China th© monetary circumstances which resulted In
66ths establishment of th© first local mint (Canton) were as foIXowss
1* Aftsr the Taiping Rebellion, ths oash oiarrency was vniy unsatis­
factory because of the stoppage of th© coinage of oash in general* The
revival of industries in ths provincas increased th© demand for the ©ash 
67currency;
2* Sentimental reasons, according to which China desired to have a 
coinage on lines which were similar to the system employed by all modern 
countries;
3* ^ith th© Increase in th® bullion value of the cash coins, owing 
to the depreciation of silver aft©r 1873, th© copper cash was promptly 
melted down;
4* The multitude of different specimens of oash coins, genuine and 
spurious, circulating side by side at unstable market rates— som® a 
thousand years old and some cast only yesterday*
Kann, Th© Currencies of China, Shanghai, 1926, p* 392; and 
Wen Pin Wei, The Currency Problem In China, 1914, Columbia University,p* 45; £• B* Wafeel, Chinese Currency anSTlJank, Shanghai, 1915, p« 55*-
A detail of casting of copper cash in Tsing dynasty is shown in 
the Appendix of Ur* Kann's The Currencies of China, p* 429*
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Besides these mentioned above, in Peking, the 10™cash pieces (token
money) had depreciated to about 2-cash in value and caused froqus nt
SBprice disturbances*
These conditions led th© impress Dowager to issue an edict in 
1887, commanding, in response to a memorial of th® Board of Revenue, 
that
All provinces along the Yangtze (river) and the seaboard be 
required to convert a porti on of ths ir remittances to Peking into 
oash and send this oash to Tientsin, there to be stored up In 
readiness for us© in Pekingj that the provinces which were required 
by law to manufacture oash should one and all be called upon to 
commence operations without delay with a view to a gradual restora­
tion to the old basis*
By a subsequent edict th© depreciated 10-oash currency in Peking was 
given a fixed legal value based upon the market value in 1887* namely,
2 oash for each 10-oash piece*
At that time Chang Ghi-tumg, then ths Viceroy of Kwangiung province, 
who already planned to set up the Canton Mint for the purpose of coining 
silver dollars, took this opportunity to suggest th© following points* 
i. n  ,000,000 in silver should bo struck off at once as the first 
experiment and if these coins were received favorably, 16,000,000 in all 
should be coined at Canton;
2* If the experiment should prove a success, he then would advise 
that the Board of Revenue establish a central mint at Tientsin to coin 
the national dollar;
3, Be proposed a coin slightly heavier than the Mexican dollar in 
order to make its introduction easy*
®*V. supra, p. 45*
® W  Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in China, Columbia University, 
1914, p. 45.
This memorial was re for rod to the Board of Revenue and no reaction 
was heard from it* Ths prospect of an early ©atabl 1 shmant of a national 
and uniform coinage was thus lost sight of. But Chang Chi-tung managed 
to secure sanction for his Canton mint which was the first modern mint 
set up in that country for the purpose of coining the silver dollar 
and copper coin* It was in the spring of 188? that he petitioned th© 
fimprass to sanction the coinage of Chinese dollar®, bearing the emblem 
of the dragon* H© had the view that the Chinese dragon dollar would tend 
to dislodge the foreign currency prevailing in China at that time* The 
petition of Chang obtained imperial sanction, whereupon the Canton Mint 
began to strike th© first dragon dollar. In 1890 th© dollar mad© its 
appearance on the market* The gross weight of it* styled Kwangsu cur­
rency, was 0*73 Tsaoping taels or 0.7245 Euping t&elsj its contents of 
fine silver weighed 0*6540 Kuping taels* which corresponds to th© fine­
ness of th© Mexican dollar, via*, 902.7/1,000the• It is said that ttth©
dragon dollar had at first a weight of 27*27 gram, which was afterwards
60lowered to 26*9 grams* The fineness Is G*900»w
Besides the dragon dollars th© Canton Mint Issued the fractional 
silver pieces and th© 7-candarin cash (old oopper cash) for the Morfch®
But It did not issue the modern copper coin (10-cash piece) until 1900*
It was decreed that th© new dragpn dollar should be legal tender and ac­
ceptable as such in payment of taxes* likin, customs dues and official 
salaries* As a matter of fact, the new dollars were not favorably re­
ceived by th© public and were accepted by the latter by weight, instead 
61of by count* They were acceptabl© outside that province only at a
g0Annual Report of the Director of the Mint of th© United States, 
19°°, p. 524* ' ™
In 1696 the Viceroy, Mr* Chang Chin—twig who had boon transferred 
to the Vie ©royalty of the provinces of Hupei and Hunan from the provinces
discount. Othar provinces followed suit in ths course of years* In 
1898 Wuchang of Hupei province established a mints in 1896 Tientsin did 
likewise. But the result was still less fortunate than the Canton Mint. 
Later on there were m a y  provincial mints operating in China. Their 
doings were not subjected to Central Government control, and it resulted
£4in a lack of uniformity of coins and in overproduction. Furthermore
"every province manufacturing dragon dollars csabossed th© name of the
respective province thereon, thus hindering and curtailing circulation
88throughout the country."
At the beginning of the setting up of the provincial mints, the 
seeds of trouble were already sowed by the non-unifoim and non-controlled 
coinage of the subsidiary silver coins in each provincial mint. The Mint 
at Canton produced subsidiary silver coins for the first time in A. D« 
1890. These were of a fineness of 0*820, as compared with 0.9GQ— th© 
fine contents of the dragon dollar. The new subsidiary coins were well 
received by the public and as they left a wide margin of profit to th® 
Mint authorities, as soon as the other provinces realised the enormous 
possibilities in connection with the pro duct ion of the subsidiary silver 
coins, th® immediate result was an enormous over-production of subsidiary 
silver coins in several mints and a consequent fall in their market values 
The over-production of subsidiary coins had been, circulated at a discount.
of" Kwongtung""and Rwangsl issued a proclamation to ths effect that the new 
Hupei dollar was officially given a oash value at th© rate of one silver 
coin to 1,000 cash. It m s  soon found out that a mere proclamation could 
not fix the exchange between ths two currencies and the order became a 
dead letter. (Wen Pin Wei, Ths Currency Problem in China, p* 49.)
®^?he details concerning th® weight and the condition of th© pro­
vinces* mints are shown in the Appendix of Mr* Kami’s The Currencies of 
China, p. 819.
Kann, The Currencies of China, p. 816.
rom the table compiled in the Annual Report of the Director of the M * of the United States in 1900, it is obvious“ThaiT“'most provincial 
mints were emphasising the issue of the subsidiary silver coins about 1898
For instance* they were stated to be at a discount of from 2 to 3 per 
oent. In Foochow and its district.
The unfortunate effect of the over-pro dust ion of the fractional 
eoins by the provincial mints and the different content of the dragon 
dollar had attracted the attention of both the Central Government and 
the province governments. In 1898 the hoard of Revenue tried to check 
this unfortunate tendency. Sufc it failed to reach its aim.
C. Paper Money
For nearly forty years after Tung-ohih came to the throne in 1862, 
the issue of paper instruments of credit was left to banks* i.e.* the 
native banks* the Shansi banks* and the foreign banks. The f i m e  * the 
money-changers* and later on sons quasi-provincial or 11 official1* bonks 
followed the example of the banks in issuing paper money.
Generally speaking* of this paper currency issued by these private 
organisations* a part is notes based on cash. Such cash notes circulat­
ing in local markets formed a considerable portion of the ordinary cur­
rency. They circulated independently of government guarantee and con­
trol. The notes were rarely current outside the district where th® credit 
of the issuer was known to be beyond question* There were also an in­
creasing amount of silver notes based on the tael or the provincial dollar. 
Those notes were also issued by the foreign banks, particularly by the 
Hongkong and Shanghai banks, and circulated extensively in the advanced 
commercial centers.
It was not rare that the cash-note® issued by firms, native banks* 
atiA other private organisations were circulating on a discount basis.
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. 65For instanoe, oas kind of cash note, issued by a cash shop of Wuchang,
Hepie province, near Hankow, about the year 18©?, was circulating at 12
per cent lees than its face value* That is, a cash not© of 1,000 cash
was worth only 880 cash in the market*
VI* China’s banking of the years around 1898*
The basis of private banking procedar © in China around the year 1898 
had been mutual trust and confidence rather than state control. The banks, 
native, Shansi, and "official,1* had been private enterprises, rather than 
joint-stock, corporation, and other types, though closely organised into 
bankers* guilds, which laid down strict rules for carrying on business, 
sad with severe penalties for violation of codes.
For the purpose of convenience to describe the existing banking 
situation around 1898, it may be well to classify the banking Institutes 
into the following groups*
A* Shansi Banks
The Shansi banks were originated and run by the people from Shansi
province of China* Prior to the years around 1898, the Shansi banks were
the only institdbions that had branches or correspondents in every part
of the country* Their drafts and acceptances were received anywhere,
66•vwn by the goveramexftal treasury, without question.
It goes back years before 1898* As China’s foreign trade grew 
these banks played a more important part* They remitted funds from eea-
F. Spalding, Eastern Exchange Currency and Finance, p* 399.
^S* R. vV&gel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p. 166*
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paF%$ to t)Mi interior and fro® th® interior to sca-ports* As th@ i23d̂ r** 
provincial business increased year after year, the Shansi hanks slowly 
gave up local business in favor of the lecsit native bonks* Furthermors,
£b  Maty instances, they supplied these local native banks with working 
capital* The native hanks haw, since about 1875, obtained support of 
capital not only fro® other sources such as Shansi banks, but also from 
foreign banks, through the medium of what is ©cmmonly known as ^ohop 
leans•* Meanwhile the governmental officials, with a view to personal 
profits, deposited the public fends not only with the Shansi banks as had 
been the custom for centuries, but also with the native banks* By the 
IsfsIspBSSli pri or to 1896 and after, the native banks, foreign banks» and, 
ether financial institutions gradually took the places of the Shansi banks 
is the basking world of China*
S« Native Banks
Originally the native banks were nothing else but changing shops, 
where one kind of money could be changed Into another* After emphasising 
the Intor-provinoial business, the Shansi banks gradually gave up local 
business to the local native banks* The existing circumstances in China 
led the native banks to dominate the local business! because, in the first 
place, the resident and merchant of one province looked upon the resident 
and merchant of a neighboring province not in th© light of eitiaens of the 
same country, but as people out of whore thoy should make profit as much 
as possible* In the second pl&oe, the officials of local governments 
looking out for their own larger interests gradually gave the native
®^It looks like the "call money” in th® money market of Europe euad 
America-
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88banks a share in the business a6 custodians of government funds*
The native banks vers (end usually still are) partnership ooneerxs 
with unlimited liability or one-man institutions and, in some instances* 
family concerns* They advanced money on the personal and f inaneial 
etasdisg of clients without requiring, security and issued draft remit­
tances over & limited area* Practically the native banks did all the 
ether kinds of business done by the foreign banka In the present time*
The whole story ef China’s banking business can not be completed 
without dealing with the Provincial Government Banks of the time* As 
mentioned above* the funds of the governments* while gam rally kept with 
the Shansi banks* were also loaned out to the native banks* The profits 
mostly went to the officials of districts and provinces* In about 1890 
the official began to organise their own banks in order to derive the 
full benefits of the us® of the money which was left in their hands* 
soa®times for long periods* before being dispatched to Peking* Since 
1880 a number of the so-called "official or provincial banks * war® started 
is almost every province* Really they were not Government bank© at all* 
They did the usual banking business— receiving deposits* giving loans* 
discounting bills of exchange, and so forth— and did such business with 
an almost reckless disregard for safety or sound commercial principles* 
They employed very little capital and traded on the credit of being a 
so-called government bank* These official banks* which cut into the 
business of the native and Shansi banks* ware the greatest offenders in 
connection with the unrestricted is sue of paper money In the latter years 
of the Manehu regime*
^ S. R* 9Tagel* Chines® Currency and Hanking* 191G* p* 181*
C* Foreign Banks
After 1842, whan Shanghai was opened as a treaty port by virtu® of 
the treaty of tanking, foreign Tear chants began to extend their operations 
Into the Chinese banking business* The Chartered Bank of India, Aus­
tralia, and China (British) established its branch office at Shanghai 
in 1853* At that time, British merchants profited. In the trade of opium 
and cotton goods imported and the Chartered Sank of India, Australia and 
China was chiefly engaged in discounting bills and granting drafts to 
these merchants* Later on the hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
also set up its branch office at Shanghai in 1867* Later on many large 
foreign banks gradually established bran on offices in Shanghai and other 
principal cities in that country*
Around 1898 foreign banks arid branch banks of foreign banks played
an important part in the banking of China, particularly in the treaty
ports and in connection with foreign trade activities* “Foreign bank®
in China sere sll located at the treaty ports or a certain place in Peking,
and under fcba system of extraterritoriality they are governed by the laws
of* the different nations having extraterritorial rights in China by 
-69treaty* They did business with the old style Chines® native banks
through the “comprador” of the foreign banks under the latter®’ responsi­
bility* “They have been able to issue notes without restriction by the
70Chinese Government” but with restriction by their own country's govern­
ment* However, “the laws of the different nations on the subject o.f
L. Lee, Currency, banking, and finance in Chins, Trade Promotion 
Series, Ho* 27, 1926, y* 102*
^Ibid• , p* 102•
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banking and the issue of notes vary ©onsidar&.bly*m<̂
Th» foreign banka specialised in foreign exchange* Deposits also 
«*?3 carried« With them loans were made against document© or by moans 
of overdrafts; credit information m s  furniahsd; drafts and transfers 
saw issued; and foreign trad® was financed*. Besides© th$se mentioned 
above* the foreign bonks served another important business* Following 
the Opium War in 1842 against Great Britain*. China was crowded with 
troubles within and without the country, year in and year out* The 
^iasss Government was compelled not only to inour large war expenses 
but also to pay heavy indemnities* This led to making loans from foreign 
sources * end the foreign banks in China acted as agencies for handling 
such losses* which again yielded considerable profits to them*
la addition to these* the foreign banks in China have been the cus­
todians of huge exma of money deposited by Chinese mnti&rism* militarists* 
politicals, and other rich people* who considered the foreign banks* pro­
tested by extraterritorial treaties* to be sanctuaries for their money*
D« Others*
Prior to the period concerned* there existed a group of ssiall money 
shops and money stands at which people could get o m  kind of money changed 
for another* They used different rates for exchange in order to make 
profit from their customers* People who hod silver dollars and pieces of 
silver wished to change them into copper cash in order to pay for daily 
purchases| those who had a large amount of copper cash wished to change 
it Into silver in order to pay for wholesale purchases and had to do
71Ibid** p. 102
business with these money shops and money stands in either a big city 
or snail towns in China* The rate of changing silver from cash or
changing cash from silver fluctuated from hi me to time and from town
to tan* There was no governmental control*
Til* Suaait&ry and Si gnifieance— Puring the latter part of the Tsing 
dynasty in China* the struggle between the dominsuTt minor and dominant 
major groups, the Empress and Shaperor, m d  the conservative and the reform
parties prevented every chance to reform, the political function and eco­
nomic life of China and to introduce the Western type of civilization*
On the other hand these conflicts fed the ambition of the aggressors 
eisong the Western Powers and Japan* The aggression of the Western Powers 
and Japan in fact added fue 1 to the existing fire of conflict* The grave 
situation lasted until 1911 when the Republic of China was created*
Until the last period of the Tsing dynasty (1851) China*s Govern­
ment was inefficient and decentralized both from the standpoint of organ­
isation and personnel, and it could not meet th© strong storm of the 
transitional period* It failed not only to fores®© the conditions and 
set up a suitable policy for the country, but also failed to handle th© 
existing trouble*
As to the public finance, the revenue was quite inadequate to meet
the needs of both central and local governmentc3 the administration of
72collections ©specially of the land tax, regular customs, and th®
n *
The tax-collector goes to the taxpayer and delivers the tax-not© 
itemized in accordance with law (the permanent aettleneit) and precedent 
(th© accretions resulting, from, many a battle and sancti onod by custom of 
years) • The amount shova as th© total cn the not Ice is th ® amount which 
must be turned into the fJsion’s treasury (magictrat®), ®ud takes no ac­
count of the actual coat of collection, though an amount is always in­
cluded for It3 for the Hsian, more sinioo, pays his subordinates little
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gIikin#n was poorly handled from. the viewpQint of "th© prinoi'pls of 
economy; 'th© whole system of taxation had its fundamenta 1 weakness 
in its inelasticity* It is not too difficult to understand why both 
the Central and th© provincial governments# for many years thereafter# 
resorted to the currency policy as the main way to solve their finan­
cial difficulties*
dr nothing as salary# but compels the® to scratch around for their 
mainien&ncej and ©van a tax-collector must live* Th© Hsian# however# 
arms his collectors with power# and thus armed they are enabled to ox- 
tract their noos ts of collection” from the tax-payer-* The amount to b© 
exacted is indeterminate# and forms the subject of a battle annually 
renewed between payer and payee *. • * (p* S3)
• « « « t
**In on© district (Esien) 44 par cent is added for me It age fee# or 
inferior touch# and 26 per cent* for an illusory ’cost of collection's 
in another th© amount in taels is converted into cash at 2#600 to the 
tael# and converted back into taels at 1,105# being an a ddition of 136 
per cent*# end then 50 per cent* is added for ’cost of collection**
(pp* 83-84}
• » « • •
*̂ hs typical customs post# and the fattest# was that of th© ’Hoppo* 
of Canton****In 1843# with a collection exceeding, ten million taels# 
in amount# the official return was less than one million*
• • * « *
nXn 1903 the Russian statistics showed on export to China exceed­
ing the Chinese Customs import by over Tls* IS,000#.000# and tan import 
from China exceeding th© Chines© Customs carport by over Tie® 30#000#000; 
it is unlikely that this trade passed entirely untoxed# bath on th© inward 
and th© outward traffic# and, at 5 per cent*# the duty collector! on this 
trade alone amounted to Tls* 2#250,000* (pP* 95-96)
e « © • e
’’Likin is a now levy, with its asm administration independent of all 
other taxing agencies, and the collection is much more in th© hands of 
the officer in charge of each barrier and hi© subordinates than is pos­
sible with oiher taxes**..A special oa.se**• will perhaps best illustrate 
our meaning• «*the costs of collection, as far a© this particular col­
lect or ate was concerned# dm& to nearly 100 per o©nt*— that is to say# 
they practically collected Tie* 7*50 of which TIs* 3*50 arc the costa 
of collecting Tls* 4*w (p# 105)
(5* B* Morse, The Trade end Adminlatration of Chino# London, 1913)
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Because o £ the lack of & money market for arranging the dome silo
loan for & short term and other reasons, China’s Government exclusively
employed foreign loans, even despite high intsrest rates and oppressive
terms, in order to get money to moot the war indemnity and at times
governmental expenditures* Most all of the foreign loam were eon*
tr&eted in terms of a foreign currency unit on the gold basis, and
secured by the revenue of customs duties and the salt tax* China’s
Government therefore assumed th® risk of the fTuotuaticra of th® gold
price of silver and also lost the right to control th© revenue from
these two important resources* The foreign loans had indirectly driven
the Chinese Government to abuse the monetary policy evon in peace times*
Regarding China’s foreign trade, two things were worthy of notes
(1) Both excess of merchandise imports and large amounts of imports of
silver for a long period before 1898 were balanced by the export of
gold, emigrants’ remittances and the issuance of foreign loans; (S) th©
total amount of China’s foreign trad© increased from year to year*
In spite of the serious aggression of the Western Powers, China’s
whole situation, although very grave, was not hopeless. Th© failure
of the young Chinese Reform Party that was attempting to improve th©
administration of th© Central Government and set up a new, effective
political machine in 1898 was the turning point for that country. Prom
1698 forward, China’s monetary system followed the whole fortune of a
state turned into the dark storm for many years*
In China th© Chansi banks with adequate capital and their inherited
career monopolized the cojmneroi&l banking, business for many centuries
78(since about 1200 A* 1>. to 1898, and even as late as I911). After the
7*S* R* Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, '1918, p. 154*
greater development of the domestic? and foreign trade, the natural 
tendency of division of labor and the existing ciroumstances in China 
fed th© growth of the native banks, cash shops and the foreign banks* 
Gradually the Shansi banks were forced to get out of the way for the 
new corners and shifted th© local banking business to the native banks.
The native and "official" banks took over th® function of keeping public 
fends* The native and foreign banks handled the function of remittance 
of funds.
From the standpoint of the functions of the banking bus in© as , the 
native banks did every kind of banking business which the modern banks 
are doing to-day. In organisation the native banks were neither joint- 
stock banks nor corporations, but either partnerships or individuals 
with unlimited powers. They advanced loans not on security but on a 
personal basis* They were not controlled or superintended by Govern­
ments but by non-official organisations, the ’’bankers guilds." Besides 
the native banks mentioned above, a few ’’official" banks crowded into 
the banking theater. During the few years before 1898, th© "official" 
banks not only did the usual banking business but also issued paper money 
either for their own purpose or for various province governments. The 
foreign banks took advantage of their hug© amount© of capital and fits 
protection of the extraterritoriality to control China’s foreign ex­
change, to finance China’s foreign trade, to do usual banking business 
in trad© ports, to facilitate eoice political foreign loans to China’s 
Central Government, to open a safe way for the avaricious officers to 
deposit their money, and to issue tho bank notes.
Until 1898 China did not have tor own Central Gov©ramont bonk.
7§
Furthermore neither the Central Government nor th© provincial govern- 
meats trie4 to superintend the hanking business and. set up some sound 
banking regulations*
The situation of China*s monetary system prior to 1898 was much 
more complicated* Generally speaking, both silver arid copper coin cir« 
eulated side by side throughout the whole country® The paper money of 
native banks, foreign banks, and firms was a relatively local currency* 
Speaking in another way, th© silver shoes or foreign dollars were the 
exchange medium, although not legal tender, in the wholesale trade, for 
salaries, aid for public payment in the trade ports $ the copper cash were 
used for the purpose of retail payment and daily wages* In the interior, 
the silver shoe of smaller sis©, foreign dollars, and pieces of silver 
were used for large payments} and copper cash, later on the subsidiary 
silver coin, for small payment* Is small towns copper cash played the 
main role* In trade ports or cities with foreign banks and Chinese 
native banks, firms issusd silver notes based on either th© dollar or 
the tael* In the interior native banks, firms and individuals used to 
issue cash notes, which circulated in a certain area*
The units of tael by which silver shoes and silver pieces are counted 
are different from each other depending on places, business, and tradi- 
tion* It is the seme case on the ?,toudh” or "purity** of si Ivor® The 
silver shoe is neither regular in size nor of th© same purity. Th© 
irregular silver pieces oan be about one tael for the big sis©,
1/lOQth. of one tael for the small size* The purity of silver pieces 
ar© not quite th© same* $hen people used either shoe a or pieces of 
silver, they must weigh them and reckon their touch one by one*
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Tbs foreign dollars circulate in their own preferred area or port*- 
circulate by weight, not by count, in China#
Th® Chinese dollar and subsidiary silver coin produced by provinces 
are different in appearance, weight, and purity* Dollars circulate' out 
of the province where they ar© produced at discount, and the subsidiary 
coin at a discount even in the province where they aare coined*
A® to the copper coins, worn and new, genuine and counterfeit, all
of them are accepted by people# The rate of exchange between silver 
and copper cash fluctuates from time to time, from place to place, from 
one kind of quality of cash to another * Especially in Peking, then the 
Capital, tdie token copper coins fluctuated much more than the heavier 
cash in other places#
Gold in China was not used as a medium of exchange, bub as one kind 
of art cask value, as a means of saving, and as ornaments. For a great many 
years, the export of China's gold was more than its import# It is said 
that one of the reasons leading to the excess export of gold is the 
rising price of gold in the world market compared with the price of 
silver# Another reason is that the Chines© send gold out as on© of the 
ways to settle the usual unfavorable balance of trade*
The fluctuation of the changing rate between gold and silver in
the domestic market of China and the rat© of foreign exchange between 
China and countries using gold money always followed the tendency of the 
fluctuation of “the gold price of silver in th© world market#
GEAPTSR III
THS CURRENCY REFORM OF CHINA'S GOVtRMFS?^ AM) BSPORTAHT 
PROPOSALS OF THE REFORM (BEFORE 1910)
I* Th© factors leading to th© preliminary proposals *
After th© war with Japan in 1895* th© modern reform movement became 
extremely popular and spread over every branch of governmental adminis­
tration* Influenced by a small group of energetic reformers* who were 
readily listened to by the Emperor Kuang~hsi, the government projected 
many comprehensive and radical reform measures for the modernisation of 
the country* Within this high tide of reform enthusiasm the currency 
reformers started calling th© government * s attention, to the existing 
complicated monetary condition* Although this general movement for 
reform was rudely interrupted by the coup d’etat of 1898* and a r©ac­
tion came with the return of the rule of the Empress Dowager, the govern­
ment and some farsighted provincial officials never lost Bight of th© 
existing serious weaknesses in the monetary system in the country.
II. The important preliminary proposals of currency reform befor©
1900s
A* Mr. Hu Chu-fen* the fayor of Peking* which was the national 
capital at that time, in a memorial submitted to Emperor Kuantl~hsi in 
1895, suggested the introduction of a uniform ooimage system using 
three metals, namely, gold, silver, and copper. He furthermore suggested 
th© establishment of a bank of issue under the control of the hoard of 
Revenue with branches in certain provinces.
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The prop©eels as submitted by Mr. Hu Chu-fen were not capable of 
reeXlse&ien* because, In the first place, th® country at the time was 
met reacty* for this change. In the second place, he was not any too 
conversant with the mechanism which his scheme entailed.
8. Mr. Wang Pen-yu&n, a censor* In another memorial to the Hmperor 
in the same year* proposed the immediate coinage of silver to take th® 
place of copper cm the market, and the opening of a central silver mint 
In order to relieve the market stringency caused by the scarcity of copper 
cash.
The only reaction to the proposal was the establishment of several 
provinoial mints* which further complicated the situation.
There were numerous proposals of the same kind mentioned above, 
but none of them revealed a thorough understanding of the existing 
monetary situation, nor offered a well-drafted plan of reform. Thee® 
patriotic officials were not experts in currency theory or practice and 
therefore suggested only what they thought to be important. tfeverthe** 
less* they had really suggested some significant points and advanced 
wh&t they considered to be the suitable remedy for the serious monetary 
condition which then existed.
C. The first comprehensive programme of currency reform was pro­
posed in 1896 by Mr. Sheng Hsu&n-huai, the Junior Secretary in the 
Foreign Office. Within his program several main points were as foHowes
1. The Chingping tael, 900 fine, of silver should bo adopted as
the monetary unit.
2. A Central Mint should be stabliehed at Peking and branch mints 
at Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, am Wuchang.
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3* Taxes should be made payable In the national coin and the use 
of bullion as currency should b© prohibited*
4* A national bank, with a cap it al of 5,000,000 taels of silver, 
all shares to be held by Chinese only, should bo established at Shanghai 
and should b© known as the Imperial Chines© Bank of International Commere©* 
5* Gold coins and subsidiary silver coins should also b© sainted*
Ur* Sheng was heavily interested in th© Chin© Merchants* Steam Navi­
gation Company; and ha pledged th© shareholder© of th© Company to supply 
the proposed central bank with one-fifth of its share capital* -The recom­
mended bank was to have the right of coinage; th© powers were to issue 
notes, to handle all govermaent funds and to establish branch bank© in 
.the provincial capitals, and in ports in Europe and America*
Although this proposal was sanctioned^ it was not put into effect* 
Because his training had been that of an official in th© Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, he was not conversant with the far-reaching financial 
system* Fe&nwhil© tbs conditions within China &ft©r th© Sine-J&panes©
War were very difficult ones* Before any definite step oould be taken 
th© Boxer outbreak occurred and no steps were taken until about th© letter 
part of 1901,
D, In 1897 l£r* Chen Chi-ohang, a censor, suggested that several 
dencminati ona of th© cash should be struck by modern machinery and put
^The imperial sanction was granted Feb* 26, 1897, to Shong and ho 
was given authority, as soon as the bank had been established, to s trite 
100,000 coins based on the tael in accordance with hi© proposal* These 
coins were to be put Into circulation as an experiment* Th© powers and 
privileges conferred upon the bank wore very comprehensive, including 
the right to coin money, issue note©, handle all government funds and 
establish branch banks in the provincial capitals, the open porta and in 
Europe and Amsrioa* (ft'ext Pin-wel, The Currency Problem in China, Colum­
bia University, 1914, p• 54*) ~ ■
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into circulation* Th© eountefoiting practices with th© old cash had 
become so&ndalous, and it was suggested that eoinag© by th© new method® 
would safes oounfe erf ait lag much more difficult* Life© most of th© proposal® 
©f that time, it lad to no practical action until 1 0 0 2 .
£• In 1807 Mr* Yang Yi-ohi, who was then a junior official in on© 
of tha ministries, stimulated th© embarrassment of th© government in 
finding the msasifbr th© payment of interest end principal for its foreign 
geld loans, proposed officially th© introduction of the English monetary 
system into China, with th© gold pound as th© unit* He suggested that 
gold export through the port of Shanghai should be mad© illegal* This 
refora was not realised*
Among all of th© proposals mentioned above, with the exception of 
Mr* Bhang hsuan-huai's banking project, non© offered a complete plan*
Each was but one cf th© many political and financial reforms that was 
advocated by the government and by people over th® country*
III* The condition ftf 1000 and afters
A* The increasing foreign loara— Immediately after 1900 the worst
foreign gold debt was the Boxer Indemnities of 450,000,000 Haikwan taels*
This indemnity was made into a gold debt bearing four per cant* interest
and calculated at a rate fixed by foreign countries (eight in number)*
This indemnity debt was secured by (1) the national customs revenue,
(2 ) the revenues from native customs within one hundred fifty miles of
2the treaty ports, (3) the salt tax* The annual payment for amortisa­
tion and interest was as followsi
A— 18,829,500 taels to be paid from 1st year to 9th year,
B— 19,829,300 w « « u n IQth ta * 13th " ,
^Feng“Hua Huang, “Public Debts in China,” Studios in History, &eo- 
n̂mietKi and Public Law* Vol* LXXXY, ho- 2, Columbia V)niv©rsYEy, p* 25*
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C— 23,285,300 taels to be paid from 14th year,
©— 34,485.600 " * " * " 13th w to 30th year,
8— 35,350,150 « • • »t a 30th " " 39th * .
The principal, £67,500,000 {in China9s money it is 450,000,000 laikwaa
taels) and interest on the huge debt were payable in gold currency*
Th© amount mentioned above added to th© annual p&ymairfc on the war
indemnity loan (£38,032,884) of SinO“Japanese STIst (1804*»X89§) and the
amortisation aid interest of foreign loans contrasted before 1300 are
really & heavy burden to the govorisnsnt«
B* The gold price of silver— Th© price of silver after 1900 continued
to dec 1 in© further from its already depreciated level as shown by th®
annual rates shown below
1870 60 9/l 6 pence (average)
1884 SO Xl/lS " 
35 9/16 M1893 «
1894 28 15/16 * h




1901 27 3/16 " «
1902 24 1/lB ** «
1903 24 3/4 " »
1904 26 13/32 * «
1905 27 13/16 ,s n
1908 24 13/32 * n
1909 23 23/32 w »
The decline of the gold price of silver increases the already heavy 
burden on China’s Govermaent from the point of view of payment of gold 
currency (since her standard was silver) for her foreign loans and debts 
which originated from war indemnity*
C* Th© foreign countries* urgency for China’s currency reform— The 
M&eksy treaty or what is known as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
between China and Great Britain, signed on September 5, 1902, provided
SfYmual Report of the Director of the Mint, Washington, D* C *, 
1940, p* 867
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that “China agree* to taka th® necessary steps to provide a uniform 
national coinage whioh shall be legal tender in payment of all duties* 
taxes and other obligations throughout th® Empire by British as well as 
Chinese subjects• ** The Treaty of Commerce between the United States and 
China signed in the following month also contained a provision to that 
effect.
0* The example of currency reform given by th© neighboring countries—  
Besides Japan and Russia which had adopted the gold standard in 1897* 
several countries and colonies located around China had adopted the gold 
standard or the gold exchange standard. For instance* India* in 1893* 
joined the rank of nations preparing to adopt the gold standards in 1902 
America decided to refora ourreno y in th® Philippine Islands 5 on Severn- 
bar 25* 1902 the gold exchange standard was adopted by Siam; a currency 
committee had been appointed already in 1893 to suggest Improvemanfc in 
the currency system of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States § India 
adopted th* gold exchange standard in 1898. In such circumstances Shim,
was stimulated a great deal in her already loud claim for currency reform.
In the spring of 1903 the great Osaka Exhibition was opened. Th© Chinese 
Government availed itself of that opportunity to delegate Prince Tsai Chon 
and the Grand Councillor tia Tung to visit Japan* UTa Tung was specially 
charged to investigate ths working, of th© gold-standard system in Japan 
with the object of having it introduced into China. But no report and
proposal was ever made by Ka Tung.
S* The minting of new copper conte— Alt houjji the establishment of 
the first modern mint in Canton was in 1889, the coinage of the new copper 
cents began in 1900. Th© design of the modem Chinese copper coinage is
m
eharacfcariby an aliagorloal designs th© stamping o f the value i in 
many eases by the date of issue being iaassribedg by omitting the square 
hole in tbs center, so ehar&cteristie of ancient cash coins* These ar® 
the most important of the innovations whioh distinguished the new coin­
age from the antiquated issue of copper o&sh.^
According to one record,
The first modern copper coin produced in Canton is 28 m* su in 
diameterj it is composed of red copper* The obverse shows within 
an inner circle the dragon emblem, while the outer circle bears 
the inscription ”£wangtung one cent.” The rovers© has ixusorigtions 
In Chinese and Manchu characters* The doriominrAAon Mono cent was 
soon altered to ttten cash,” an inscription whioh all Chinos© copper 
coins of that value showed during the imperial regime*
The coinage of tbs Canton Mint was just a provincial affair* Th© 
conclusion of peace in 1901, after th© Boxer Rebellion, led to an im­
provement through far-reaching reforms in ©very branch of China’s national 
life* Relating to the new copper coinage, a reform ©diet was issued under 
date of February 2, 1902s
• ••Let the Viceroys and Governors of Hi a provinces along th© River 
Yanhse and the sea-ooast provide th© necessary funds and adopt th® 
aforesaid plan (as the plan of Kw&ngtuaag and Fuehien) and at once 
mint these coins in addition to th© otha r being mad© by them, that 
they say be put into general circulation....The legal cash of the 
Capital ought also to be of th© seme sortj therefore, lot th© pro­
vinces of Fuohien, Kwaagtung, and Kiangsu at one© forward to th©
Board of Revenue several hundred thousand each of the copper coins 
minted by them, that the s&id Board may pay them out and get them 
into us©, which we hop^ will be beneficial arid oonvenient to the 
people and prove a help to the currency.. <, •
The order of the Coatral Govormnont was obeyed by the provinces whioh
foresaw the possibility of obtaining profits from minting. Provincial
^H* •£*-* Samsden, Modem Chinoss Copper Coi rs, ^orcoo'cer, p'.6.ss», 1011,
p. 3#
^S. Aaim, The Currencies of China* Shanghai, 1926, p* 393*
®Jbids, p. 39d.
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mists sprang up liks mushrooms # !,Their output; of now copper cents was
readily taka®. by the people* not only at the face-value of 100 to th®
dollar* but not infrequently at a premia*n7
Within a few years after the beginning of the coinage in 1900* a
bogs amount of the copper cents was put out from these provincial mints#
One source put the estimate at the figure of 10,000,000,000 places issued
8up to th® and of 1908* and probably over a third of these earn® from the 
9Wuehang Mint* From other sources it is said that the'total issue of
copper coins rose from 1,698,700,000 pieces in 1904 to 7,600,000,000 in
1&# following year; and at the close of 1906 there were sixteen copper
mists and 846 coinage presses with a capacity of sixteen billion coins 
10a year# The imports of copper, whioh rarely amounted to over a mil­
lion taels before, increased to nearly twenty-two million taels in 1807® 
These new copper coins weighed only 7*6 grama, containing ninety-five 
per cent* copper and five per cent# sine, and th© actual values of a silver
tael and a dollar were then equivalent to 228 and 168 pieces of copper,
respectively* These cents or ten-cash pieces at first circulated at the 
rate of a hundred for & dollar# Therefore these cents war© only token 
coins which at first the people took readily*
F# Depreciating the new copper cents— After overp rod notion of these 
new coins, the old cash, being undervalued in t$xms of the* new coins, was
7Ibid», p# 395#
A# Hamsden, Modern Chinese Copper Coins, Worcester, Mass*, 1911,
p* 4*
B. Mor ^Currsncy ixi JourDii 1 of tb.6 3y? ® 0»
Rt A* J3*, Vol* 38, 1306, p, 15*
H. Wagel, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915, p# 108% 
aryi g, Kami, The Currencies of Chino., Shanghai, J.92S, p* 102®
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rapidly disappearing from the principal city markets through the opera­
tion of Gresham's Law (the better ones were melted down and the inferior 
ernes driven to surrounding territory)*
The success and the minting profit obtained by the provinces* whioh 
had mints* caused Jealousy among soma of the provinces without possession 
of coinage plants* This led to feverish activity for installment of 
further minting machinery* In the minds of governors* coinage of money 
became a favorite means of raising revenues* In consequence* the over­
production of the new copper coins or copper cents and finally the de­
preciation of their value was ih© result* For instance* they depreciated* 
in terms of silver in Shanghai, twenty-two per cent* within the year 1006* 
The conditions in different provinces varied* but the depreciation was 
general* Furthermore this situation became more serious from th© follow­
ing causes: The embargo which was placed by some of the provinces on
the import of copper cunts from neighboring provinces caused further 
depreciation of this copper cent in the market of the ov©r-produotive 
provinces* The lack of uniformity owing to th© coinage by different
policies of province mints was also responsible for depreciation from
11the original value of the copper cent*
The Government was gravely concerned about th© depreciation of copper* 
An edict issued on August 22, 190b pointed out the serious situation* On 
December 7 of the same year* th© copper coinage was ordered suspended for 
a period of thro© months, ©waiting results of invest!gat ion* Under the 
nominal control of the Beard of Finance th© minting was soon resumed 
in 1906* From then on no attention was paid to the actual demand for
Kann* ?hg» Currencies of China* 1926* p* 395*
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solas. Violent fluctuations in the silver value of thes® copper coin© 
took place almost dally* la th© coarse of th® following; years the 
provincial mints continued to strike large quantities of copper coins 
ia their osa way. It is said that in 1906 the total issues of copper 
coins turned out by provincial mints was 1 *7 0 9 ,5 8 4 , 0 0 0  piecesj in 1907 
and 1906 the issues were 2,851,200,000 and 1,428,000,000 pieces, 
respectively. In 1909 most of the copper mints were obliged to close 
daws, the market being over flooded with coppers. In 1910 the total 
issue was worth the silver value of 100,000,000 taels.^
ius to the confusion of the coinage and distribution of China5s 
copper cents, the following factors were accepted as the causes increas­
ing the seriousness of the confusion* (1) The absence of adequate 
transportation facilities, which prevented rapid and organised distribu- 
ties.* The outlying districts lacked this copper coin and the producing 
centers were congested with it, (2) Speculation in these co ins grew to 
be Very extensive. The copp©r cent is distinctly a token coin of a 
bullion value inferior to its face amount. It has become an article 
of fluctuating value and an excellent object with whioh to speculate*
(3) Ignorance and avarice displayed by some of China's official,s.
(4) The prohibition o£ the part of one province to permit the importa­
tion into its own domains of coppers produced in another province*
{6) Th© deliberate adulteration of the metallic content of the coins, 
reduction of their sise and weight and very inferior workmanship.
(6) Tim refusal of all government offices to accept the new coins at 
their face value, 100 pieces to th© dollar, but instead only at their
12Ibid.. P. 397.
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market Tftlui* (7) An additional factor, contributing indirectly
towards tbs icoliao In Talus of China's copper currency system, is to
ha f©and ia th© uncontrolled issue of vast quantities of copper cash
note®* These ar© ©a it ted not only by provincial banks, but also by
private* banters, by cash shops, by pawn shops and by dealers in msr-
©handle© ©h© have ©if fie lent standing to Induce the people to accept
swell notes* (8) Furthermore another principal cause of th® debacle is
IShe be found ia the desire ho derive undue profits from minting*
O* The ©ver-produa tion of subsidiary silver coinage™***If wa trace 
the tendency of tbs provincial minte’ policy, we shall find that the 
provincial mints mere originally created for the purpose of minting 
the old eash and the silver dollars* Sooner or later they tend that 
the issue of the eld cash involved a loss to the respective provincial 
governments * Thus they stopped issuing the cash end turned their full 
attention to-the silver dollars* Finally they found that thee® Chines© 
dollars (dragon dollars) were not freely received for taxes, end wfeaa 
taten, ware accepted by weight, and not by count * These dollars had 
not the prestige of the Mexican dollars, but had only a provincial 
gmrente©* ***** outside the province of issue circulated only at a dig- 
count• The policy ©f the mints vias changed again* They devoted thair 
energy to the issue of subsidiary silver coinage* The* ten-cant and 
tweetyoent pieces of subsidiary silver coins, whioh consisted of 
silver 800 fine (while the dollar was 900 fin®) could be sold from the 
at 110j for the dollar and still show a profit* In this case 
the Inevitable result m s  an enormous overeproduction of these silver
*sIbid *, pp* 387-406*
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84&sldiary coins, thou greatly out of proportion to th® output of th® 
dollar pieces*^* Tbs logical consequence was th® falling in their 
mrhit value*
HP"* The currency reform of China's Govornmont end the proposals
consenting currency reforms
Since the movement of reform initiated by Emperor Kwong-sui in 1898
had failed, no step regarding th© currency reform m s  taken either by the
Central Severasent or the provincial governments* However, the situation
of the monetary system in the whole country became worse* At last th®
Cent rtO. Government was forced to do something because of the seriousness
of the situation*
An edict issued after th® Boxer Rebellion by th© Impress Dowager in
August 19G1 ordered the closing of th© provincial mints, except those at
Canton and Wuchang®, and legalised the circulation of coins issued by
those two mints in view of their uniform might and fineness* These two
mints were ordered to supply all the provinces with coins, in exchange
for pure silver ingots* Th® ©diet declared that seventy per cent* of
18the tribute and taxes were thenceforth to b© payable in silver syce® 
and thirty per cent• in silver dollars* The officers of the mints were 
required to give great care to th© strict uniformity in th© weight and 
fineness of the coins and to render quarterly reports of th© mint to th® 
Board of Revenue* Owing to the enormous ©xtent of th© territory and th©
total ismae of dollars was estimated at 40,000,000, while th© number of fractional silver issues was 1,400,000,000, according to a government statement made in 1910* (Wen Fln-wei, Th© Currency Problem in 
China* Columbia University, 1914, p* 45.)
2-̂ The word syce® used in China to describe silver oj a certain fine­ness* •• • Syce© is in China often called Wen Yin, meaning pur® silver”*.** Syeee silver is gene rally oast into "shoes” in China. (Herbert M*Bratter, Silver Market Dictionary* 1933, p. 172*)
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absence of modern means of transportation, th© eapaoity of th© two 
m in ts was not great enough to supply China with the neoeeeaiy ©sins*
A© a natter of fact, th© edict of reform of th® provincial mints was not 
obeyed*
In 19Q3 China Joined Mexico in proposing to th© fiovarxausnt of the
thaited States that an arrangement b© made for an international inquiry
Into the silver quest! on* fin April 2% 1903 an Imperial edict was issued,
appointing a Financial Cosraaission. The sssn© edict ordered the establish*
sent of a central mist at Tientsin for the purpose of making silver coins
uniform* The edict stated in parts
8e hereby command Prince CHixig and Chu Hung-chi, in conjunction 
with the Board of Finance, to consider carefully all necessary steps 
to mate© improvements in that direct!©a* * .*
At any rate, uniformity must be preserved with regard to all 
the money received or sent out by the Board of f inance or by various 
provincial treasuries****Weslso command you to make exhaustive in­
vestigations as to how to frame satisfactory regulations, mad submit 
them to .us in regular order for enforcement*
Unfortunately Prince Ching, th© head of th© Gkyvenzmanb under the 
S&press Oow&ger, and Chu Euag-ohi, the President of th© Board of Foreign 
Affairs, were not men well versed in this particular branch of knowledge* 
Besides the establishment of a Central Mint and the Financial Com­
mission, all the Chines© legations in Surop® were instructed to partici­
pate in the discussion of China’s currency reform*
Professor Jeremiah W* Jenks co-operated with H* H* Hanna and C* A* 
Conant, members of the Cossniesion on International Exchange from th® 
H&lted States, after being invited by China’s Government and visiting 
China with the purpose of investigating business condition© in that 
country, and he suggested a new monetary system for China early in 1904*
m
The main Ideas in his plan ares
&.* Stand&rd— He recommended a general monetary system of si Ivor 
coins with a fixed gold value• The standard unit of value will consist 
df ear tain grains of gold and bo worth presumably th® gold vs. Ins of a 
tael of silver. Silver coins at par with standard gold at a ratio of 
about 32 to 1 will be coined for circulation in the country. It will 
be free coinage of suitable pieces on demand for reasonable coinage 
charges.
For maintaining the ratio of 32 to 1 between gold and silver, he
gave the following reasons *
Fluctuations downward in the value of silver would increase the 
difference between the bullion value of the silver coins and their 
face value under a gold exchange standard* thereby imposing a 
heavier burden upon the credit of the issuing gavernmenft and increas­
ing the dsger of counterfeiting, but suoh fluctuations would not in 
themselves necessarily defeat the system, as is shown by the circu­
lation of the coins of the countries of the Latin Union and the 
United States at a face value more than double their bullion value. 
Fluctuations upward in the price of silver bullion, on the other 
hand, if they carried the price above th® coinage ratio even for a 
short time would involve serious risk of driving the coins to the 
melting pot and denuding the countsy of its currency.
The issue of coins upon a gold exchange basis at the ratio of 
32 to 1 would meet these conditions at th© present price of silver, 
because it would afford a margin of about IS per o®nt between th® 
gold exchange value of the coin and the bullion value of the metal 
which it would contain.
Furthe rmoie he said that the ratio of about 32 to 1 did not depart
widely from the current gold value of the silver currency in circulation 
ITin the Orient- It represents the average price of silver for the ten 
years ending with 1902. Jtill another reason for ohoosing the ratio of 
32 to 1 was given by him as fbllows*
H* Hanna, C. A. Constat, and J. W. Jenlcs, Stability of Interna­tional Sbsehanfc®. 58th Congress, Second Session, KouseTo? Representatives, Document So. 144, Washington, 1903, pp. 92-94*
I7Ibld., p. 25.
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It seems to to desirable, therefore* in countries whos® police 
system is not thoroughly organised to prevent and detect counter­
feiting and whose or edit la not of the highest order, to depart 
from the ratio of European countries and the United States and to 
choose a ratio more closely approximating the bullion value of the 
coins**a
8* Adninl strati on— ’For the purpose of establishment and management 
of the new plan, the Chinese Government should employ a foreign comptroller 
eft the currency having general charge of th® system for China*
C* Schedule of time— He recommended that th® now system be put into 
effect when 25,000,000 of the new coins were rea^r for circulation. The 
Government should declare, from time to time by proclamation in the vari­
ous provinces, the new coins legal tender for debts incurred after a cer­
tain date* Within five years the new system should be introduced into 
all the treaty ports and as far as possible elsewhere* All customs duties 
and local taxes should be collected in th® new currency as fast as it was 
adopted*
0* Set hod of maintenance— For the maintenance of the parity of the 
silver coins, +hs Chinese Government should open credit accounts in 
foreign trade ports against which it mig^t draw gold bills at a fixed 
rate somewhat above th® usual banking rates. For replenishing th® 
gold fund after Its reduction by gold bills, the comptroller of the cur­
rency had to honor silver drafts drawn by the foreign agents of th© 
Treasury in exchange for gold at rates fixed by the comptroller* If it 
were necessary a loan would be mad© in order to scour© with adequate 
exchange funds. Th® seigniorage profit from coinage would be kept a® a 
separate fund*
10Ibid*, p. 26.
In introducing his plan, he pointed out that th© introduction ot
th® new system must, in the nature of the oe.se,Mb® gradual. The aid of
ISthe hanks would he required.
Finally he Hated the economic benefits of th® proposed reform*
(l) ^Farther losses in the proceeds of taxation o&ussd by th# fall in
the gold value of silver will b© brought to an ©rid” ? (2) an increase in
the public revenues will be the result of the increased stimulus given
to trade and industry by th© adoption of a stable monetary systems and
20(5) the inducement of foreign investment § in China*
From Mr* JenkS* plan, it is easily understood that some distinguish- 
ing ideas had been in hie mind* Generally speaking, his plan shows a 
relatively well considered grasp of th® existing situation and detailed 
schemes feu* the operation of the plan. H© based his arguments on the 
principles of monetary science and drew reference from th© practice in 
the colonies of Me stern Powers* In th© main his plan was known as a 
gold-exchange steward. But it is more or less different from th© 
theoretical gold-exchspge standard. According to a theoretical gold- 
exchange standard a legal and fixed ratio is determined by a nation 
without active gold coins, but with subsidiary silver coins for the pur­
pose of circulation. In his plan h® seems to put th© ffgold coins” with 
the subsidiary silver coins for the purpose of circulation. If this is 
so, his plan is a modified kind of gold standard and is not th® pur© 
gold-exchange standard. tTow from the technical point of view, Professor 
JenksT plan left sons problems to bo solved*
^ Ibid. . p. 23. 
aolbid., p. 24.
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1* As to the ratio of 32 to 1, he &ays that wit would afford a 
margin of about IS per cent between the gold exchange value of the 
coins and the bullion value of the metal whioh it would contain,!t but 
if the price of silver bullion went above the coinage ratio in a short 
tine, it would tend to drive th© coins to th© malting pot* That might 
be remedied by changing the ratio* From the theoretical view, the 
change of ratio is a reasonable and possible policy, but in practice 
it is not a safe policy to change a fixed ratio within a short time 
in a case like that of Chine* In view of ths lack of good systems 
of transportation, coxsroani cation, and banking, and from the viewpoint 
of the conservation of Chinese people, it is doubtful that changes of 
ratio oould be declared by the Government within a short time to meet a 
sudden change in the gold price of si Ivor in the international market*
2* If bar foreign trade should permanently show an unfavorable 
balance, under ti» Jenks* plan China would have difficulty in maintain­
ing her exchange fund safely* To borrow foreign money in order to 
maintain a gold-exchange standard is not only dangerous but also is 
impossible *
3* In the case of China around 1900 both Chinos© Government and 
people were taking many pains In dealing with ths Yvy stern r’efwero*
Normally ths appointment of a foreign comptroller for the currency 
reform is considered a desirable financial stop, but in fact It would 
lead to political trouble between China * b Government and the foreign 
invaders* The appointment of the Inspector-General of th© Imperial 
Marine Customs of China has offered a good example• But as a matter 
of fact, China really needed experts on currency reform* In this dif­
ficult situation it was a logical result that the plan of Professor
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Jenks mat w ith  much oppositi on ruSi oi f o f  botih. bii© osn'Cy>s i
wad provincial governments &ad influential individuals in bh© country,
Among the opposers Chang Chih—tung, then the viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh,
mad© a strong attack on the plan because of the appointment of the
foreign comptroller.
Besides th© questions mentioned above, there were still many to be
decided. In his plan, "the unit to consist of *** grains of gold and tb
be worth presumably th© gold value of a tael or somewhat more than a
Mexican dollar"— if th© "taeln is used, what kind of ta©l is it?
If the ntaeiw is not used, what sis© greater than a Mexican dollar
will be used? How does th© plan treat th© existing copper cash and
ths subsidiary coins? How does the plan treat the Provincial Mints?
Another serious difficulty will be met, when a money system of
gold-exchange standard is introduced into China* That is th© problem
of preventing counterfeiting. Professor Jeiiks had considered it whan
he drew th© plan, but ha omitted the specially serious character of the
counterfeiting in China. As Mr. P. W. hen pointed outs
Of course, the danger of counterfeiting is unavoidable in other 
countrie s where token coins are in circulations but it was claimed, 
*rsA this must be admitted as quit© true, that the danger was es­
pecially great in China because of the enormous extent of terri­
tory and the looseness of the political system. Moreover, th© 
leased territories could easily be mad© use of as & basis for 
counterfeiting operations if th© Government should successfully 
prevent them in Chinese territory.
Viceroy Chang Ghih-tuag, who wielded groat influence in the M&iaohu
court, did not favor the plan proposed by Professor denies. First of
all, lie objected to employing a foreign comptroller who would play, an 
\
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important ftinabion in the plan proposed by Professor Jenks* Secondly,
be pointed out th© impr&et i c ab111ty of the gold standard system for 
China* and said*
••♦The people are poor* product of labour cheap, labour and 
personal service unremunsrativ©, th© common people economical in 
their way of living* Therefor© the daily expenditures are usually 
reckoned in terms of the cash* A poor man limits his daily ex­
penses to not over 20 cash, those of the w© 11-to-do olasses to not 
more than S0/7Q cash* In trade cantors along the sea coast and 
the Youngtsse River gold and silver* bullion or coins, circulate 
side by side with the cash; but goods from th© interior* whother 
wholesale or retail, are always valued in terns of the cash**** 
Generally speaking, In the cities of th© provinces of Kwapgtung, 
Kwangei, Yunna, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Ki&ngsu, 70/80 per cent* of 
the business is done in silver currency, the remaining 20/50 per 
cent* in the copper oash| in the trad© centres along the banks of 
the upper Youngtsse business is done, partly in silver and partly 
in cash; in the interior towns on both sides of the Youagtoae th© 
proportions are 10 per cent* in silver sad 90 par cent* in cash; 
in the provinces along the Huang River 93/99 per cent* is cash and 
the rest is in silver* ' Taking the country as a whole, the copper- 
using area is ten times as much as the silver-using area* Hence 
it is easily seen that China is actus. 1 ly a copper-using country, 
although foreigners considor it only in the light of a silver- 
using country * Hot? much more different, therefor®, China is from 
foreign countries where it is found suitable to use gold, on ac­
count of the enormous wealth and the high level of prices prevail­
ing in these countries.
For this period of time statistical material can not be obtained. 
In my opinion Chang#s analysis closely follows the existing, facts*
For a criticism of the ratio of 32 to 1 between silver and gold 
proposed by Professor Jenks, Chang hold that the silver coins in 
Professor Jenks* plan were to pass at th a ratio of 32 to 1 in Chinn, 
but if payments abroad were made with these coins they must bo valued 
'according to their bullion content on the market price, i.e., about the 
ratio of 40 to 1* This regulation proposed by Jenks would therefor© 
compel the Chines© people to pay over to th© Government a taoX gold,
22XI. H. Hanna, C* A. Conant, end J* '?• denies, Stability of Inter- nati QMAjl ffxchaiur. e. bSth Congress, Second Cession, louse of Representa­
tives* Document Ho* 144, TV ashing ton, 1303, p. 25*
worth 40 taels of silver* as the equivalent of 32 taels of silver* 
while foreigners upon entering Chines© territory csould with $2 taels 
of silver get the equivalent purchasing povar of one tael of gold. 
Apparently Professor Jenks w&a attempting to follow ths long-time ratio 
and the example of the Philippines*
The ratio of about 32 to 1 was adopted in th© Philippines and
has been recommended for other countries* because it seems to
conform to the requirements of existing conditions.... .The ratio 
of 32 to 1 does not depart widely from the present, and recent 
gold value of the silver currency in circulation in the Orient.
It represents the average price of silverfor the ten years ending 
with 1902. It was also the actual ratio of about two yvsarsu&go 
and of several preceding years.
But it is true that when Mr* Chang wrote his criticism th© ratio
of 40 to 1 was the case in the local market of China. But ths average
commercial ratio of silver to gold in London1 s market was 34.68 and
33.33 in 1901 and 1900 respectively* and the average ratio for the ten 
years ending with 1902 was about 33 to 1. Mr* Chang criticised Pro* 
fessor Jenks * ratio based on the average for ths past ten years by th© 
already changing ratio in th© currant market.
Finally as to the suitable time vhen China could adopt the gold 
standard* he maintained that the reform of China * s currency must begin 
with establishing uniformity in the silver and copper currencies. Th© 
value of a tael in ths cash should be mad© fixed end deficit©. After 
the currency has been made uniform* after the coins o f silver and of 
copper have com© to stand in a definite ratio, after thp us© of bullion
as currency has been given up, after th© product of gold mining has
gradually increased and the use of gold for ornamental purposes has boon
^Annual Report of the Director of the hint* 1940, ^sshington* p. 6
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effectively prohibited, after railroads have spread over th© whole 
country, after silver coins have bosom® universally acceptable, after 
eonsumption of native products has Increased, after manufacture by 
means of modern machinery has pushed into the interior, and after the 
circulation of silver has reached even the remotest regions of th®
Empire, then the government should investigate the whole situation of 
China and consider attempting to introduce th© gold standard* Mean­
while he pointed out that "if gold become dear and silver cheap, it 
would be a great encouragement to the development of export trades con­
sequent ly domes tie industry would spring up in course of time and China 
would become economically independent*” As to adopting the unit of 
tael instead of the dollar, ha argued that ¥?th© adoption of th© dollar 
as & unit was not feasible because tbs adjustment, especially in the case 
of the land tax and grain commutation, where th® fractions are carried to 
a millionth part of a tael, would become exceedingly difficult*" At 
that tims even though a strong body of opinion was against the tael and 
in favor of th© dollar, which was 72/100 of the weight Of the tael,
Chang proposed the tael coinage* Be suggested that an experiment be made 
in Wuchang first, and if it is successful th© scheme will b© adopted by 
the whole country* To this proposal, the imperial sanction was granted* 
The Viceroy was then in a position of great influence • As id© from th© 
fact that h® was Viceroy of th© two important provinces of Hupei and 
Hunan, he had had a vice-regal career of more than a quarter of a century, 
and was the leader of the literate. Furthermore he had been a pioneer 
in the currency-reform movement and was responsible for the establishment 
of th® first mint at Canton in 1887* His memorial may b© reasonably taken
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as voicing th® official opinion of the time* His proposal greatly 
influenced th® creation of th® tael coinage act of 1905*
Following Chang** proposal, about 600,000 tael coins have boon 
minted at Wuehahg as an experiment« Chang tried to carry out his plan 
in his own province of Hupei by way of providing an example for th© whole 
country, but his death put an end to his own project*
In 1903 Hr* Jamiessin, an Englishman, pointed out that th© gold 
exchange standard, which was the plan supported by Professor Jenks, 
stressed foreign trade sad ignored domestic commerce* He held that the 
direct object of China’s currency reform was the silver standard Che 
may mean the uniformity of the silver coins, since it is logically is*» 
possible to have both a silver standard and gold exchange standard 
operating simultaneously), and that the gold exchange standard should 
be adopted only after the silver standard had been per footed* Even 
though be never suggested a valuable plan, his observation was rela­
tively near to the practical situation of the existing Chin©a© currency* 
claim influenced the argument between the silver standard and the 
gold standard under the movement of currency reform to no less extant* 
Another important suggestion concerning a uniform currency for 
China was Sir Robert Hart’s proposal* Sir Robert Hart, th© Inspector- 
General of Imp rial Marine Customs of China, presented his proposal to 
China's Board of Foreign Affairs in 1803*
The principal point of his scheme was *fa silver coinage on a gold
gAbasis • ** He pointed out that the gold price of silver varies from day 
to day and is still falling* Because of th© uncertainties of the gold
despatch^ of Sir Robert Hart appeared in a Chinese Hu-Fao (news­paper) May 7, 1803 and the copy of the same proposal oan also bo found in 
pages 36—42 of Mr* Joseph Adkins* Banking and Prices in China, 1905•
price of silver, China’s traders suffered much inconvenience and China’s 
Government had to pay more to foreign countries for her gold debt and 
indemnity than she otherwise should have to pay* China had no gold in 
abundance, therefore it would not be easy to adopt a gold currency* What 
is needed for her is to find a method by which silver coins with uniform 
purity and uniform method of manufacture may have a fixed gold price.
But he did not throw any light on what would be the fixed value of gold 
in relation to her silver coins. He only stated that*
A tael, or silver liang, consists of a certain quantity of silver* 
Shall this be weighed by the native treasury scale— -the kuping— or 
shall it be the American twenty-cent piece which already has a 
fixed gold value recognized in all countries‘t At present eight taels 
(liang) are one pound sterling. This might, without any difficulty, 
be fixed upon by authority.
He did offer some suggestions* (1) There should be only one mint;
(2) the mints in the provinces should all cease their operations; (3) in 
ths Central Hint there should be a foreign mint master, an export, an en­
gineer ftwrf an accountant; (4) it would be well to retain the decimal nota­
tion already in use, i.e., the names "liang, tsioxi, fen, li*f1 He mentioned 
that four silver coins (i.e., a silver tael, J a tael, J a tael, and l/lQ 
a tael) and two copper co ins (l/lQQO a tael and l/lGO a tael) should be 
coined; (5) the silver tael and half tael should be nine parts silver and 
one part copper. The quarter tael and th© tenth of a tael should be made 
up of eight parts silver and two parts copper; (6) provinces should trans­
fer all the silver in the official treasuries to th© Central Mint to be 
melted and made into coin; (7) paper notes representing the new coins may
may mean the 25/-piece of the American coins.
Joseph gdkins. Banking and Prices in China, 1905, p. 37*
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or may not be mad® and circulated by the Mints (S) when th® Central 
Mint has ooaasenoed working , the circulation of foreign coins in China 
and the use of uncoined silver should b@ prohibited after a definite 
time; (9) foreign merchants having firms or banks in China must us© the 
silver money in China* They must obtain China*8 silver coins with gold 
on application from China’s exchange officers* Th© gold is taken charge 
of by the exchange officer and may b® used in paying th® indemnity to 
Western Powers or as a reserve for gold bank notes or for the manufacture 
of gold coins; (10) it is requisite to have a satisfactory under standing 
with th® banks of foreign countries* ^fh© negotiations must be 
from time to time with those banks* so that in this matter of currency 
there may be no uncertainty or want of clearness*”
Be neither offered anything new to th© existing opinion as to th® 
movement of th© currency reform nor drafted any sore detailed plan for 
reference to China’s Government• But he had contributed something prac­
tical to the group of officers maintaining a silver standard for Chins.*
It was due to the fact that ha occupied a very significant position in 
China’s financial world, and meanwhile h© was introduced by the British 
Government. His claim gave a strong recommendation to the Chinese Govern­
ment and finane i al wor Id •
Opposing both Professor Bonks’ plan and the silver standard .for 
China, Mr* hu Gei-tc, the Chinese iliniater to St* Petersburg, submit ted 
a memorial 'which followed Professor Jenks* plan*. In his memorial, h® 
maintained the accumulation of a gold r e s e m  .for the gold standard 
system* Be held that, since China is th© only non-gold country in th© 
world and all other countries are gold countries, tho on$y way to protect
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China.*e foreign trade is to circulate gold coins in as much, as the high 
price of gold and ths low price of silver are injurious to a country 
having the silver standard* He advocated the plan of collecting the gold 
ha&rded by the people and expressed his own opinion that this may be 
brought about by selling government posts.
He gave & comparison of th© advantages between th© country using 
gold eoins and the country using silver and said %
Financial experts have estimated th® years* output of gold, and 
there is no cause fb r concern lest it be not enough for the supply 
of the people of every country* As to the output of silver, there 
is no end to it* The greater the supply of silver, the cheaper:it 
gets, so that the present high price of gold is not in reality that 
gold is dear, but rather that silver is cheap.
A gold-standard country is like a man who has accumulated riches 
to buy grain— if the grain is cheap, he reaps the benefit. A silver- 
standard country is like a farmer who has accumulated his grain and 
holds it for arise in price— if the price goes down, h® suffers* So 
silver-using countries and gold-using countries are in the earns case 
as two people making a barter, in which on© man’s daily increase of 
loss is only the other men’s daily increase of gain. Therefore, if 
we use uncoined silver for money we are in just such a os,so, of 
barters with those countries which have a gold coinage, and it is 
needless to say which country is the loser* To use uncoined silver 
for money is like using uncooked rice for food*..for uncoined silver 
is nothing more than & product of th© earth* Other nations consider 
silver merely as a coirtv.odlty and not as money*.**At the present time 
gold is used in all nations throughout the world.
As to th© coinage unit, he proposed that th© silver coins should b©
called 11 yuan” because they are round and s,yuantt means round* The copper
coins should be called "w®n*w The weight of the new silver coin should be
28of ”0.72 ounces (as in the Rexican dollar.” With this unit as the basis, 
gold and copper coins are minted besides the subsidiary silver on®a. Hi© 
arrangement was to have trwo gold coins, one worth ton silver yuan, and th©
Gold Standard in International Trade, Soport on the Introduction 
of the Gold-Sxohang.e Standard. 50th Congress, 3d Session, Sens.to, Docu­ment No* 128, 1904, p"* BE. 
g8Ibld.,p* 196.
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other five silver yuan®* The coinage of copper was certainly an essen­
tial part of the system.
Be also recommended a total coinage, on th© averag®, of two silver 
dollars per capita or approximately BOO,000,000 yuaas. At th© beginning 
only a quarter of this total would be needed. Of this 200 million 
dollars, fifteen per cent, should be mad© into gold coins end the rest 
into silver pieces* In every $1Q0 ths re should b© one gold coin of $10 
value and one of $5 value* Th© remaining $85 should be made into silver 
coins* The uaifom method and designs must be used in the Central and 
provincial mints*
Regarding the old coins, he proposed that during the first few years
tee government should give full market value udien taking back the old
coins* Bid: after ten or more years nthe coins can be bought at the rate
of ordinary silver end it will not be necessary to consider them at their 
*29coin vali» .
He figured the needed gold reserve in the following ways* As the
bbw yuan was to be 920 fine the remaining 80 part® became th© nation's
seigniorage* Out of a total coinage of 800,000,000 yuan.a the profit 
should be 64,000,000 with which th© government could not only pay its 
debts and cost of coinage, but also form a gold reserve. Meanwhile the 
Government would at the beginning of the new system raise & currency loan 
and deposit the borrowed gold aong the various foreign banks? thereby
foreign nations would know that China had gold in reserve and thus would
insure confidence for the new system*
39jbid*, p, 198 *
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Xu his sohem© on® th lag whioh is mors important; and was pointed 
out by him, but still was never determined by him* is th® ratio between 
the three metal coins, i.e., gold, silver, and copper. H© only said 
that a
Ths system of coinage as adopted by the other nations has a 
fixed value in relation to each oth.r, &ad although there arc ex­
change charges, the market value is approximately th© same, so 
that banks have no change to impose upon the people, nor have 
foreign merchants any opportunity for swindling.
The three metals, gold, silver, and copper, will have a fixed 
relative value; on© silver piece being worth so many copper ones, 
and one gold piece being worth so many silver ones..».Gains 0021 
then be used everywhere, far and x&ar, at the same value.
At that time, both foreigners and Chinese opposed to his plan for a
gold standard gave ths following reasons* (1) The economical conditions
is China did not permit the us© of gold? (2) China had not enough gold
to meet the need for a gold coinage; (3) Chinese banks and exchange
shops which mad© their livelihood out of exchange, discounts, false
cash, etc., would oppose the adoption of th© gold standard; (4) the
officials of the governments and tax collectors who manipulated the
discount and exchange so as to appropriate money to themselves would
oppose it; (5) th© mints in th© various province© now reckoning upon a
surplus to make up deficiencies in th© provincial expenses would not
like it; (6) complications would arise out of indemnity payment; (7) the
gold standard proposed might collapse on account of the unfavorable
balance of trade; (8) the Chinese wore fond of talking but never did
anything, and they stuck to their ancient customs so closely -that it
was difficult to adopt anything new.
To answer these opponents, he held that the third and fourth of
^Ibid pp. 1S2-193 .
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the objections mentioned above might be urged against any system of 
unifora coinage. To the fifth* he said 51 it was not originally intended 
that the surplus of the mints should go to enrich the various provinces*0 
As to the first and second he held that economic conditions then in China 
required the oirculation of copper and silver* but the gold-standard 
system was not intended to replace copper and silver with gold as a 
medium of exchange and that the adoption of th® gold standard was for 
the purpose of giving foreign nations confidence in China* To the sixth* 
he held that all nations have recently adopted th© gold standard* there­
fore China should use gold for the sake of convenience in commerce* To 
ths seventh* he maintained that when imports are great and exports small* 
money gets into foreign countries and the amount of money on the home 
market is small* Then the value of money is high and with th© money 
dear prices must go down* China*s exports will increase and money will 
return to China from foreign countries again. To the last one* he 
furnished some examples in order to prove its untruth.
But as to what th© coinage ratio was to be* he did not give any 
recoraiendation. It is evident that th© considerati on of th© coinage 
ratio and the maintenance of that ratio are factors of primary importance. 
By overlooking this point, Mr* Hu left in© whole plsei fundamentally defec­
tive and unworkable.
The Board of Revenue, however, was much impressed by his proposal 
and arguments and subsequently submitted a memorial which received 
immediate imperial sanction* The Board proposed that (.1) a gold reserve 
be accumulated and ultimately gold coins b© issued in addition to silver. 
It was to the great disadvantage of China to use silver’ whor all the rest 
of the world had a gold standard* (£) Thor© was a large gold hoard among
xos
the people* To obtain the gold supply for mintlag purposes which were 
considered urgent , th© money paid In for ranks* titles and offices 
should be paid one—half in gold* The memorial reads
We (ministers) have mde further investigation Of the sugges­
tions submitted by Hu Wei-te*•*in which he asks that gp Id coins 
m y  be issued in addition* His report as to the advantages and 
disadvantages is very thorough***.hhsn Japan was about to adopt 
a gold coinage* she first collected gold for ten years before 
proceeding to mint it* A great deal of gold is hoarded by the 
Chinese people* ***Xt becomes very necessary to adopt soma method 
to secure a reserve of gold which may m e t the demand for minting 
purposes*••.People who desire to purchase restoration to lost rank 
and those who desire to purchase promotion* as well as those who 
want to be advanced on the list of expectants by making subscrip­
tions sad thus secure the right to an earlier appointment to fill 
a vacancy, shall be required to pay one-half of the sums respec­
tively required in gold, Treasury standard, at the rate of 1 ounce 
of gold for 32 ounces of silver*
In  1905 the Board of Revenue petitioned the throne to put a stop
to the eoin^e by the provinces, and to turn four province mints into
52branch mints under the Central Mint at Tientsin* ' With this petition 
mentioned above, the ministers proposed the "Ten Regulations for the
ts $$reform of the currency. The "Ten Regulations we re granted on August 22, 
1905* These proposals were results of two years* deliberation on th© 
part of the ministers of the Financial Commission and the Board of Revenue 
or the Board of Finance* Ths content of' the "Ten Regulations*1 is outlined 
as follows*
1* The coinage of silver, after the weight and fineness of the 
coins shall have been decided upon and sanctioned, shall be allowed 
only to ths Central Mint and th© branch mints at Tientsin, 31ankin» 
Canton, and ftuchang* The Central Lint shall be under the direct 
management of the Financial Commission*
2. Ths provincial mints already in operation shall be allowed 
for the present to go on with their minting, but they shall be 
allowed to us© only the machinery already on hand— no further 
machinery may be added to increase the output*
Kaan, The Currenclos of Chl:-aaP 1C 26, pp«
3% Annua I Report of the Director of the .joint. * mishin^ton, 1906, p* 192.
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Th® fineness of "the copper coins to be stinted shall bo 96 per 
cent ptir© copper and 5 por cont zinc* Ths wsigjrb oi ths coins 
shall be, via., 20-cash piece, 4 mace, kuping scales; 10-oash 
piece, 2 mace, kuping; 6~cash pieoo, 1 xmo& > kupingj 2-oash piece,
4 cendareens, kuping. The matrices shall be furnished by the Board 
of Revenue, and th© coinage shall be exactly like that of the cen­
tral mint, except that on the obverse on© character shall be added 
to indicate the province in which the coin is issued, so as to 
facilitate examinat ion*
5* In all the provincial mints the coins minted each day shall 
be in the following proportions? Ton-oash pieces, five-tenths of 
the whole number, and 2-cash pieces, also two-tenths of the whole 
number; 20-cash pieces, but one-tonth* The demand for coins smaller 
than the 2-cash piece shall be supplied by th© use of th© old cash 
in circulation*
4* The number of the coins to be minted must be determined by a 
careful consideration of the supply and demand*
6* All the provinces engaged in minting these copper coins must 
first supply in full th© lack of the ordinary cash in their own 
provinces, and they must not ship t h e m  in large quantities to other 
provinces.
6* Every viceroy and governor in ahose province there arc mints 
for the coinage of silver or copper must one a ©very three months 
report to the Financial Commission and once a year report as to 
certain requirements*
7* Owing to savings in the cost of transportation, certain of 
the provinces should send their quota of silver of the imperial 
revenues to Tientsin to the Central Mint.
8* Every requj st from merchants for permission to mint copper 
coins shall be refused*
9* After the bank of 'the Board of Revenue shall have been put 
into operation, the silver and copper coins minted by the Central 
Mint, will be delivered to the bank, which will distribute them 
from time to time, according to th© deficiency in the supply of 
cash., in the various provinces.
10. The weight and quality of the copper coins shall be mad® 
uniform* The various provincial governments shall b® forbidden 
to purchase the ready-made copper disks from foreign merchantsZ*
Three months after the sanction of th© '’Ten Regulations,” th© acts
of the "coinage of taels” and "fractions of the taol in silver" were
granted by imperial ©diet* By these the silver—t&al coin w«a provided
standard coin and copper coins were provided for euppl©went ary use*
By the acts th© standard coin, corresponds in its face value to th©
bullion value of the metals contained and circulated in any ©mount*
^Ibid.7 pp* 193-195
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The subsidiary coins ware token coins and circulated. within a certain 
amount. Th© reasons by which silver m s  ilia choice as standard and 
tael as the unit are*
China9s aeourauiations of gold are not large# and heretofore# 
in public or private financial transactions, it has been customary 
to use silver and copper, so that it is still difficult for us to 
decide how gold should be used*
The silver coin* heretofore minted in the various provinces 
have imitated the Mexican dollar in their fineness and weight, but 
this was sanctioned as a temporary measia*© only, and can not be 
regarded as a fixed rule.• • .China, in the levy and collection of 
her taxes end duties, has mostly used the Kuping tael; and th© 
people, too, in the use of silver, have generally made their reckon­
ings in taels, mace, cam are ©ns, and 11* Your ministers are there­
fore of the opinion that in fixing upon a standard eoin for China 
we should select the Kuping tael, mint it with extrema care, and 
maintain its fineness in full, and that more than all else it should 
first of all be received by the board of revenue in payment of im­
perial dues.
AS to the fineness of the new silver coin, it provided*
The purest silver in circulation in China to-day is shorn by 
chemical analysis to oontain not more than 98 or 99 por cent of 
pure silver, but a deduction of 2 or S por eent should ba allowed 
in minting, the new coin to cover th© cost of coinage, and it is 
proposed to make the new tael piee© of 9 mac© 6 car.da reens of pure 
silver, mixed with 1 mace’s weight of pure copper, to be fixed as 
the equivalent of 1 Kuping tael of full touch*
The acts provided that all provincial taxes levied in kuping taols
shall be paid in the same amount of th© new tael coins • But the acts
did not provide an effective way to force upon the bankers and merchants
a kuping tael of 96 touch in the place of a kuping, tael of pur© silver*
Foreign banks would only accept it at its bullion value——that is, at
3*80 per cant discount; and the government, accepting revenue in that
36currency, would stand to lose to a corresponding extent* This lui- 
port ant weakness of the acts might have been one of th© reasons why
34Ibid., p. 198* 36ibid*
36Ibid., p. 201*
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the ’’tael coinage acts” of 1905 were never put into effect.
Regarding the fractional silver coins provided by the sam© acts*
S?they provided as the following table indicates*
Denomination Face value Pure silver Pure copper
^ tael piece a kuping tael 
silver full 
toueh
0.48 jkuping tael 0.05 tael (kit-* 
ping)
2/l0 tael piece 1 /5  * 0.17 * 0.03 *
1/10 * 1 /1 0  " 0.085 n 0.016 *
In the acts it was also stated that as th© general rule (with some 
exceptions} in every 10 pieces minted 4 of them shall be of 1 tael's 
value and 2 of the denomination of b/lO tael, 2 of them 2/lQ t&el, and 
2 of then l/lO tael. The 5-mao© or 5/10 taol and other fractional silver 
pieces shall be legal tender in every transaction to the amount of 10 
taels.
According to the acts, all people may send their silver to be minted. 
nEvery tael of kuping silver of full touch will be refined to pure silver 
985 fine, or finer; in return for it they will receive one of the now 
tael coins... .The excess in the fineness of ths silver will pay fchs cost 
of the mintage.*^
An important point which the acts failed to decide was the rat® of 
exchange between the copper coins and silver. Probably the depreciation 
of copper cents in terms of silver from the original value of those 





At Hi® time when the acts were drafted,, there war© different 
opinions among the ministers sad some viceroys* Viceroy Chang; Chih- 
tung of Bupeh. province and Viceroy Yuan Shi-kai of Chili were in favor 
of the silver; tael unit* Those who had favored ths gold standard were 
naturally disappoint ©d, but the real disagreement was over the question 
of th© coinage unit and of the fineness of the silver in the coinage of 
the standard piece* The controversy centered on th© question of th© 
relative familiarity of the people with these two units, dollar and 
tael* Those vctio were conversant with monetary principles pointed out 
that there should be free coinage of the standard coins either without 
charge, or subject to a brassage charge for covering the expense of 
assaying, loss of interest and th© cost of th© alloy* For those reasons 
the tael acts fixing the fineness f t 960, while the kuping silver is 
987-5 fine, was considered defective* They held that should the people 
lack confidence in the new system the coin would probably depreciate, 
if it were accepted at par valve, the high seigniorage would be 
an inducement to counterfeiting*
Disagreement among influential officers over thsse questions, 
together with the unsettled problem of the exchange rate of copper and 
silver coins, offered ample opportunity for delay of this reform act*
Another important cause which led to the postponement of a ddfinit© 
action with regard to currency reform was the mounting gold price of 
silver owing to th® large purchase of silver for coinage in India*
"When after 1905 exchange improved to over three shillings per Shanghai 
tael, th© Government found it easier to meet gold obligations, due on
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account of th© Boxer Indemnity said several other loans
The postponement of currency reform lasted about three years, until 
1908* In that year another major movement In the history of China’s 
currency reform was initiated by Mr* Tong Shao-yi’s suggestions* Hr*
Tong, the special ambassador to the United States, upon his return from 
America made & series of suggestions on the questions of currency reform, 
to th© Board at Finance in 1908* He urged an immediate reform of th© 
Chinese currency as pledged by treaty provisions with foreign countries* 
Hie suggestions were on five subjects, namely, the standard, the sia© of 
the silver coin, the fineness of tie silver in the coinage, ths subsidiary 
coinage, and the treatment of the existing copper currency*
On the suggestion of the standard, Mr. Tong reached the conclusion 
that the reform had best begin on the silver-standard basis, but with the 
ultimate aim of attaining the gold standard* He found that the gold- 
exchange standard would be very difficult to an force in China, and that 
the difficulty was that, tho token coins under this system would be con­
tinually fluctuating in terms of tho silver bull!021* Alse h© feared 
that the coins might depreciate through over-issue of th© token coins 
for th© seigniorage*
. As to the sis© of the silver ooins, he favored the adoption of a
unit of the weight of the dollar* but in the memorial given by him and 
submitted by the Prince of Ghing and other ministers he accepted th© 
tael coin with the remedy of th© coining in large amounts of th® half tael 
or 5-maea pieces, which were to be unlimited legal tender along with th©
.
S. R* tlagel, Chinese Currency and Banking Shanghai, 1915, p* 118.
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standard tael, the one-tael pieeo*
G& the \ju© sti on of the treatment of* th© copper currency, hs ©ug*' 
gested that th© new coins should be used to retire the old, end pointed 
out the fault of the previous acts in not including the copper currency 
in the return cons id or at ions hut treating it as an independent system 
by itself*
On October 5, 1908, an edict was issued in response to a memorial
of Hr* Tong’s to attempt to establish, the tael coins^©* Th© memorial
of Tong who had been supported by Prince of Chi&ng; and other ministers 
of China’s Government mentioned that the Government had decided upon a 
silver standard* Tong mentioned that a poll of provincial opinion was 
taken and eleven provinces were found to be in favor of the tael unit 
while seven were for th© dollars# Th© ministers recognised that the 
tael coin would be heavy as pocket money, but ths situation could be
remedied by the coining in large amounts of th© half tael or 0-raac©
pieces, which were to be unlimited legal tender along with th® standard 
tael*
In the imperial decree reacting to Tong’s memorial, silver was made 
the sole legal tender* The reason for adopting the silver standard and 
the method of maintenance of it was declared by this imperial decree as 
follows*
If actiml gold coin were to be taken as th® standard unit, it 
would be difficult to raise th© necessary amount} while if gold 
were merely taken nominally as the standard unit, grave danger® 
would be incurred. It is evident, therefor©, that we should first 
standardise sad render uniform th© silver currency, and care­
fully proceed to take measures for a further advance, with a view 
to assuring the adoption of a gold standard in the future*
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this silver currency, except in so fur as calculations under 
treaties and agreements with tho foreign powers will re emir© to be 
made as before* shall be uniformly used by all yamens, great or 
small, in Peking or th® provinces in all their treasury transac­
tions, and all allowances for differences of weight or touch, or 
mslt&ge fees, etc•, shall henceforth be perpetually forbidden*
In the decree it said that a large silver coin weighing 1 kuping
tael and 0*5 of a kuping tael shall be minted for general convenience
in use* A 3pind of small silver piece of l/lG and b/lGO of a kuping tael
will serve as a subsidiary currency* Th® two silver ©oina aforesaid
42will be 0*980 fine, .mil© the two small silver pieces will be 0*880 fine*
To give the silver coins weighing 0*5 of a kuping tael th© sas© legal 
tender as th© silver coins of 1 kuping tael in ord©r to secure eanvenienc® 
in the use is the special feature of this edict. Unfortunately the edict 
did not find a suitable and definite way to settle th© old coinage. The 
only step taken toward currency reform by the edict of October 6, 1908 
was the establishment of a Bureau of Currency Reform* This Bureau con­
ducted extensive inquiries in all parts of the country with regard to . 
the standard sise of the silver, the fineness of’ silver in the coins, 
subsidiary ooinage and tho treatment of existing copper coins*
In 1909 several proposals were presented to the Government. Among 
them an outstanding one was Bheng E^uan-hwai*s plan* In 1896 Mr* Sheng 
had suggested a program of currency reform with a practical system of a 
national bank* Unfortunately th© outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion (1900} 
kept the Government from taking any definite step about it* In this
^Th© word used in China to describe th© place and buildings where the officers of govemmants wark.




year (1908) h© proposed another plan for the currency reform of the 
country* Prom his plan It. is apparent that hi© last goal is the gold*** 
exchange staidard, but his immediate objective is th© uniform national 
silver dollar similar to the existing dollar. He held that sooner or 
later exchange rates of Chins on go Id-stand ard countries slight be 
stabilised by use of deposited reserves in foreign countries. Effort 
should be mads to reduce excess of imports into China ao as to prepare 
for a gold standard.
He gave a new re© oranandation which is the coin of $1*50. He main­
tained that the silver dollar should be .72 kuping tael of *900 fineness* 
The silver dollar was to be the same as current dollars, and worth about 
42 cents U. S. currency with silver at 56 cents an ounce. Silver coin 
of $1.50 was recommended because it would contain practically the same 
amount of silver as the tael.* but should not b© c&lld tael coin. Other 
silver coins were to be those of &1.QG, 50, 20 and 10 cents $ copper.coins 
were to be 20, 10, 8, 2, and 1 cash pieoes, 10 ©ash to equal l/lOO of a 
dollar. The Bank of China, in association with mints and th© bank note 
printing office, should have charge of the issuance of coins.
As to th© method of introduction of tho new system, lie advocated 
that taxes anr? customs be payable in new ourrojioy, silver syce© b® bought 
up minted into new coins, old silver coins be redeemed by th© Govern— 
m&nt and remizxted, coppers bo withdrawn at tho rat© of about 125 to the 
dollar and reminded, silver bullion b© received in exchange for paper 
notes, after one year*« time about 2/s or 3/6 of this silver b© coined, 
*mH silver notes be exchangeable for gold notes, presumably ht varying 
rates.
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In the long run the foreign exchange rates on th© gold standard 
countries shall be stabilised eventually by use o f reserves deposited 
in. fear sign countries. All obligations due th® Government shall be paid 
in the new msney* Quantity of silver ooin will be limited to #1,000,000* 
estimated to be $2.50 per capita.
In treating the tael, he held that one-i©.©! (not bo be known as 
taels but as 11.60 pieces) coins might be allowed to circulate in in­
terior districts along with the new dollars. The kuping tael has about 
1.50 as much pure silver as the dollar so tael coins would circulate 
without causing trouble. The dollar should not show on its face the 
fast that it contained *72 sf a kuping tael*
Meanwhile in his plan he mentioned that among the provincial mints 
only tie or threw mints should be continued under the control of the 
Central Mint in Peking*
Mr* Sheng had been interested and had put forth effort for the de­
velopment of China * s comraunic at ion, transportation and modem Industries. 
From his proposal for currency reform it is apparent that he understood 
the serious situation of the currency in China and the significant points 
also, but he was not familiar with th© knowledge of monetary administra­
tion* Por instance, he suggested th© coins of ftI.SQ-pieces in order 
to uphold the tradition of Chines® people, meet the withdrawal of th© 
old copper ooin at a rat© of about 125 to on© dollar and th© limitation 
of ths silver coins bn an amount of* #1,000,000,000. All of these seem 
to be some kind of idealism* i\® can not, nor did he himself, find any 
scientific Basis and reasonable statistics for these figures. Never­
theless, Ar« Sheng did throw some light on tho future of China *s banking 
operation and the bank of issue.
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Another plan w s  proposed by Prince tsal Tse, who was before 1908 
opposed bo th© silver tael standard of Chang Shih«*tung® He had sug­
gested establishing the Bureau of Currency R@forra to study the eco­
nomic condition and monetary custom in the currency histories of China 
and of the Western Powers* After the death of Viceroy Chang Ohih-tung 
he revised the regulations of 1905 fundamentally which had been' based 
oa the silver .tael standard and already promulgated, and did his best 
to try to set up the silver yuan or dollar standard* He held that one 
yuan silver ooin must be 0*72 kuping t&el with 0*900 fins silver, i*e*, 
0*648 tael pure silver* In 1908 he proposed a plan of currency reform 
at the Lang Jeen Yuan (Congress) • He reached his conclusion by a 
gradual process of adoption of the gold standard over a period of ten 
years* His plan also failed to materialise because of the wide opposi­
tion to the Government and the consequent Revolution (1911)*
Still another plan in 1908 was the suggestion of th© Board of 
Finance of China1 s Government« Reacting to the urge to adopt the gold 
standard by Mr* v;ang Ta-hsieh, Chinese minister to Great Britain, the 
Board of Finance in 1908 outlined four different policies, on® of which 
may be used by the Government, and the Board favored the last one, as 
followst
(1) The introduction of the uniform national coinage based on 
silver, giving it subsequently a fixed parity %ith gold, such as 
found in British India*
(2) At the very beginning the introduction of silver coins at
a fixed value in gold which will be maintained afterwards, such as 
found in tbs Philippines*
(3) To supplement the token silver coins 2n (2) with a partial 
note circulation.
(4) The introduction of the :r»aw national silver coins on th® 
silver basis in order to replace the old coinn and bullion currency* 
Subsequently, the note circulation will be extended to replace th®
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saw standard, coins; th® coins so withdrawn will be held as a trust 
fund or sold for gold* fthen the note circulation becomes universal, 
th® policy then will be to declare for free coinage of gold at tbs 
market ratio of & given time and convert the silver notes into gold 
notes* If th® gold reserves prove insufficient at any bin®* th® 
notes aaay be redeemable in silver bullion at its market value In 
-eld.43
Th® fourth point, said to have been originated by Samuel Ingham,
United States Secretary of the Treasury under President Jackson, was 
preferred by the Board of Finance, because it combined the advantage® 
of the others* However, to carry out this plan it was necess&jy to 
prepare over a period of years* Because of the insuffioieaat stock of 
gold and the unsound banking system, the scheme was consequently dropped*
The whole situation would not be complete without mentioning the 
suggestion of Viceroy Yang Shih-hsi&n of Chi hi Province* In 190T he 
intended to minimize the loss due to China*s payment of th© Boxer in­
demnity and the foreign loans in gold coins by coining; gold coins at the 
Tientsin mint • But Viceroy Chang Shih-tung criticised it as defeating its 
awn purpose, and Chang advocated the development of gold mines, rather than 
the coining of gold money, for the solution of the problem* Yang had neither 
a tangible plan nor an adequate argument to meet the criticism presented by 
thorn® who advocated silver currency at that time* His suggestion, like 
other.minor or»s, gave no significant influence to the improvement of th© 
currency reform*
In 1910, for the first time a proper act to deal with currency was 
Issued* It provided much more concrete reform measures than its previous 
ones (such as the ten regulations of 1905 and the acts of the "coinage of
L* E* Tb&o , Currency Reform in China, p* 5*
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taels”)* The imp©rial sanction was given to it on May 24 of th® smm 
year* These regulations for the national coinage consisted of eleven 
articles and thirteen supplementary articles • Th© important points in 
these regulations can be briefly described as follow®s
(a) As to the unit of currency, they provided that th0 dollar (or 
yuan) will be the monetary unit of the T& Ghing ^ipire* Below unity 
the reckoning is decimal*
(b) For the appearance of the coins, on on© face of the silver dollar
and on all kinds of subsidiary coins will be a dragon ©ad on the other
face the characters "Ta Chlng Silver Coin, One Dollar. n»
(©) Begarding ■the different coins, the following table Is condensed
from the original articles:




One dollar (yuan) *72 9056 *648 tael of silver
50-cent coins •36 80$ • 288 •
25- * *18 80$ • 144 ”







1-  " J
1* Yuan or dollar will be standard coins 50—csont and under will 
be subsidiary.
2. Nickel coin will be delayed for investigation into methods of 
mintage, and the resources for the material.
3* One—cent coins will bo postponed owing to th© danger of their 
being confounded with th® bon cash coins formerly minted.
4* Kuplng, tael - 37 30l/l,000 grams of pur® silver*
5. No limitation in th© us© of the standard dollar, and the sub™ 
sidiary silver coins may not be offered in excess of five dollars1 worth in any on© payment| nickel and copper coin may not be offered in excess of half a dollar*s worth*
^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint, hashington, 1911, pp. 236-242*
To be determined later
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(d) As to the ratio between the new dollar and th® tael, they pro­
vided that during the introductory period of Issuance of th© new coins, 
one dollar and fifty cents will be reckoned as equal to one tael of th® 
Board of Financers treasury weight, standard silver* By standard silver 
is meant silver of nine hundred and eighty-five ona-thousandths fineness*
As to the old coins they provided that the large end small coins previously 
minted might continue to circulate temporarily at their market value*
Both, the governmental mints end th© Ta Ching Bank would gradually with­
draw /them at the market rate to be reminted into the new coinage* After 
a certain period all such circulation would cease, and the mints and the 
Ta Ching Bank would exchange the old coins as silver bullion* The acts 
treated the existing old coins in such a way for the following reason*
Silver coins were minted from the sixteenth year of Kwanghau 
(18S0) to th® thirty-fourth year (1908)* The number of silver 
dollars reported as minted at th© different provincial mints was 
over 40,000,900, and the fractional silver coins amounted to 
1,400,000,000* Since the number is so great, to call them all in 
at once and ramint them would involve a loss in th® five items of 
inferior touch, exchange, transportation, refining, and interest 
of approximately $20,000,000* To arrai^o for this out of treasury 
reserves would be difficult*
(e) To deal with the complicated problem of the copper coins, it 
decided that copper coins previously minted, in th® provincial mints 
would continue to circulate at their market value* Th© Board of Finance 
would be endowed with power to regulate it in accordantc with circum­
stances*
In the original memorial of the Board of Finance on the proposed 
treatment of the old silver and copper coins so as to secure stability 
for the national currency, th© ministers held t at the Board of Finance 
would take measures to redeem the coins and would remint a sufficient 
numb a r as 2-cant and 5-mill subsidiary coins* .Besides this a sufficient'
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number of th® best 10—cash coins would bo saleotod to serve temporarily 
as l—oout subsidiary coins with a fixed value like the now coins , to bo 
disposed of in the interior* By this method in three years th® old 
coins loft on th© market should not be over two-or three-tent ha• Th©
Board of Finance needed the hearty co-operation of all th© boards and 
of the viceroys and governors in devising ways to prevent the jointing 
of counterfeit coins*
The acts also set up & transitional period that provided that after 
the regulations had been approved by imperial rescript during a period 
of a year, all regular official receipts and disbursements would be con­
verted into kuping taels of standard silver and -then reckoned in th© new 
monetary unit* After the on© year all public accounts would directly 
reckon in the new monetary unit*
According to the acts, from the date when these regulations re­
ceived the imperial sanction, all mintage of large and small silver and 
copper coins in the provinces should cease* Th© Board of Finance would 
establish an assay office and engage an expert to take charge of it*
For the purpose of executing the act, a fin© of from $10 to $1,000 was 
ruled tor those who were forced to discount the new coins and who refused 
to accept the new coins*
These acts of 1910 mentioned above provided for th© first time for 
the treatment of th© old coins* It seems to ei© that the main body of 
the acts can be said to be a comparatively detailed provision much more 
than its previous ones* The pol idles adopted by th© acts are much more 
suitable to the existing serious situation* If the government of China 
at the time could effectively execute this act according to its provisions,
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it have accomplished the purpose of* a tin.lf*orss. currency, ©von if
it could net h&ve solved the sorlous problem of fluctuating foreign ex­
change at once* However, the acts were criticised by Mr* la an Chi-chao 
(the late famous scholar of China) for the following reasons*^*
(1) It was silent about the foreign coins then in th® hands of 
the Chinese people (estimated at over 100,000,000 dollars)*
(2) The amount of provincial dollars was over-estimated suad the 
Government ought to redeem these coins at the face value*
(5) The dollars and the minor coins ought to have been separately 
created»* * *Ths silver and copper subsidiary coins which were all 
circulating at different rates of discount at different places, 
would be ©xch sn&ed by th© Government for the new coins within a 
prescribed period of time at their actual mar lost value*
As to the Chinese governmental policy of banking regulation and 
the banking situation during th© period concerned, before 1905 there was 
neither the bank owned by the Central Government nor a Central Bank in 
the country* Until April 22, 1905, an edict mentioned the establishment 
of a governmental bank and decided that Peking would be th© proper place 
in which the governmental bank could be located* If tor the .Issuance of 
the Ta Ching Sank Regulations, the Ta Ching Bank owned by the Central 
Government was established in 1905* This bank did not directly in­
fluence China*© banking business as much as the central banks or govern­
mental banks in other countries did their own banking businesses* But 
the modem banking institutions or foreign-style Chinese banks, modeled 
on the plan of the modern, banks in Arne rice, or Europe or the foreign 
hgnVa in China, were set up by individuals first in the coast ports and 
gradually within the interior*
In the eleventh moon of the thirty-third year of Awang Hsu (about
^®p* y* Wen, ?he Currency Proto lam in China. 1914, p. 128.
m
4t61807), another a bank, the Bank of CoHwrunicaiions * was
chartered with two-fifths of its capital from the state * for th©
flassoing and unification of various means of ©ommunication,, partiou-
larly the railways*
Bow ever* the major expansion of these modem banking institution®
47did not 0 0 8 0  until th© ’/<orld War (1914)* On th© other side* th© 
native banks* with the foreign banks, still dominated the existing 
banking world of China* For a few years before 1910, the native 
banks in China* besides the banking business* did all kinds of specu­
lations* including land* foreign stocks and securities, and worst of 
all rubber shares* Unfortunately anything the banks took up in the
way of speculation fed.led and with the collapse of th© rubber boom
40(around 1910) began the collapse of the native banks*
V* The me rits of the *gold standard1’ %
49Honey is very commonly defined as a medium of exchange. In 
much more detail money may be defined as narry medium of exchange which 
ia (1) widely accepted in payment for goods and services and in set­
tlement of debts* and is (2) accepted without reference to th© stand-
«50tag, of the person who offers it in payment* Money may be said to 
have three kinds of functions* i«©•* (l) essential services, (%} de­
rived functions* and (3) contingent functions, According to its
^*The China Year Book* 1921-22* Tientsin press, 1921* p* £82»
^F* E, L©e* Currency* Banking* and Finano© in China, Trade Pro­
motion series* No* 27* 1926, p* 72,
R* Wage1* Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai, 1915* p* 211, 
49r . g « Eawtray* Ths Gold Standard in Theory and Practice* Now York* 
1933, p. 1*
B* Foster and J# X* Bogan* .teonoy and Bfojakinf; * l-iow York* 1940*
P*
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essential services, money serves as (a) a measurement of value and
(b) it facilitates exchange• From its derived function® , it serves 
(a) as a standard of deferred payment, (b) it stares value, and (c) it 
transfers value* The oontingenfc functions of morny ares (a) distribu­
tion of sooial income, (b) equalisation of marginal utility in expendi­
ture, (o) furnishing of the basis of a credit system, and (d) Impart­
ing of a general form to capital.®^
Many commodities could be, and in the past were„ chosen for this 
purpose* But as the result of practice for hundreds and thousands of 
years the precious metals have been generally chosen by mankind as the 
most suitable ocasmoditie s for a medium of exchange. Among the precious 
metals gold, because of its especially suitable physical characters, 
such as general acceptability, stability of value, divisibility, homo­
geneity , cogniaability, malleability, durability, and portability, was 
looted upon as the most suitable material for the functions of money, 
far centuries* After 1933 most of the important countries in the world 
adopted the managed currency systems Instead of the gpld standard, the 
old argument, i«e*, which one as between the gold standard and the well- 
controlled paper money would be the better one for the purpose of cur­
rency and revived it as a significant topic among the economists. This 
ie another problem outside the scope of this paper* In the period 
iraasdlately after the China-Japan IHTar, from the point of view of either 
the continued improvement of China’s foreign trade or the payment of 
the heavy gold debts of the Chinese Government, it was really necessary 
for China to pay much attention to the widely adopted gold standard*
As a matter of fact, either the group of officers in China's Government
51D. Kinley, Money, New York, 1924, p. 123,
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wii& insisted a uniform silver standard wme the necessary step for 
China to take before she adopted the gold standard, or the group is 
China aho maintained that the gold standard was th© immediate way for 
China to take, had the same opinion, !••*, the gold standard must be 
the last goal for the reform of China * s currency* But neither of them
had explained th® merit® of th© gold standard in the stability of in*
tarsal price and of foreign exchange.
Generally speaking, th© supply of gold, unlike the paper money
whioh can be issued in unrestricted quantities, is limited, end if
52money is gold the supply of money is limited* Th© supply of gold
is always controlled by th© cost of production* Th© supply of silver,
os the other hand, most of which is produced as a by-product of th® 
mining of other metals, is not automatically controlled by the cost 
of mining silver itself* Who n th© oost of production of gold is high, 
some peer mines will b© automatically olosed* Th© supply of gold de­
creases* The prioe of gold in tanas of goods, i*e*, th© purchasing 
power of money coined from gold, goes up* On th© other hand, th© price 
of goods in terns of money or gold, will be lower. Than th© cost of 
production of gold will be low* Th© poor mines or sons now mines will 
open and more gold will be produced* Th© fluctuations of the produc­
tion of gold tends to condition th© lew or high oost of production of 
it* However, this does not mean that the purpose of stabilization of 
priee can be reached by automatically controlling production of gold®
In the first place, it i s not the case that tho whole amount of gold 
has been used for the purpose of money* In the second place, countries
^R* G• Hawtrey, The Gold Stand ard in Theory; and. practice, 1933, 
p» 14*
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which adopted the gold-standard currency, even before the war, used
geld coins, bank money, and demand deposits subject to check for the
53monetary circulation* In th© third place, there may be maldistribu—
54tion of existing gold* These are just some of the significant factors
which Influence the relationship between the quantity of gold and the
price of goods under th© gold standard* But if one country adopts the
silver standard and most countries with which th© countiy on a silver
standard does business are on th© gold standard, such as was the case
of China about 1900, the gold standard is better than the silver one,
especially in the case of China with a system of silver sycee* This
would appear to be true frcaa both the standpoint of facilitating foreign
exchange improvement and from the standpoint of stablizing the internal
price level* Furthermore, the system of the silver sycee existing in
China would probably have to be abandoned*
55With the gold standard, the rate of foreign exchange between
countries on the gold standard is determined in the long run by nparw*
In a country with a gold standard the value of gold Is th© value 
of the monetary unit* Th© price of tha currency of on© gold stand­
ard country in terras of that of another is the value of gold in the 
former in terms of the value of la in the latter, and can only 
vary from parity by a fraction representing the cost of transporta­
tion of the gold from one country to th® other*
^^iohael A* Heilperin, International Monetary Economics, 1959, p* 26* 
5*Ibid*, p. 75.
®®”*The term ’gold standard1 may be used in a narrower or in a wider sense* In the narrower sense it signifies* a monetary system under which 
gold coins of standard specification, or gold certificates with 100 per cent* gold backing, form tha circulating medium* In th© wider sense it 
covers also the ease where notes or silver coins are legal tender, pro­vided they are convertible into gold at a fixed rate* Thor© must, of course, be no prohibition of th© melting down of gold coins.” (G. von Haberier, The Theory of International Trade* Mew lork, 1937, p* 23*)Here I awe the "gold standard" In the wider sense.
G. Hawtrey, The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice, New York, 
1933, p* 37.
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In the short run, the rat® fluctuates for reasons such as the desmnd
for and supply of foreign exchange,©to* , but this fluctuation is a
relatively limited one« "When countries abandon the gold standard,
their exchange rates may fluctuate much more widely or may fluctuate 
«57even less* If a country is on a paper standard, by the forces of 
competition, there may be no limit to the fluctuations which may occur 
in those rates*
Under the gold standard, according to the famous theory of the 
Classical economists, the balance of payments of gold standard coun­
tries can be automatically restored to equilibrium by th© movement of 
gold and of commodities. After the balance of trade of a country ha© 
become passive and gold has begun to flow out, the outflow of gold will 
decrease the volume of money in circulation* By the operation of th® 
"quantity theory" of money, prices will fall* Then th© export® from 
the country will be stimulated and imports will b© reduced* Gold will 
flow in again and then th© volume of currency in circulation will expand* 
Prices will rise, imports wx 11 be stimulated, and exports will be re­
duced*
The movement of gold, which is the something as the cash pay- 
meats necessitated by the passive balance of trad.©, produces a gap 
between th© price levels of the two oountri©®. This in its turn 
stimulate® a flow of goods in the same direction as the original 
flew of gold, and th© flow of goods induces a flow of gold in th® 
opposite direction. The two gold movements, thoreforo, cancel 
out axti the balance of payments is restored to equilibrium by th® 
movement of commodities* Thus, payment is made pr ovisionally in. 
gold, but finally in goods.®®
In theory this mechanism preserves equilibrium in the balance of 
payments. It prevents a complete loss of gold by any one country and 
Insures an appropriate distribution of gold among ilia gold standard 
countries which enter into world trad®.
• G» Bawtrey, The Gold Standard In-Theory and Tract.ice, p. SO.. von Haberler7~Th©^FHgoi^^oŜ^ n^erna^l^aJ^r^aTni?^ 26-27.
CHAPTER IV
THE MONETARY SITUATION BETWEEN 1911-1928 AND 
THE PROPOSALS FOR CURRENCY REFORM
After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, in which th© Manehu dynasty 
was overthrown end a nominal republic established, the republican Central 
Government within a short period of about two or throe years started to 
get things into running order* Then there cam© th© counter revolution 
and the creation of the new Ehrire of Hong-shain. The first President 
©f the Republic of China, Yuan Shih-k&i, made himself the first king of 
the new Empire* The new Empire lasted only a few months* On account 
of Yuanfs death and the opposition of the military leaders in most of 
the provinces, the new Snpire was closed and the Republic of China re- 
opened* But from then on there followed a succession of civil wars, 
and the rise and fall of on© war lord after another, who controlled for 
a time the Central Government, a province, or a group of provinces* 
Following the political complications, th© outlook turned dark*
The year 1928 marked the new era in the life of the Republic of 
China* The establishment of the National Government of China at Nanking 
took place in that year*
I* The Currency Situation from 1911 to 1928— The currency situation 
In China, after 1911, became much more serious owing to th© fact that not 
only the existing complicated political situation did not improve, but 
also the non-uniform silver coins and the subsidiaiy coins (silver and 
eopper) of provincial mints added more trouble to the existing condition*
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The situation was pictured by Mr. F. E. Leo as follows*
•«» Since 1911 th© complete disorganization of th© ©dminls** 
tretion has resulted in additional complications-•* The pro* 
vineial mints, under th© control of various grasping militarists, 
have been minting coins of all kinds, of inferior quality, for 
revenue purposes* Consequently th© country has been flooded with 
depreciated copper and silver coins. Th© variation in weight and 
contents of silver dollars produced by different mints and even by 
the same mints at different times has been *»»* • At the best they 
are but a commodity whose expressed value in th© accepted tael unit 
must necessarily fluctuate considerably .1
Much more detailed information would be needed to show bhe situa*
tion of China* s currency after the creation of the Republic of China and
before the eve of the creation of the new currency system of the
National Government of China* A brief description of the currency
situation and classification of the proposed reforms will be given in
the following discussion:
A* The situation of the silver dollar— After the issuing of th©
2eoinage lair of 1910, the new standard dollar "yuan” with 0.72 kuping 
taels end *900 fine was first coined in the mints at Wuchang and Wanking 
in July, 1911* When the revolution broke out in October, 1911, the 
soldiers were paid with the new dollar*
In 1914 for the first time th© Yuan Chih-kai dollar was officially 
issued* According to the provisions of the new law3 of 1914, th© Yuan 
Sheh-kax dollar with the picture of Yuan Sheh—kai, the first President 
of the Bepublio of China, as a design on the coins, w&s to be 0*900 fin© 
to weigh 0*72 kuping taelsi that is, the contents of pur© silver was 
to be 0*648 kuping taels (23*97795048 grarrmeej in weight* Since then th© 
Tuan Sheh-kal dollars gradually replaced not only the Mexican and other
Ik* E* bee, Currency, Banking, and Finance in China* Trad© Pro­
motion Series, no* 27, 1926, p* 6i*
2y* supra, p. 316 of Chapter Ull.
Sy* inform, p* 153 of Chapter IV.
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foreign dollars, but also the Chinese dragon dollars, issued by pro­
vincial government before th© coinage of the Yuan Sheh-kai dollars,
SBsre circulating in China at that period* After an existence of 
about thirteen years (1914-1927) the Yuan Shih-kai dollars had become 
popular both in the ports and inland*
This do lar came first from the mints at Tientsin and Wanking, 
then from some of the provincial mints* The Bank of China, the Bank of 
Cersainicabions and th© official provincial banks as the agents of the 
Central Government exchanged, free of charge, the old dragon dollar for 
the new Yuan Shih-kai dollars •
As to the weight and fineness of these dollars issued in different
Ayears, Mr* A* Tracy Woodward offered the following reports
Republic 
of China
Weight Fineness Diameter Thickness
3rd year 
(19X4)
414*73 grains 0*880 38*75 m*m* 2*66 m*m*
8th year 
(1919)
413.37 ft 0*880 38*75 m»m® . 2*66 m*m»
9th year 
(1920)
413*99 n 0*880 38 *78 m*m* 2*66 m»m#
lOth year 
(1921)
414*66 tt 0*880 38.75 m.m* 2*50 m*m *
From 1914 to 1917 , ,owing to both th© export of a large amount
Mexican dollars and the melting of a certain amount of the same coins, 
the Yuan Shih-kai dollar had succeeded in fimly establishing iteelf* 
Of eourse, th© un-uniform silver do'lar© minted by provinces still were 
in the local market, but only th© Yuan Shih-kai dollar circulated in a 
much wider area* Once there occurred th© unfortunate debasing of the 
Yuan Shih-kai dollar by the mint at Anking (the oapltol of Anhwei Pro­
vince) and the formation of a powerful group for personal gain at th©
4k* &ann, ^©"Currenciee of China, 1926, p* 326*
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International Settlement of Shanghai* By the efforts of the Governments 
these happenings were seen ascertained and checked*6
After the arrival of the revolution party, Kuomingts&g, in banking 
In 1927, the mints at Shanghai and Hangchow began turning out Sun-Yat- 
sen dollars, bearing the effigy of the late revolutionary leader of 
China's Kucmingtarig, Dr* Sun Yat—sen* The Sun Yet—sen dollars weighed 
23*9025 grams of pure silver and an attempt was made by th® Hational 
Government, which was established by the Khomington, to have them r©«* 
place the Yuan Shih-kai dollars*
B* The situation of the paper money— The issues of the provincial 
and local paper money, since the Revolution (1911;, added more compli­
cations to the existing serious situation of th© currency* According 
to one source, an approximate amount of paper money worth $130,000,000
silver dollars had, to 1914, beer issued by twenty-three provinces and 
£districts • Another source put the estimated amount of the total of 
both Central Government and Provincial Government issues, bo 1915, at 
#172,0C0,000*7
Among these provinces which issued paper money it was th© govern­
ment of Kwantung Province which was first to turn its attention to th© 
scheme for redemption* An authentic record6 showed that of the total 
notes issued (including 5G</, $1, $5, and $10 in that province), 
amounting to $33,040,000, only a sum of $31,645,504 was redeemed and 
cancelled at the fixed rate of t0*455 for each dollar during duly, 1914* 
The remainder w^s left to be cancelled without redemption* Tk© paper
6Ibid., p* 326*
%'en, P* The Currency Problem in £hina, 1914* p* 134*
^William F* Spalding, Eastern Exchange Currency and Fineno©, Londod,
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notes in other provinces were subsequently either called in by way of 
redemption at a fixed price or cancelled without redemption* Unfor­
tunately there are no available figures to show the real situation*
As to the bank notes, encouraged by the existing fact (issuing of 
notes by th® Central Government, the provincial governments, foreign 
banks, and some merchants in all parts of the country) there was nothing 
to prevent the free circulation of notes put into circulation by the 
Chinese banks* The crisis of unsound and uncontrolled banking institu­
tions (both native and modern banks) following the revolution of 1911 
made all paper money issued by Chinese banks absolutely valueless* After 
that event only the redeemed notes of the Taching Bank, the Bank of
China, and the Bank of Commimicati ons were oonsadored good in the minds
of the majority of the people.
C* The copper cents— With the appearance of modern copper coins** or 
copper cent s, which is one kind of copper cash without a hole in the
center, in 1900 all further supply of old cash coins ceased* During
the World Ifar th© market value of copper rose and it became very 
profitable to collect the old copper coins and melt them down for ex­
port* Thus tha existing old copper cash gradually went out of circu­
lation*
The modern copper coins or the copper cents continued to ba turned 
out by a number of provincial mints after 1S00* According to one source 
of information, the total output of the copper cents from 1900 until the 
end of 1917 was 31,682,102,308 pieces of 1/ and 386,292,308 pieces of
supra* p* 82*
10S* Kann, The Currencies of China* 1926, p. 398*
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Several series of oopper cents had bean coined since 1905* Fro®
19OS to 1909 there were two series of copper cents} that is, the Tai 
Tsin Ti Kuo series and the Regular Provincial series. Both of them 
were issued in the period of the Tsin Empire. They were characterised 
by (1) more or less uniform design, (2) dragon and clouds or waves,
(3) average weight 112-116 grains with 28 m.iru for tbs one cent piece and 
33 ®.m* for the two cent piece. Under the Republic of China, there were 
several kinds of issues, such as the Commemorative series, the Regular 
Provincial series, the coins for general use, and the ”blg money” 
copper series. They wre inconsistent with regard to weight, size, de­
sign, composition and workmanship, owing to lack of central control of 
issue.
The over*production and un-unifonnity of issuing at last led to 
the depreciation of these copper cents. The cause of depreciation of 
the copper cents more or less varies with different periods. As Mr. E. 
Kazrn says 9
The depreciation, which had taken place between the years 1906 
and 1911, was due to over-production, and not to adulteration of 
the metal contests. But shortly after the inauguration of the Re­
publican regime, and especially after th© ending of the World War 
in 1919, the production of copper coins became so prolific and 
the metal contents so variable that, within live years, the situa­
tion had become desperate. In certain districts of the country 
not less than 300 oopper cents had to be tendered for a dollar in 
1924. Occasional analysis of the fine contents of 10 cash (or 1 
cent piece} pieces showed that there were debased coins in circula­
tion which deviated up to Zb% from the standard weight of 18 oan- 
dareens. *
It is safe to say that at the last stages of the bad tendency 
(around the year 1926} China*s copper coinage was not a medium of ex­








































actual demand and ■the fineness o f these ooins* Th® fo llo w in g  quotation
o ffe rs  an example**'®
(!) Shanghai daily quotation  (October 12 , 1925)
K a tiv e  in te re s t  per day: A* M* ta e ls  0*25 per ta e ls  1,000
P . M . " 0 .24  11 "
Msacioan and Chinese # a A* S3* ta e ls  72*53575 per 100 #
P. M . ta e ls  72.625 •  «
Kiangnan cents * A * K . ta e ls  60*70 per 100 cents (s i lv e r )
P* M* " 60*70 « « «
Canton cents : A * M* ta e ls  54*925 per 100 cents ( s i lv e r )
P* Um *  55.000 « tt w
Coppers * A* M* 542,000, per ta e ls  100
P. M* 542,000 *  *
Exohen go:
d o lla r  1 -  12 s ilv e r -2 0 ^ -p ie c e s , 19 coppers 
d o lla r  1 -  242 ooppers 
10 cents * 18 coppers 
10 cents *  6 coppers
(b ig  money)
(2 )  Shanghai Foreign Exchange Bankers* Association (on May 1 1 , 
1925)
Members o f th e  above asso cia tion  have agreed that, on 1 1 th . in ­
stant end u n t i l  fu r th e r  n o t ic e , subsid iary  coins w i l l  b® received  
and paid out a t  the  fo llo w in g  r a t io :  —
Dollars Subsidiary coins
10 cents 9 10 cents silver and 5 coppers
20 cants m 20 R and 11 coppers
SO cents m 40 n and 1 copper
40 cents = 50 n and 6 ooppers
50 cents 9 60 ft and 11 ooppers
60 easts S 80 (t and 2 ooppers
70 cents a 90 » and 7 coppers
80 cents m 100 ft and 12 oopper©
90 cents s 120 w and 2 coppers
(5) Post Offloe notification
(Shanghai, Ootober 2, 1925)
Subsidiary eoias tendered for the payments of taxed mail matter 
mill be accepted at the foil wing rates*
!'
One Mexican or Dragon dollar * copper cash 2600 
* * » « * oopper cents 260
91 * 16 lO-cont pieces, 9 copper cents
v: and 5 cash
/ *or one 10 cent piece may be obtained stamps to the face value
/ of ? cents plus 10 cash*
A 10 cent stamp coats one 10 cent piece, 6 oor>p©r cents, and S
cash*
A S cent stamp costs 7 copper cents plus 5 cash*
A 1 cent stamp costs 2 oopper cents plus 5 cash#
It is apparent that the exchange rate between the subsidiary coins 
and the dollar, between subsidiary coins and oopper cents, and between 
subsidiary coins and the copper cash fluctuated from business to 
business, from time to time, and from place to place* This added more 
trouble to the existing serious confusion of China* s currency situation# 
II* The monetary policies of China’s government and the advocates 
of currency reform during the period concerned:
A* The policies of government and the proposals of currency reform—  
In the beginning of 1911 Mr# Sheng Hsuan-huai was appointed Minister of
dommonications• Through his instrumentality a foreign loan was signed
on April 15, 1911, between the representatives of American, British, 
French and German banking groups on th© on© part and Duk© Ts&i Tee, the 
Minister of Finance of China on the second part# Df th© loan of 
1:10,000,000, thirty per cent* was contracted to be used for the develop­
ment of hanchuria, and the remainder for the purpose of reforming 
China* s currency system* Meetings were held in London and Berlin by 
representatives of the four power group and th© Chinese Government with 
the purpose of finding a suitable scheme for the reform of China’s 
currency system* Under the terms of the loan, it m s  agreed to Invite 
Dr* G* Vissering, late president of th© nJave.sche Bank” to act as
i m
monetary advisor to th® Chinese Gevenament* About M O O  ,000 of the 
loan was paid to China to be devoted to Manchurian development immedi­
ately after the loan agreement sms signed* 3)r* Vissering1 s appointment 
was made just on the eve of the Revolution (October, 1911)* Owing to 
the outbreak cf the Revolution, this loan was not completed, but Dr* 
Vissering carried on his investigation for one year*
After studying the Chinese currency situation for a year, he 
drew a plan for the currency reform of China* His plan was accepted 
by the Revolutionary Government and gave rise to the plan of the Chinese 
Currency Reform Committee of 1912*
His whole plan is briefly described as foil owe?:
a* The standard of currency— He maintained that from the standpoint 
of stability of prices and foreign exchange, the gold standard is the 
beet one, but from the standpoint of existing circumstances in China 
•perhaps for some time to come, a gold coin will be far too big a unit 
for the ordinary transactions in the interior of C h i n a I n  China th© 
gold exchange standard with a circulation of token coins of silver, 
nickel and oopper may be the suitable one for a transitional period*
But the principal disadvantage of a gold exchange standard is that It 
is always to a certain extent an artificial system which requires a vexy 
close supervision if a deterioration of th© currency is to be avoided* 
However, this is not the disadvantage which only the gold standard 
possesses and it is the disadvantage which even under the silver standard 
cannot be avoided*
14g* Vissering and W* A* Roost, Cto Chinese Currency, Amsterdam,
1912, Vol* I, p* 16*
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Under a silver standard the silver coins carry their own real 
value in themselves• But a very serious disadvantage of this system 
is that the same objection of artificialness remains in full fore® 
as regards the circulation of subsidiary oopper coins, which can 
not be detached from the silver currency*15
Thus he proposed that during the early period of reform China should 
have a dual currency, a silver standard and a gold-exchange standard* 
b* The sise of unit— fie criticized the new unit of the new dollar 
?yuaa* provided by the Chinese government in 1910 as being too large a 
unit* A large unit tends to raise the prices of commodities, salaries, 
wages and the oost of living**** instead of the unit "yuan3 of 
28*97795048 grams of pure silver; that is, 64&/l»C0O of a kuping tael 
of pure silver,*^ ho suggested that one unit of silver coin should con­
tain 8*50 grams of silver with *900 fine involving a gold ratio of about 
21 to 1*
isThe several coins proposed by him are#
Silver Coins
one unit piece 8*50 grammes, 900 fine 7*65 fine weight 
two unit piece 17.00 * " * 15*80 "
4 unit piece 4*75 H 800 " 5*80 w *
l/5 unit piece 1.90 ” " 1*52 w ”
Nickel Coins
1^0 unit piece Weight and alloy to be determined later on*
1^80 « « " *
Copper Coins
1 cent piece Weight and alloy to be determined later on*
1 cent piece ” "z , , « «2 cent pleee
15 P* 17 *
Ibid., p. 61.
17^7. supra»y p. 127.
18 Ibid., p* 95*
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The gold coins should he issued, only after the silver end
subsidiary coins had been In circulation for some time*
Gold Coins
20 unit piece 8*09974 grammes, 900 fine, 7*289766 fin© w.
10 unit piece 4*04987 grammes, 900 fine, 8*644888 fine w.
The new unit was to weigh *8644883 grammes of fine gold, which is 
equal to about 25 cents United States currency, and was determined from 
gold value of l/5 of a kuping tael of silver* His reckoning is as 
fellows:
1 kuping tael * 575*8 grains - 57*31128541 grams
(987 fine) (987 fine)
Thus, 1 kuping tael * 568*3146 grains of fine silver, and l/3 
kuping tael * 189*4382 grains of fine silver*
The normal silver price for that moment was a value of 28 d* 
per standard ounce* (i.e* 28 d*will buy 480 grains of standard 
silver)* Therefore the same 28 d*will buy 37/^0 of an ounce, or 
444 grains, of fine silver*
The gold value of the rroposed unit, expressed in silver at 
the price of 28 d*, would thus be
189*4382/444 x 28 d. » 11*946553 d.
For 240 d* * gold sovereign ( » 7*52238 grams of fine gold)
Thus the new unit (l/5 of a kuping tael) «
7*52238/340 x 11*946555 * 0*3644885 grams of fin© gold*
When we adopt a future ratio between gold and silver as 21 to 1, 
■fee fine silver content of th© proposed new unit would hav© to be 
0*3644883 x 21 s 7*6542543 grams of fin© silver*
Supposing a fineness of 900, the gross weight of th© new unit 
must be 8*504727 grams *18

















in fine gold 
of grams*
Giving a ratio 
as from:
8*504727 7*6542543 0.5644883 21*1
5*65518 5*2310415 0*3661192 14*28:1
5*55555 5. 0*35842
5* 4.175 0.29032 13.95:1
10. 9*45 0.6048 15 5/8 :1
10*126 8.100 0*3749962 21*6: 1
11*665811 10.69182675 0*4882113 21.9: 1
19ibld*, pp. 68-90,
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The bullion value of this proposed silver token coin would 
only become equal to its nominal value if the price of silver 
rose to 45 d* per ounce standard* With this margin it would seam 
to be vexy satisfactorily safe—guarded against the consequences 
of a rise in silver*
Meanwhile he presented a comparative table of the content of gold 









piece (China) 8*09974 7*2^9766 0*900
Sovereign (Br*> 7 *98805 7 *32238532 0*916
20 Beiehsmaxk piece 7.96495 7.16845 0.900
patch 10 Guilder piece 6*72 6*048 0.900
SO Francs piece 6*45181 5*80645 0*900
10 Ten piece 8*55525 7 #499925 0*900
U* S* $5 piece
&  Sftglaj 8*559 7*525158 0*900
21
e* The steps of adoption of the new system—
According to his plan, an outlined scheme is as follows*
First period of transition
(1) The very first step must be the adoption of a future gold unit 
as the foundation of a new system in order to avoid speculation on th© 
announcement of the gold par, and also to avoid the possibility that the 
new unit would later on have to be raised to its future nominal value* 
(2) The organisation of a Central Bank of issue, or otherwise the re­
organization of the Tft Ching Bank as a central bank for the whole 
country* (3) The introduction of the new gold unit as a money of 
account for book credits and book transfers* (4) Securing th© 
cooperation of the foreign exchange banks and of th© private Chinese 
h»wWy bankers for the introduction of th© new gold unit into their 




(6> The accumulation of a gold reserve against th© aforesaid hank notes* 
(?) the regulations of the mansgement of this gold res ©nr©* (8) Eventu—
ally dtQltriiig the bank notes legal tender* (9) To niak© a close study 
of the conditions of the balance of trad©, and of the balance of payment 
for China*
Second Period
(10) The establishment of weight* fineness* and alloy of the token 
coins and of the nee subsidiary coinage* (11) The issue of these token 
eoins and simultaneously• (12) The accumulation of gold reserve against
the token eoins* and the regulation of its management* (15) If de­
sirable* the coinage and issue of gold coins* Also, if desirable* the 
temporary adn&3ion of seme particular foreign gold coins as legal 
tender* and the temporary issue of gold certificates* (14) The procla­
mation of unlimited legal tender of (I) the silver token coins of 1 
unit and 2 units i (XI) the above-mentioned gold coins and eventually 
the gold certificates«
Third Period
(15) The gradual withdrawal and subsequent demonetisation of th© old 
silver dollars* as far as necessary of the old sycee, and of th© present 
copper cash*
In hie plan, a special point which distinguishes it from other plans 
is that in the first period h© uses one kind of money for book credits 
to take the place of gold units*
The requirement for employing token coins and then adopting a gold 
exchange standard is that the government ought to bo able to protect 
against counterfeiting and against illicit importation of false coins* 
especially the tthonest* counterfeiters in the first instance* Further­
more* the government should have some means to meet a possible rise in
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tfe* gold price of silver to the extent of raising the bullion value
of tho ooin above its nominal value, which could result in the coins
going into the melting pot* From the point of view of China1 a
situation at that time* he ©aids
China is certainly not in such an enviable position enough 
to prevent a serious degree of counterfeiting, especially in the 
remote parts of the interior****22
Therefore he gave us an alternative ways
China would have to try and do without token coins for the 
first few years* However, as a stepping stone to a gold ex­
change standard she might for the present have a unit based in 
gold in conjunction with bank-notes and the silver and copper 
currency now existing.. • • He claims that by this method (to 
maintain a double standard for a while) all speculations in ad«* 
vance of the new measure and the sudden losses and gains* which 
were the unpleasant features of conversion in India and the 
Straits, could be avoid«d*2S
The issue of bank-notes under the Central Bank* the next step in 
his plan* would be more difficult to counterfeit because of the 
technical skill required, the numbering of the notes, and ©o forth* 
but he held that the reserves under his scheme would be represented by 
gold stocks or gold credits held abroad* For the following reasons he 
pnxiously maintained that the issue of notes in the bank unit should
i
purt be a government issues
/
j- (1) There is a temptation to misuse such power in times of
, stress by the government j (2) proper gold reserves abroad should
i be kept strictly and exclusively for the redemption of these
/ notes *24
/ 1 d« How is the system maintained?— According to his plan the
i ;
[- Central Bark redeems its notes in foreign drafts, charging slight pre­
mium in amounts of 50,000 or 100,000 or more of the new units* Reserve 
funds in cash, bills of exchange or first class investment of short
z£g* S* Wage!, Chinese Currency and Banking, Shanghai* 1915, p* 156* 
25lbld*, p * 136 *
24ibid., p. 138*
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Maturities * should be maintained in several foreign financial centers* 
Amsterdam may be the administrative ©enter of reserves for western 
countries and Shanghai for the eastern ones* Bank notes should be 
issued at first only -when an equivalent of gold, bills payable in gold, 
or silver capable of being sold for gold, were tendered the bank# Re­
serves of about fifty per cent# are contemplated eventually*
Seigniorage profits go into a currency gold reserve fund to form a 
government fund but is to be managed by the Central. Bank in the same 
way as the bank note reserve funds♦ Fiduciary coins can be redeemed in 
the same manner as notes, in amounts of 50,0 0 or 100,000 or more of 
new units, or in gold or silver bullion* Opportunity should be given 
in many places in China to exchange fiduciary coins for larger coins, 
notes or transfers in amounts of 10 or 20 units or more*
e* Others— The Board of Directors of the Central Bank, a private 
institution with some government control, will be elected by share­
holders, and a president and secretary will be appointed by the govern­
ment* A Government Commissi oner appointed by the government would 
supervise generally the transactions of the Bank, especially those of 
general policy* The Bank should secure the services of a few carefully 
selected foreigners* Capital of the Bank is about ten million 
Chinese dollars • The Bank has a monopoly of note issues bo the exclu­
sion of the government, and aots as fiscal agent to the government*
In Dr* Vissering1 s plan, the important policy in the operation of 
his plan is that the date of minting of the token and other coins would 
actually be left entirely open for many years after starting the bank 
unit system in actual practice*
In Dr- Vissering’s mind, the silver standard does not procure any
14 2
stability of prices fop commodities, contracts and so on* Fur the more, 
under a silver standardTTth© same objection of artificialness remains 
in full force as regards the circulation of subsidiary copper coins, 
which cannot he detached from the silver currency*” For the purpose of 
stability of prices and foreign exchange a go d standard is the best one* 
bat from the view of existing circumstances in China the gold exchange 
standard is the suitable one for a transitional period* A gold ex­
change standard has the advantage that the gold standard has* It 
insures stability of prices and of international exchange# Under the 
gold standard just a few steps are needed to guarantee the nominal value 
of token coins, and to maintain the parity of foreign exchanges# For 
the special circumstances in China, he would adopt a money of account 
for book credits; then an issue of bank notes of a new gold units 
after adequate accumulation of a gold reserve, then declare the bank 
notes legal tenders then issue token coins and new subsidiary coinages 
if desirable, then issue gold coins* His last step is the gradual 
withdrawal and subsequent demonetisation of the old silver dollars, as 
far as necessary of the old syoee, and of the present copper cash*
It seems to me that the key point of his whole plan Is the first 
step; that is, "the introduction of the new gold unit as a money of 
account for book credits and book transfers*” I have the same question 
which l£r* Wagel has; that is, in the case of China, how would Ur# 
Vissering make effective this kind of highly skillful policy? he says 
to "secure the cooperation of the foreign exchange bank*" It would ssem 
difficult for the Central Government to secure the cooperation of 
foreign banks* Even though China’s government has reached this goal, 
hew the money of account be run all over the interior, in most of
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which places these Is no uniform measurement of value, no uniform 
exchange mediima, no modern banking institutions, and no good trans­
portation and oommunioation system?
After the aoooptanco of Mr* Vissering*s plan by the Revolutionary 
Government, the Chinese Currency Reform Committee drafted a plan in 
1912* It decided in favor of the adoption of the gold exchange standard 
in order to stabilise exchange, to make payment© to foreign countries 
economically, to place the nations*© foreign trade in safety, to stimu­
late the inflow of foreign capital, to minimise the drastic fall of the 
value of "the silver tael, and to avoid the loss of interest due to the 
hoarding of gold* The plan called for the issuance of silver substitute 
coins for the gold unit, for the gold reserve exc?aange fund, foreign 
bonds and other means of international settlement*
For various reasons this plan has never bean brought into effect* 
Mr* Vissering was succeeded in Hovember, 1912 by Dr* W* A* Roest, 
but on the daath of the latter in January, 191-3 Dr* Vissering again 
took up the post of honorary adviser on currency matters* Meanwhile 
a Bureau of Currency was formed with Dr* Chang Tsung-yuen as chairman, 
to consider the question of currency reform in the light of the sug­
gestions made by Doctors Vissering, and Roest* In 1913 l.'r. Hsu Un-yuan, 
acting director of the Audit Department of the Chines© Government, was 
one of the three members of. the Currency Reform Commission and a strong 
advocate of the silver standard* After the Government of China had de­
cided upon the adoption of the silver standard, Vr. Hsu drafted a law 
for unification of silver coinage which anticipated the creation of the 
National Currency Regulation of 1914* Tha general idea of his scheme 
is as followss
144
ft* The unit of the national coin.——He suggested the term 1tHuanM as
tha name of the new standard coin for the following reasons
la olden times the currency system in China m s  called 
tt huen—fa * In the past we have been accustomed to call the
dollar yuan* This word is also used by Japan® In order to
make a distinction between the currency units of the two 
countries, we adopt the ancient name huan as the name for owr 
unit *25
Ha held that the total weight of the unit of standard coin should 
be 65 oandareens kuping weight (0*55 kuping tail} or 20 grammas* He
As tha 72—candareen dollar is now approximately equivalent to 
1,500 cash, then the 55-candaroon dollar will be approximately 
equivalent to 1,0'0 cash, which is a number at once regular, con- 
veaoient and possible of decimal progression* The relative value 
between silver and the cash will not be altered* Trie people will 
be in possession of a dollar whose value is not too high for 
daily transactions* It will not tend to force up the standard of 
living*
The 72-eandareen dollar is of too high a value to be suitable 
to the people and it invites irregularity*
To introduce by force decimal progression with the 72~cand&reen 
dollar will be a source of great danger* This act will encourage 
speculation* A do lar is now worth as much as 1,520* If its
value is forced down to 1,000, the laboring and other classes
will suffer acutely, as the dollar will be depreciated b~r one— 
fourth of its usual value, and there is no prospect of lowering 
the price of the necessary commodities*
He cited the usual foreign provision as an example to decide the 
fineness of the standard coin suggested by him with 90 per cent* silver 
and the remaining part with copper*
b* The decimal progression— The Huan will be divided into 100 
fdng or contendj each feng shall be divided Into 10 II*
c» The sioaidiary coins— According to him, huan, the standard coin, 
will bo unlimited on the amount in on© transaction* The silver token 
coins, 50 feng and 20 feng, involved in one transaction shall not exceed 
10 huan* The amount of nickel token coin, in fong and 5 feng, involved
Zbjinmtel Report of the Director of the Mint, 1915, Washington, p* 209*
^3j[bi4«, pp* 209—210*
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in transaction shall not exceed 5 huan* ^he amount or copper token 
eoin, 1 feng and 1 li, involved in on© transaction shall not exceed 1 
huan* The one li of the copper token coin shall be of the same value 
as the cash then in current use*
d* The designs of the coins— The standard coin as well as the 
silver and nickel token coins shall be inscribed with the national flag 
and four words s’*ftandard coin, one huan**1 and so forth on one face of 
the coins* On the other side shall be engraved the picture of the 
President and the date whan the dollar is minted*
The special features in his plan were: (1) the new term 1!Euon” for 
the standard unit suggested by him in order to make a distinction with 
the term *Yen* of Japan; (2J the weight of 55 oandaroens kuping for the 
unit of standard coin in order to meet the existing market rate of one 
dollar to 1,000 copper cash* Neither of these suggestions had been 
adopted by the government when the National Currency Regulation of 1914 
was drafted*
Srinivas R* Wagel, a private scholar studying the Chinese currency 
situation and the problems of Chinese currency, believed that the 
greatest difficulty of currency reform in China is not the fluctuation 
of the exchange rates of gold and silver but the lack of unification of 
domestic currencies* He urged that the Shanghai tael should be jma.de 
idie uniform currency unit and that subsidiary copper coins should be 
unified* He especially offered a reasonable criticism about the plans 
proposed by experts for China, ©specially about V'v* Vissoring*s plan* 
Some points of his criticism and suggestions are given as followss
is* He £5.rst mad© a comparison between the conditions existing in 
China and those in countries of Europe* Ho saidi
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Contrast the conditions in China with those in Europe* There 
is no comparison between the national wealth of the two countries* 
There ere no manufactures in this country, and besides the country 
has been for nearly forty years buying more than it sold, and thus 
accumulating a large adverse trade balance* The country has no 
wealth with which to improve its industry and manufactures j and it 
is a well-known fact that the profits of industries and manu­
factures are greater than those of agriculture, and that such pro­
fits alone have enabled Europe to adopt and maintain a gold 
standard* Moreover* China has not even the freedom to develop in­
to a manufacturing country•*•• Foreign goods entering China are 
taxed merely to furnish revenue to the government* and not with a 
view to encourage local industry or with a view to enable her to 
compete with foreign manufactures* Tie standard of living* 
especially in view of the almost entire absence of manufactures 
and the small national wealth, is extremely lows and the ratio be­
tween the standard in China and England may be roughly put at one 
to fifty*27
Therefore, he concluded that China is not able to follow the line of 
the foreign countries to adopt the gold standard* The adoption of a 
currency unit must be regulated by the active circumstances existing in 
the country which adopts the currency unit*
b* He did not omit the merit of the old system existing in China 
which used to be ignored by most reformers of China1 s currency* He 
pointed out ■shat the fault of many proposals for China* s currency reform, 
such as hr* Vissering*s, is the assumption that "because the gold or gold 
exchange standard has been found suitable in another country, they should 
also serve the purpose for China*" As a matter of fact, the Chinese 
currency system had some merits to have existed for centuries* If 
currency reform is to be carried ut in China successfully, one should 
consider the possibility of adopting her existing system to suix; modem 
conditions




o* He also pointed out the ignorance of the local trade in most of 
the proposals of China*s currency reform* nlTo doubt foreign trade and 
foreign intercourse have a deservedly higher importance than local trad©, 
but****no proper regulation of currency is possible if sufficient heed 
is not given to the situation as it affects purely local interests*tt̂
He presented a bird’s eye view of the local trade situation in China 
at that times
The situation, especially during the past thirty years (before 
1915 j has been as followss ^h© traders and merchants in the ports, 
and the foreigners dealing with Chinese, thought in terms of the 
artificial and the conventional taels of the different localities3
the Government and the Provincial officials thought in terms of
the kuping taels and several provincial taels, as distinct from 
the taels in the ports; the Haikwan was the money of the Customs! 
the people in the interior, and even in small places very near the 
ports, thought only in terns of the cash, which 1ms remained su­
preme, in spite of all charges, and an almost unvarying standard 
from Tientsin to Canton; in spit© of the circulation of the 
dollar, few except wage earners and small shopkeepers thought in 
terns of the dollar except in a fevj places where convention held 
to the dollars the circulation of the piastre in Yunnan or th© rape© 
in some parts of Szechuan has not made people think in terms of the 
rupee or piastre*30
According to his theory of tho value of money, gold does not give 
any special advantage over he other possible standards from the view of 
stability of price* In his mind "economic forces determine the relation
of exchange between any two commodities, end the same forces determine
the value of gold in relation to commodities*w51 Ther©for©,what finally 
determines the value of money is not the number of metallic coins or any 
other coin of stendard money, but "what a certain amount -would fetch ih 
the market*"
He maintained that if China adopts the go.d standard, it would mean
%%bid*, p* 269*
3QIbld*, p* 272*
31ibid *, p * 274—276 *
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nothing ®iso but th.® appreciation of* gold, which shs has not gob wnrf 
in the meanwhile the depreciation of silver, which is her national 
wealth.
©. He held that the gold exchange standard is not the suitable on® 
for the existing situation in China for these reasonss (l) the Chines© 
have long been accustomed to having their money at its mere bullion 
value in any shape or sise; (2) China's Government is not powerful 
enough to prevent counterfeiting and can not defend its frontiers 
against the introduction of counterfeit money from ©broad, if she adopts
g«the token coin, the fundamental of the gold exohang® system.
At last he concluded that nthe primary steps in any reform must be
to establish a coin which, with its auxiliaries, would prove readily
34acceptable in every part of China.®
f. Mr. bagel's plan— Because of the special circumstances in China, 
such as both gold and silver being used at their bullion value and the 
value of copper coins depreciating as much as possible in order to bring 
them to the level of their bullion value, aixl different taels and purity 
of silver existing in various ports and places throughout the whole 
country, he therefor© held that (l) in the first stage China should 
maintain its copper cash and silver monetary system "with the copper 
each as tha basis and the silver tael as the unit for the standard.®
(2) China's cash, which has boon the standard in China for many centuries, 
should be the foundation of currency reform. A copper coin token should 
meet with no objection* (3) The Shanghai tael is in ©very way the more 





h&ikvm tael. (4 ) The Shaagh&i fcael , properly spa a king „ ought to be 
worth 1,000 o&sh* {A dst&llod &ooouat of hi® proposal is show la 
pages 409*315 of his China so Cur rency and Banking®)
How let os taka a view of his whole idea. In the first place, he 
held that only the economic forces determine the value of gold in rela­
tion to comiodities, ''What finally determines the value of money is not 
the number of metallic coins or any other coin of standard money but
nwhat a certain amount would fetch in th© market. Therefore from the
4%
view of stability of prices, gold does not give any special advantage 
over other possible standards. Furthermore, China does not have gold 
enough to support the coinage of her gold 0 0 ins if the gold standard 
is adopted. From another angle. If China does adopt the gold standard, 
that means the depreciation of silver, which is her national wealth. 
Therefore, he held that it is not necessary to adopt the gold standard 
as the only possible policy for the purpose of stability of her foreign 
exchange. In the second place, he held that the fundamental of the 
gold exchange standard system is the token coin, and China's Government 
has not enough. power to prevent counterfeiting. Thus the gold exchange 
standard systos can not safely be adopted in China. The using of book 
malt ills toad of the token coin suggested by Dr. Vissering is not a suit­
able policy for China because it ignores the local situation. In the 
third place, he maintained that the local tradition and existing condi­
tion should be recognized, when th© standard and unit of currency are 
determined. In the special eas© of China any reform of eurrenoy must 
establish a uniform coin first.
According to his opinion he set up some steps for the currency reform 
of China as ffcllowst a reform mking copper coin token® should meet with
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3&o object ion j the government should regul&t® the supply of the c&sh; 
ike new standard unit of th© Shanghai tael should be worth 1,000 oaahj 
sod the Shanghai tael would be th® more suitable standard of iralie for 
China in ©wary way*
But he failed to tell us (1) by what way China's Government would 
Induce the people who used to appraise th® copper cash and silver coins 
according to their bullion value to accept the copper coin© as tokens;
(2) if according to his plan, 1,000 cash is regulated to be worth one 
tael of silver, how much copper must be contained in o u  unit of th® 
token copper ooin; (5) in what way the Government would control the 
supply of copper coins; (4) when the new unit of the tael is issued, 
how the Government would treat the existing silver dollar and the sub­
sidiary silver coins.
In January, 1914 the draft regulations proposed by th® Bureau of 
Curreroy received the approval of the President and th® Cabinet of the 
Republic of China, they were the National Currency Regulations and th® 
Regulations for the Enforcement of the Currency Law.**® In these regula­
tions not only the plan of Vissering was not adopted, but even the im­
portant points were not very different from those in the Regulations 
for National Coinage of 1910.^
1. In this act the same silver yuan with exact weight, as that of 
the Regulations of 1910, was adopted as th© unit of currency (i.e.,
0.648 kuping tael or 23,97796048 grams of pure silver).
2. The following is t lm value of th© national coin in its decimal
®®The ?/hole text of the law is shown in The China Year Book, 1921-22, 




Silver coins Gross weight Silver Coppercandareens
1 yuan 72 90$ 10$
i " 32.4 70$ 30$20-cent piece 12 70$ 30$lO-eesrb piece 6 70$ 30$
Hiokel coins Hlokel Copper
5-eenfc piece 7 25$ 75$
Copper coins Copper Pewter Lead
2-cezxt piece 28 95$ 4$ 1$1-cent w 18 n « w
5-li * 9 « w
2-li " 4.5 n « 41
1-li • 2.5 w n n
Article 6* So restrictions ̂ i&ll bo placed upon the use of tbs 
1 yuan piece • The amount of 50 cent pieces involved in one trans­
action shall not exceed twenty do liars* The amount of 20 cent and 
10 cent pieces involved in one transaction shall not exceed five 
dollars. The amount of nickel or copper pieces involved in one 
transaction shall not exceed one dollar* This restriction shall 
not be applied to the collection of taxes and th® exchanges in 
the national banks.
3. As to the right of minting and the minting fee* they provided 
that the right of minting, and issuance of the national currency shall 
belong to the Government. If the Government coins 1 yuan silver pieces 
for people it shall charge them 0.006 each as a minting fee.
4. According to article 1 of tha regulations for the enforcement 
of the- currency law. the national coins must b© used as th® medium in 
the transaction of any financial dealings in the country.
5. Article 2 stated that the Goverzaaent shall exchange the silver 
dollars coined by the old mints with th© national coins and remint them. 
A provisional order shall fix a certain period in- which the old dollar 
will possess the sane value as the national yuan (new dollar).
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The reform cm which "these regulations were based was planned to 
commence within a district and then gradually to ©xtoQd to th® whole 
country for the following reasons: (1) there being different financial
customs in the various parts of the country, th© reform should be started 
In trade ports; (2) the amount of th© now coin© and naw bank notes m s  
not sufficient to meet at once the demand of th© whole country; (3) the 
ciroumstanees in different parts of th© country demanded suitable re­
vision of the currency regulations to meet th© special needs of each 
district.
After the publication of those regulations, the criticisms directed 
against them might be grouped into tha followings
(1) The emission of a definite statement to th© effect that 
Government institutions will always accept the token coins at their 
face value*
(2) The excessive margin of minting profit in the case of 2 cent 
coins, whioh should weigh" 36 per cent more (222 grains Instead of 
1 ®  grains), if they are to have the same intrinsic value in rela­
tion to face value as th© present 10 cash copper coins*
(3) The 6 cent nickel coin would represent even a greater margin 
of minting profit, as its intrinsic value would b® only about one- 
tenth of it* faoe value•
The Bureau of Currency of the Central Government was abolished in 
1915, but re-established in 1918* For three years, between 1915 and 
1918, b o active action for currency reform was pursued by China®s Govern- 
sent• In August, 1918 an attempt to introduce a gold standard was pushed 
by the Minister of Finance, Tawo Ju-lin. He advocated th® issuance of 
gold notes based on the gold yuan having 0.752318 kungfun (it may 
mean the wgramtt) of pure gold. Mr. Tsao Ju—lin, in a >p©tition to th®
®^KoJi Matsuoka, China * s Currency Reform and Its S1 p-,nif ioanoe, The 
Imperial University of Kyoto, Vol. XI, XSSSjTp* 81*
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varged that stops should bo taken for the issue of6 gold 
ourrsxtty notes and for the re—estab!ishtnant of the Currency Bureau* 
fi® stated that the scbemo of th© national currency regulation of 1914 
had been, ©erried out and added that another step in advance was required 
to achieve complete success. The reasons presented by him were*
(1) That China's foreign indebtedness and the Indemnity* amount­
ing to one—third of her annual budget, were in gold currency*
(2) That exchange fluctuations were a serious hindrance to the 
development of trade* end
(5) That the most advanced nations of the world use gold.
The important points in his plan are briefly described as follows*
a. Gold dollars and gold currency notes issued— lie suggested the 
gold standard with reserves concentrated in certain cities in China.
The reserves were to consist of Chinese gold ooin, bullion or foreign 
gold coin. National gold coins should be minted and gold currency 
notes should be issued by a bank or banks appointed by the Currency 
Bureau of the Central Government.
b. The sise of the unit— The new unit was called nchin yuan1*
(gold dollar) and was to contain .725318 kungfun of pure gold or 
2.01683 Mi— lm non■ of kuping tael, worth about fifty cents United States 
currency. Gold notes should be 1 , 5, IQ, 20* 50 and 100 dollars. The 
(tore ran eat migit order the issuing of gold currency notes of small de­
nominations, such as i l/S, 1/10 of a dollar. Subsidiary coins provided 
in the national coinage law of 1914 would be used as fiduciary ooins
in the gold currency system.
o. The method of Introduction— At first gold notes should be 
issued by two Government banks, the Bank of China and th© sank of 
Communications, backed by geld reserves. Th© conversion rates between
g8The China Year Book, 1921-22, Tientsin, p. 299.
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gold, motes tod silver coins sod sotds would be postod fnro tiae to 
time* A£ first government railways, telegraphs and other Gesamimioa- 
hi cm offices and, later, public funds and salaries would accept and 
m o  new notes* fVhen the proper moment arrived, th© Government 
would declare the legal ratio between gold and silver and would enforce 
the geld standard* Uhifioation of silver and copper coins should be 
accomplished by rigid enforcement of the existing National Coinage 
Law* Old coins should be exohanged for th© new coins or notes at the 
legal rate prior to a certain date, after which old coins were to be 
accepted only as bullion. The two Government banks would take charge 
of these operations* The Currency Bureau would b© established for ten 
years to carry out the ref cm*
d* The policy of maintenance of the system— Th© reserves of the 
gold notes should be held by the two government banks and concentrated 
In certain cities in China, which might be in certain foreign centers, 
where any type of the notes aright be cashed*
e. As to the tael— After a specified date all accounts and transac­
tions, both government and private, should be interns of dollars, not 
taels~ Treaty nations should be consulted regarding conversion of 
the maritime customs to the dollar basis at rates fix ad by the Currency 
Burses*
f* The Central Bank— The Bank of China and th® Bank of Communica­
tions were to perform functions of th© Central Bank, i*©*, were to be 
the fiscal agents of the Government* They should have th© sole right 
of note issue, and other banks might circulate notes as agents of these 
two bankfc* Banka with, notes now outstanding should withdraw them within 
a fixed period* Prior to this tlme fchoir reserves should b© ©et aside
16b
for rstirQBOJit of 'the notes, and bo sealed by "th® Currency Bureau*
In his plan "th® Control Mint was to be at Tientsin* Th® on®’-dollar 
coins should b® coined less and less, and emphasis placed on the half 
dollar• Furthermore ha held that foreign advisers should be obtained 
for currency refom. He had the opinion that even if a gold standard 
were not adopted, currency unification would be beneficial and would 
facilitate a future shift to gold*
From a technical standpoint, his plaawas a relatively complete one 
in comparison with the previous ones proposed by his predecessors*
Sold currency notes were to be used to a considerable exbent in order 
to save the circulation of gold coins* By means of th© assistance of 
the Sank of China and the Bank of Coaamunications, a careful policy and 
an adequate reserve could take care of the gold currency notes through 
normal times• Banks with notes then outstanding should withdraw them 
within a fixed period, after which & special reserve should be set aside 
for th© retirement of the notes still ©insulating* The Bank of China 
and the Bank of Communications would perform the functions of a Central 
Bank* By means of rigid enforcement of th© existing National Coinage 
Law (1914) the goal of unification of silver and copper coins was counted 
accomplished* In his plan th© subsidiary coin in the National Coinage 
Law of 1914 is used a* fiduciary coin in th© gold currency system* The 
Central Mint at Tientsin would coin th© one dollar less and less, and 
the half-dollar more and more in order to meet th© existing condition 
of th© leer standard of living and popular, but entail amounts of numerous 
trass aotl one * After a specified date the old measures of value, th® 
taels* would be abandoned* . All of these points mentioned above were 
surely the neeessaxy steps for currency refom at that time*
i m
Wmnmr* he left out Isport&ni and difficult point of deciding 
tha i*|al ratio between gold and silver* In his plan he only scentleased 
that *The conversion rate* between gold notes aad silver colas end notes 
shall be posted from tise to sad "'when the proper isQRcet arrives,
the Ocveroaent will declare th® legal ratio between gold irnd silver..*.* 
the poiat eade his whole plan a ha I f  complete statute* Forth© mere, in 
hie plan, *tfce reserves of tha gold notes shell be held by the two 
government beaks end concentrated is certain cities In Chine, which 
eight be in certain foreign centers, where any typo of tb© notes stig&t
be cashed*1* This is his issthod to maintain the new system*
Chine did not produce an adequate as&ount of gold to support the 
exhaustion of the reserves by seans of the unfavorable balance of in­
ternational payssei^s. If the tiase ooem&s the Covemaenfc will be forced 
to borrow foreign loans for the purpose of currency reserves* In tbs 
case of China the experience has been that foreign loans and * foreign 
advisers* always tend to soa© type of political invasion fm& outside*
If China was already a country with self-control led custom duties* 
effective ad*inirtr*tion, a powerful Central ^oaenacieat, available 
transportation, ee&sgunieatlcn and financial institution©* sad wee with­
out all kinds of foreign invasion and interrupt ion, th© plan proposed 
by Sr* Tsao might said to be useful *
Els plan wee enacted by & Presidential mandate on August 10, 1&1&
in the fdfst of regulati on© „ but hi® plan was depend®at upon a loan frees 
Japan to assist In China's currency unification* The proeeeds of the 
said lean were to be deposited with bank® in Japan ae reserves against 
which gold notes were to be Issued* At th* very time, nation-wide
as?
boycott against Japan forced the elaborate and unworkable regulation# 
then promulgated to remain in abeyance, the contents of the regula­
tions for the issue of gold currency notes were the some as those in- 
eluded in Mr* fsao’s plan*^
After the failure of Mr* Tsao’s attempt at currency reform in 
1918, the country fell into a pessimistic situation by a continued 
aerie# of civil ware* The authority of the Central Government could 
never be effective outside of the Capital, Peking* So further reforms 
were executed or proposed until th© establishment of th© National Govern­
ment at Banking in 1928, except the establishment of the unsuccessful 
Shanghai Mist*
In 1920 a memorandum from the foreign exchange banks at Shanghai 
was offered to the Central Government* In it the "Eleven Practical 
Suggestion#n concerning the creation of a mint in Shanghai were recom­
mended to the Chinese Government* (The text of the suggestions is in 
the China Year Book, 1921-22, pp* 309-310.) The Chinese Government 
aeoepted the advice, so far as the mint was concerned, from the foreign 
exchange banks, but showed itself unwilling to place such a mint under 
foreign experts1 control (the important point in the suggestions and 
one ten# in the suggested loan from the foreign exchange banks)* The 
Chinese Geverosenb turned to conclude two loans with the Chinese banking 
group for the purchase of rolling—stock for the Government railways 
fbr the purpose of the proposed Shanghai mint*
On March 3, 1921, the Loan Agreement was signed between th©
Ministry of Finance and the Chinese banking group (representative of
£®The text of the regulations for the issue of gold currency notes 
is found in pages 299,300 of the China Year Book, 1921-22.
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tlto principal fiuaeial ifitsreets in China) for tha ©rootion and 
ment of a modem mint at Shanghai*
The mount of the loan was $2,500,000 Chinese currency« In the
40meanwhile the Chinese banking group suggested the following points?
1 • height and fineness of the coins*“According to the suggestion 
offered by this group, it would be wise to adopt the fineness of the 
yuan Shin-kai dollar at a new fineness of 890*00 for th® new dollars to 
he coined by the Shanghai Mint, i.a#, containing a weight of 0*6408 of 
kuping tael or 25.9024808 grass (according to the law of 1914, the dollar 
should be 0*648 of a kuping tael, or 25*97795048 grams of si Ivor, and 
the fineness should be 900 silver and 100 copper)*
Z* A new die should be adopted for th® Shanghai Mint in order to 
distinguish the coins from the existing issues*
3* Judging from the standpoint of the minimum cost of minting, a 
1*5 per cent (that is, 0*01 tael seigniorage) seems to be a Just charge* 
Then a dollar would oontain 0*6508 kuping tael* However, should the 
1*5 per eexrt• seigniorage become too high at a future date, It could be 
reduced by a presidential mandate*
4* The Chinese Bankers1 Association at Shanghai and the Shanghai 
Mint will work together and fix the amount of money that the mint should 
coin every day or every month*
5. If China should adopt a system of free coinage, the bullion syce© 
and the tael standard should be first abolished* The reason held by 
the banking group iss
tf̂ yhe original suggestion is in The China Year Book, 1921-22, 
pp. 314—317*
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^  bullion sycee and the t&el standard ere bo he allowed 
to r«Baini dollars will still have a market ©xahango quotation 
daily* When th© exchange rats Is high* people bring their bul­
lion to the mint Tor coinage, and when th© rat© drops, the mint 
would owns© coining altogether*
6* Organisation of th© mint— Th© control of the Shanghai Mint should 
be in the hands of the Ministry of Finance and th© Currency Bureau* The 
officials should be appointed according to their real qualifications 
both regarding knowledge and experience* and should not be ©hanged or 
shifted too often so as to insure efficiency of the mint management 
and production* A. foreign assaying expert should also be employed for 
testing the variations and fineness of the coins minted*
7* Product ire oapaoity of the mint— A basis of daily production of 
#€00*000 would be enough bo start the initial production* The present 
plant of the Mint should leave plenty of room for further expansion so 
that enlargement plans to the extent of 11*000*000 daily production ©an 
be formulated whenever necessary*
8* in order to make certain of the abolition of the tael standard 
and bullion eyeee* the Shanghai Mint should appoint a Special Committee 
consisting of persons* who have olose connection with the question of 
the tael and the dollar* to discuss ways and means of abolishing the 
bullion syeee and tin tael standard* as well as to test the fineness of 
coins and supervise the coinage of the mint* and to make suggestions 
for general efficiency of the mint*
In the reply by the Ministry of Finance and the Currency Bureau 
of the Government to the Chines© banking group* it stated * TtW© have 
duly instructed the Shanghai Mint to act upon them* In case we desire 
to make any changes we will discuss them first with you on th® subject*”
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1923 * a©w mint had bean constructed at Shanghai and equipped with 
up-to-date machinery. Unfortunately the installation was not finally 
completed* on account of lack of funds* and the plant was never operated 
until 1927*
la 1927 the Shanghai Mint (with the Hangchow Mint) began turning 
out the Sun Yat-sen dollars bearing the effigy of the great revolutionary 
leader* Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The Shanghai Mint was later expanded into th© 
Central Mint in 1933.
B. Th© banking situation and demands for positive reform of China's 
monetary systems
1* Banking situation during the period concerned— Th© losses from 
speculation* especially owing to the rubber boom (about 1910) and the 
various local disturbances weeded out nearly half of the existing native 
banks* By the Revolution of 1911 th© native banks were assailed* on the 
one hand* by th© foreign banks which pressed for Immediate payment for 
ehcp leans; on the other hand* by the fact that tine native banks had 
net th© bens fit of using governmental funds which were gem©rally de­
posited with them by local officials. Under the sudden attack "the 
banks crumbled to pieces one by one* and as early as .November of that
year* or in th© second month of the Revolution* the number of -the native
41banks left was a tenth of those existing prior to 1910.n After this 
crisis* the surviving native banks were certainly better than th© ones 
of the previous year* although they were not quite sound.
On the side of the Central Government the "Nineteen Regulations
ttS. R. Wagel, fihinese Currency and 191&, p. 213.
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(kvtming th* Issuo of* tit® Convertible BftQk"not9 Currency” were issued 
la 1910* They provided bnly for the bank-note issue of the Xa-Ching
n w r  »
After the World War broke out In 1914, on account of th© withdraw­
ing of the foreign banks free China*a banking business to a great extent, 
and the development of China’s internal and foreign trade, th® Chinese 
banking; institutions, especially China9s modem banks, started to spread 
their operations to a considerable extent* But the banking activities 
were still in private hands and free of Government control*
Is 1912, far political reasons, the Shanghai branch of the former 
Ta-Chisg Bank reorganised into the Bank of China* After the reorganiza­
tion it fell into private hands where it remained for many years*
The banking development of China during this period (1011 to 1923) 
tended met only to increase the quantity of the modern banking institu­
tions, but also to the establishment of a sound banking business by self- 
supervision* For instance, in Shanghai the Bankers* Association for the 
modern banks was organised early in 1915 in order to roach the goal 
of self—control and mutual help* After th® example of th> Bankers* 
Association for the modem banks, the Native Bankers* Association, tha 
highest authority of the trade of native banks, m s  organized in 1920*
In other trade ports there was th® same tendency*
Z. Demand for positive reform of China's monetary system— Although 
during a long period (from 1918 to 1928) there were no further monetary 
reforms undertaken by China's Central Government, from the individual
^Annual Report of the Director of the Mint, Washington, 1910, p* 240*
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side there came a 8®ri$s of loud voices, or even som& unsuccessful 
loi^sds^s urging the positive reforaa.* Even though, these movements 
hod no direct results, they influenced the la tor opinion of th® public 
and the actions of the Government a great deal*
Of those movement& the more distinctive ones are ag felloess
In 1921 some petitions and memoranda to the Government from several
Chinese banking groups urged currency reform. One of them is ths peti­
tion from the conference of Chinese bankers at Tientsin In &ay, 1921*
It (1) petitioned the Government to abolish the tael, making the dollar 
the monetary unit of China; (Z) petitioned th© Government to establish 
a system for issuing bank notes; (3) proposed to the Government the 
resisting of old coins; (4) petitioned the Government to exempt trans­
portation charges on bank notes and silver forwarded by banks*
Another memorandum submitted on October 6, 1921 by the Chinese
banking group had drawn the attention of the Government and the public*
It mentioned the following points;
(1) Gold should be adopted as the basis of Chines© monetary cur­
rency;
(2) The use of the tael should be abolished;
(3) All the mints In the country should be placed under a unified 
system of management in order to reach a uniform fineness and legal 
standard*
(4) Every rostrlotion shall be imposed on the minting of old sub­
sidiary soins, both in silver and copper?
(5) The profits realised from the minting of new subsidiary coins 
should be deposited in a sinking fund which would bo solely used in the
16$
introduction of a uniform silver our rare y and in the adoption of a 
Said standard*
(6) The paper currency throughout th© country should b© reformed 
so that iifc becomes uniform*
(7) Proposals should be made to stop th® foreign banks from issuing 
notes*
(6) As the notes issued in foreign currency by th© foreign banks 
in Chinese territory infringe on China’s sovereign rights# strong action 
should be taken to have such note issues stopped at once*
At the Fifth Annual Conference of the Chines® Bankers* Association
held in Peking in April# 1624# the ease resolutions# more or less# were
again passed with regard to the currency situation*
C* Tiro important proposals for currency reform in 1628*
After the establishment of China's Kational Government in Banking# 
an economic conference was convoked in 1928 under the supervision of 
the Government • The Conference proposed a plan for th© purpose of 
unifying existing silver currency and advanced a plan for a gold stand­
ard* The content of the proposal is briefly as followss
a* Tbs standard and unit— Tha silver standard will be based on th® 
existing silver dollar* At first the unification of existing silver 
currency is needed Immediately* and then other preparations shall be 
made looking to a gold standard* The silver standard dollar should be 
freely coined except the subsidiary silver coins* The unit will contain 
64 #08 e and arsons of kuping tael of purs silver (72 c and arsons with 890 
fin en es s ) and will be equivalent to 23*9024808 greens# or 368*87 grains 
of purs silver* It is approximately the average weight of current silver
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doll&rs * It is "wot*th about forty*two g ®nts United fifcat©3 currency with 
silTfir &t flfty»fiT6 cents an ounce • The subsidiary coins shall b© 
silver of 60# 20# and 10 dents# and copper of 1 and Jr cents* The 
silver subsidiary coins shall be .700 fine, and copper .950 fine.
b. The method of introduction and maintenance— Within a certain 
period the old silver dollar will be exchanged for a new one on th© 
basis of dollar for dollar. The old subsidiary silver coined accord- 
i»E to established standard will be redeemed by the Government with the 
new subsidiary silver. The subsidiary coins shall be minted only on 
Government account» The profits from coinage should be acemulated in 
preparation for the adoption of the gold standard and for carrying out 
monetary reform. The reserves against bank notes shall be sixty per cent. 
cash and forty per cent, securities•
e. The treatment of the tael— The tael must be abolished and re­
placed by the dollar. Th© contracts, taxes t*nd payments of all kinds, 
government «*d private# expressed in taels, must be converted to a 
dollar basis at the rate of 0.6669S kuping tael to on© dollar (the old 
silver dollar contained an average of 0*6408 kuping tael).
d. The Central Bank— Th© Central Bank will be established with 
capital subscribed by th© public. Th© country will be divided into 
four main districts* Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow and Canton. Th©
Central district will be Shanghai. The Central Bank will have a monopoly 
of note issue# the amount of notes for each district will b© limited. 
The existing bank notes must be withdrawn within a reasonable period*
The Board of Directors shall be elected by shareholders, and th© Governor 
Anri vio©—Governor of the Bank shall be ohos&n by the Government from
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among members of the Board* Above the Board of Directors a Committee 
of Supervisors -will be appointed by the Government. The Local Govern* 
®«nt •••h banking district will select a member of this Committee#
The Central Bank has the functions of receiving deposits from, other 
banka, fixing the discount rate, and issuing notes and acting as the 
Government Treasury* The provincial banks shall be made uniform in 
character, shall be made stock companies with a minimum capital of 
$1,000, 000, end shall not have the right of note issue*
e* The ¥infc— The number of mints in the country will depend on 
whether a central banking system or a federal banking system is adopted*
If the former is adopted, one mint is adequate j if the latter, several 
mints are necessary* The existing provincial mints must be abolished*
The Central £ int or mints will be under the direct control of the Minister 
of Finance* All available measures should be taken to prevent counter­
feiting*
Seme significant points In this proposal were accepted end put into 
act afterward by the National Government.
Dr* E# W* Kemmerer, the financial adviser to the Chines© National 
Government and Chairman of the Kommerer Commissi on, in 1926, set up 
study currency conditions and to reoommend reform measures, presented 
his report on the "Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a 
Gold Standard Currency System in China* on November 11, 1929* The plan 
drawn by Dr* Kemmerer for China is known as a gold standarda but it is 
really a gold exchange standard* Even Dr* Kemoierer himself said so*
i m
Thar© nr© three us©s of gold coin in & count ry * s monetary cir­
culation: (1) t© pr ovid e money for hand to hand olroulatl on and
bank reserves, (2) bo provide full-wolght comaodihy money for th© 
needs of would-be hoarders who laok confidence in the country*© 
fiduciary money, and (3) to provide gold for redemption purposes 
and for International payments, whereby the country * & currency 
supply is adjusted to the demands of trade and the gold parity of 
the currency is maintained.
The last of the three above •mentioned functions of gold coins 
• ••is idie only legitimate function of gold coins that could not 
better be served in China by silver coins and bank notes* It is 
to provide a method of performing this function without the nsce©- 
sity of circulating gold coins in the country that the meohanissa 
of the gold-exchange standard is recommended.4®
In another section under the title of "Sources of Fund,” he ©aids
"Such premia (received on the sal© in China of drafts) have proved to
be important sources of revenue for the gold reserve funds of many
other countries having the gold exchange standard and are likely to be
so in China
Dr# KsBsserer gave a detailed explanation about the reasons why the
gold standard is preferable to the silver standard for China* It is
because (1) China *s foreign trade is almost entirely with gold standard
countries; (2) China * s public debt is largely a gold standard debt and
40is likely to be Increasingly so for many years to come* In view of 
the downward movoment of the price of silver in the world market, ”the 
monthly expenditures in silver for service# on China’s gold public debts 
are now (October, 1929), about 11,000,000 greater than were th© monthly
— ® k T  W# Kemmerer, National Covernra©nt of the Republic of China. 
C ossa is sion of Financial Bxperts* Project of Law for the T̂radualT
tion of a Gold-Standard Currency System in China, together with 
in Support Thereof, Submitted to the Minister of Finance by the 








expenditures for the same service in January, 1929."4:6 (6 ) All im­
portant countries in the v<orld ha to adopted the gold standards so the 
problem of stabilizing the iralue of gold is "the subject of serious 
and widespread consideration, while there is little or no international 
concern as to the stabilization of the value of silver."
He advocated and gave a thorough-going discussion of the advantages 
of the direct plan (i.e., China directly adopting the gold standard)*
Ee listed the following under the direct plan; (1) there was no need 
for a large loan because of the adequate seigniorage profits j (2 ) there 
would be an immediate introduction of the gold standard} (S) there would 
be less disturbance to business ("it proposes to measure values with a 
yardstick of approximately the same length as that at present used in a
large part of the Republic- The yardstick will, however, be made of a
A?different material" 5 (4) there would be less injustice to debtors}
(5 ) the re would be less social and political discontent and. opposition
bee&UBe of lees disturbance to prices, wages, and outstanding debts}
48and (6 ) ths re would be less speculation.
On the other hand, the disadvantage® of the indirect plan (i.e.,
first set up a uniform silver standard system? second, from a silver
standard change to a gold standard), according to him, ares (1 ) the
advantages of gold would be delayed} (2 ) currency deflation would be
necessary before a gold standard could be adopted} and (3) there would
49be a logs of seigniorage profits.
4&Ibid., p. 72.
*7 Ibid., p. 82.
48IbidT
^According to his estimate, "under the direct plan the margin be­tween the bullion and the money values of the dollar coins would b© 
0 *1 2 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  and the margin between the bullion and th© money values of the fractional coins would be 0^144,000,000, making a total of G|264,000,- 000 on the 1,200,000,000 dollars of new silver coins. Under the indirect plan* the Government would receive of this vast sum only $$24,000,000."
168
Us sis © considered "the situation that; during the period of improve— 
®®st» changes in the gold price of silver would result in fluctuations 
in the values of the existinc silver-standard currencies in terns of the 
new gold standard unit. But his own answer to this situation is that 
** among people so familiar with multiple currency systems as are the 
Chinese, the addition of one more system would not be a very serious
50inconvenienoe, if it were only a temporary one *u
Dr. Kemmerer*s plan can be briefly summarised under the following 
items s
a. The standard and unit of value— The unit of the gold standard 
will be called the KSuan (a new meaning invented for this term by Dr. 
Keaaaerer), consisting of 60.1866 centigrams of fine gold. Therefore 
the new gold currency unit will have & value equivalent to forty cents 
in United States currency; to Is. 7.7265d. in Sterling; and to 0.3025 
yen in Japanese gold yen.
1 Sun - 100 cents 1 cent * 10 mills
As to the provision for the unit, ha explained?
This unit was selected largely because it is of practically 
the sase value, in terms of gold, as the silver dollars now cur­
rent in most parts of China....The shift should involve little if 
any disturbance to prices, wages end the relationship of debtors 
and creditors.®^

























The project does not provide for the minting of gold coins and 
mints the smallest copper coin only under an urgent need for such a coin.
He indicated the function of the coinss ”Al 1 of the coins* includ­
ing the silver sun* are to be fiduciary* and maintained at a parity with 
geld by means of unlimited redemption in drafts on gold-standard eoun- 
tries, or in gold bars.. • - But it is expected that this form of redenip-
Cntion will be rarely if ever ub ed. ”
He gave three advantages of the nickel coins over silver ones:
(1) they are more durable* (2) they are more difficult to counterfeit*
53because of the hardness* (3) thay are much cheaper than silver coins*
How did Dr. Ksmmerer decide the weight of currency unit for his 
plan? For this important point he gave th© following five Important re­
quirements to be met* namely: (1) the coins should be good coins as
money* from the standpoint of appearance* durability* and convenience 
in physical sizes (2) their silver content should be such that the 
margins between the ir bullion value and their value as money would be
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large enough ho give th© coins ad@qua.te projection from the danger of 
being driven to uh.© melting pot by future advances in the gold price 
®f silver; (s) the margins mentioned above should be sufficiently large 
to yield, the government a good seigniorage profit to he used as a con­
tribution to the required gold reserve fund & j (4 ) these margins should 
not be 0 0 great as to encourage unduly the counterfeiting of coins of 
full legal weight and legal fineness! (5) the margins should not be so 
much below the money value of the coins as to create too great on ©b-
Clst&ola to the acceptance of the coins by the public.
The silver coins proposed in the project by his commission, in his
opinion, will meet these requirements}
The price of fine silver in Hew York at this writing (October 
24, 1929) is 50 cents an ©unco which would give th© pure silver 
content of the proposed sun a value of 25.7 cents gold, and which 
would therefore maks the bullion value of the sun 33 per cent less 
than its money value»
He cited the Philippine gold-standard peso authorized by the United 
States Gaverment in 1903 as an example to prove the thirty-three per
ggeast* suitable*
The higher percentage of alloy he proposed for the fractional
silver coins in his plan is due to th© foHawing two reasons s (l) the
half-sun »nA twenty-cent piece will probably circulate more actively
than the sun, so it will get harder wear; (2) th© desire for increased
57seigniorage profit for th© needs of the gold reserve fund*
b« The legal status of gold-standard currenoy—  In his plan, the 




57Ibl d*, p. 114.
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dates, i.e*, the gold-standard currency circulation date, the gold- 
standard legal tender date, and the debt adjustment date* In each 
province, after the gold standard currency circulation date the gold- 
standard curenoy shall circulate legal Xy, and shall be accepted in 
all payments to the Government at rates in relation to the silver dollar 
and other non—gold standard currency fixed by the Minister of Finance* 
After idie gold-standard legal tender date which will not be earlier 
than a year after the go Id-stand ard currency date, all payments by the 
Government shall be fixed and .paid in gold-stand ard currency, and all 
contracts made thereafter shall be in the gold—standard currency (except 
for special provision)* After the debt adjustment date, which shall not 
be earlier than the gold-standard legal tender date, all debts and other 
obligations previously or thereafter made, calling for payment in 
Chinese non-go Id-stand ard currency, shall become payable in gold—standard 
currency *t the official rates fixed by the Minister of Finance.
c* The organization and function of the administration of the gold 
stand ard— Dr • Kemmsrer proposed the following organization and opera­
tions i
(1) L Curreucy Department in the Ministry of Finance is charged 
with the administration of the gold-standard fund and with other matters
relating to the establishmont and maintenance of the gold-standard coin—
, 59age system.
(2) A gold-standard fund for establishing and maintaining th© gold 
staid ard shall be set up and never be less than thirty-five per cunt • of 
the total amount of gold-standard coins in circulation and shall com©
58Ibid *7  P* 33* 
p* 34.
m
^rom resources of (a) seigniorage from new coins, (b) premia frosi 
®al# of exchange» (©) interest frcxa part of funds deposited abroad* 
(d) loans for currency stabilisation# ©to*60
This fund shall be divided into two parts* Part I of the fund 
includes* (a) gold bullion and ooin held in China or abroad* (b) gold 
deposits abroad* (e) high grade bankers* acceptances drawn on banks or 
bankers in foreign centers where th® gold standard fund is kept* Part II 
©f the food includes* (a) gold-standard coins of China* (b) metals 
purchased for coinage purposes*
Gold—standard coins shall b® redeemed in one of the following forms 
at the option of the Director of th© Currency* (a) gold tars of a value 
between about 15*090 to 25*000 suns at a rate of 60*1366 centigrams of 
pure geld per sun* (b) cable transfers on a foreign depository of th© 
gold—stand aid fund, (c) defraud drafts on any foreign depository of the 
fund, (d) sixty-day sight drafts on any foreign depository of th© fund 
(the drafts are to be for amounts of not less tie it 2,000 suns and a
x 61premium shall be ©barged corresponding to th© gold export point)*
Gold-standard coins when presented for rodempti on for gold bar,
draft, ©to*# shall be withdrawn from circulation (Just as th© coins
had actually loft the country, as would b© the case in a country on th©
gold standard with gold in circulation), and paid out again only against
62drafts sold abroad upon the fund in China*
Xh© important point in his plan is that th© Chines© coins in th® 
gold-standard fund must bo kept out of circulation in China* Therefor®
175
under no cireumstanees shall any portion of ths gold-standard fund bo 
placed on deposit in any bank in China * nor in any foreign branch of 
a Chineee bank, nor shall any part of the fund be invested in China.65
d* Dr. Kfflamerer offered a detailed scheme for gradual substitution 
of gold* standard currency for the non-go Id-standard currency and stated 
that after the announcement of a gold-standard currency circulation date 
fcr one or more provinces, exchange office® will convert the old money 
into geld standard money at official rates fixed by the Minister of 
Finance (these rates may be different for different provinces and may 
be changed from time to time). The 10-cash or one-cent copper coins 
new in circulation are to be withdrawn from circulation until they are 
circulating at a rate of 200 to th® sun (at that time the current rate 
varied in different parts Of China and in the neighborhood of 300 coppers 
to the silver dollar. The copper in these 10-cash oopper coins is worth 
more than the value of the coins as money). Then the Minister of Finance 
shall announce a oopper coin stabilisation date for each province, and 
after this date these coppers shall be redeemed at the rat© of 200 to 
the sun.
After a.certain date, each province or municipality shall make
provisions for the retirement at par or leas than par of whatever notes
it may have outstanding or any notes that it may have guaranteed. Every
bask, business concern, or private individual shall retire hotes at par
64or less before the final note retirement date fixed by th© Government.
The final note retirement date for each province, which is not to be
Ibid., p. 142.
^Ibid., p . 44 .
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earlier "than the debt adjustment data, is ho b© announced at least oh® 
year in advance,
e. As to the rights of foreigners, Nothing in this law shall 
impair the rights of foreigners under existing treaties*”65
These five points are the main proposals in M s  plan* Besides 
he maintained that th© National Currency Commission, assisted by a 
foreign currency expert and by a Provincial Currency Commission in 
every province of the Republic, should study and recommend to the 
Minister of Finance from time to time matters regarding the currency 
reform*
After the publication of Professor Kemmerer's plant, there cssse 
much oriticiss* Same critics attacked the technicalities of th® plan 
itself* and others based th®ir criticisms on circumstances current 
in China* As far as tbs latter are concerned, there was still poli­
tical chaos to be straightened out before China could hope to adopt 
such a plan. It is largely true that
Before the Chinese Government can carry out Professor Kem- 
mererf s recommendati ons it must be powerful enough to enforce 
the etse of the new money and th© withdrawal of the existing 
money after a reasonable time limit* It must be able to pre­
vent counterfeitIng; and if the gold price of silver should 
rise considerably it should be able to prevent melting and ex­
portation of the coins, It must bo able to Insist that all 
bank notes have adequate backing of the new gold-standard 
money.***It crust bo able to close provincial mints end keep 
all coinage operations under its exclusive control, so that 
the profits arising from the issue of the fiduciary coins shall 
be free from th® depredations of local war-lords and officials*
These were the reasons why China’s Government did not immediately
put his pl«i into effect after accepting it* As far as th© plan itself
Sbjbid., p. 47.
6%. W* Pinnick, Silver and China* Shanghai, 1930, p. 72*
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was concerned* It was still th© old story as to how th© Grovermient 
would he able to prevent th® smuggling of counterfeited coin from 
foreign, lease areas* How would th® Goversmeixt induce th® people, who 
had become habituated to the use of coins at bullion values, to change 
their habit within a very short time? "It is difficult to conceive how, 
with the present low price of silver, it would be possible for China to 
aocraul&te a sufficient reserve from the sales of surplus silver to
gnmaintain a gold exchange standard*"
In the following years, after the completion of the report, th® 
whole situation of foreign countries changed* After Britain and Japan 
went off tbs gold standard, nation after nation abandoned gold for paper* 
China's Government, however, adopted one recommendation from Professor 
Xemmerer's plan to establish the gold unit of Maritime Customs (i.e.,
C. G. U*} with 60.1866 centigrams of fin® gold suggested by Ksmmerer for 
the new currency - system* The balance of his proposal was he Id In abeyance 
pending a changed internal or external situation, but up to the present 
ib has not yet received serious cons id© rat ion because of th© Manchurian 
and Shanghai incidents, the undeclared war with Japan, and th® present 
war of the Pacific*
^Y. S* Leong, Silver, an Analysis of Factors Affecting Its Price, 
Washington, E* G*, 1&53, p. US*
CHAPTER V
THE MONETARY REFORM AFTER 1928 AND THE 
MANAGED CURRENCY SYSTEM
After the Rational Govermiant of China had been established at 
Banking in 1928 by China's revolutionary party, th© Chinese Kuoming- 
tang, war lords still occupied th© old Capital, Peking, and th© northern 
provinces* Because of the political and economic circumstance® ©listing 
Inside and outside the country, the Rational Government in Ranking could 
not undertake the policy of one—for—all in every political and economic 
refora* However, in spite of the difficult situation, th® Rational 
Government did its best xor th® currency reform movement* In this 
paper, the apace and time allow us only to pick up th© significant en­
actment s concern!ng the currency reform of the Rational Government before 
Hie adoption of the managed currency system in 1935 which was as follows* 
I* The monetary policies and currency reform of the Rational Govern­
ment before 1955*
A* The creation of the Central Bank of China— Th« establishment in 
1928 of the Central Bank of China was th© beginning of real government 
control over banking and currency in the Republic* The Central Bank of 
China, the first real government bank in China, was established in 1928 
by the national Government, with th© head office of the Bank at Shanghai„ 
ihe financial center of the country. This bank, founded with twenty 
million dollars of state capital, was chartered in 1928* According to 
the inauguration speech of Hi© Minister of Finance, the duties of the
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Sank shall to® ntoo unify currency, too consol! da to© the banking system# and 
to maintain staoiliiy in th® domestic financial situation,1*1 During th® 
twenty-third Fiscal Year of the Republic (July 1., 1933-June 30, 1934), 
the capital of the Bank had been increased to the amount of 1100,000,000® 
(Chines® currency), largely out of reserves and accumulated profits.
On Hovejaber 4, 1936, regarding the managed omrrency, the Ministry of 
Finance announced its intention to r©organ!a® the Central Hank of China, 
originally opened by the government as a central reserve bank, to to© owned 
principally by the banks end th® general public so as too become an inde­
pendent institution devoting itself mainly to maintaining the stability 
Of Hie nation's currency* In order to facilitate the early carrying out 
of that program, Article VII was revised as follows*
When necessary, the Central Beak may, with the decision of the 
Board of Directors and the approval of tbs hoard of Control, pro­
pose too the National Government for approval an increase in the 
total amount of capital, and may solicit commercial capital, but 
th® total commercial capital shall not exceed 60 per cent of the 
total capital®
This reorganisation plan of th® Central Bank, proposed by th® 
Ministry of* Finance, was approved February 4, 19S6 toy the lia&eeutiv© Yuan® 
In the proposed new capitalisation of $100,000,000, the 1,000,000 shares 
of $100 each were to be of four kindss 400,000 ”AW shares, subscribed toy 
the Sat!onal Governments 50,000 ltBn shares, to to© subscribed toy the vari­
ous provincial and munic ipal governments % 350,000 wGn shares, too be sub­
scribed by the various Chinese banks and money exchangesj and 800,000 
*’B® shares, to bb subscribed toy private individuals*
According to th® reorganisation plan, the Board of Directors of
^The~ Chinese Year Book, 193 5-36, p. 1430®
178
the Central Bank should consist of nine members appointed by the National 
Government, and eight elected from stockholders holding more than 100 
shares* Its Board of Supervisors should consist of four members appointed 
by the national Government * and five elected from the holder© at more than 
100 shares*
The Central Bank shall enjoy the special governmental privileges of 
issuing lotal tender notes, Customs Gold Unit notes,^ and standard sub­
sidiary coins s of acting as the national depository, and of underwriting 
domestic and foreign loans* (Because of th© war which began in 1937, the 
year iollowing approval of the plan, the reorganiaation plan of the Central 
Bank was not completely executed until 1941*)
Before the attempt at a reorganisation of tin Central Bank, the two 
semi-governmental banking institutions, the Bank of China and the Bank 
of Communieati ons, were reorganised* As stated in the notice issued by 
the Minister of Finance on October 10, 1935*
For the purpose of strengthening th© control of the Government
over the banking structure of the nation, so os to be in a better 
position to cope with the impending financial crisis, the capital 
of the Central Bank was in Mi arch of this year considerably in­
creased while the Government1 s share in the capital of the Bank of 
China and the Bank of Communications was also augmented, thus bring­
ing these two leading banks into a community of interest with the
Central Bank* Although these three leading banks still function 
as separate institutions, they act with a unified front to meet 
emergencies* This centralisation of financial power has consider­
ably strengthened the position of the Central Bank in th© money 
market, which has proved to be a veritable power of support to the 
Government and thus has been enabled to render invaluable help in 
assisting to tide over the crisis*
To 1928 the Bank of China had been a seml-governmexrtal concern, with
2V. infra, p* 184*
®Tang Leang—le, China*s Hew Currency System, Shanghai, 1936, p* 77•
i n
its offie s at Sianghfti instead of Peiping* Th® Bati onal Govsrsmest
subscribed $5,000,000 of th© bank’s paid-up capital of 125,000,000 and 
appointed three of the ten directors and one of the fir© auditors, while 
the Chairman of Director s < had to be approved by the Minister of Finance* 
In the same year the Bsnk of Communications had been nad© a semi—govern— 
mental concern, also with its head office at Shanghai* Th® National 
Government in 1923 subsoribed $2,000,000 of the reorganised bank’s 
$10,000,000 authorised capital, end appointed three of its fifteen 
directors and one of its five auditors*
The reorganization of the Sank of China in 1935 w&s accomplished 
by increasing the government shares from 15,000,000 to $20,000,000, out 
of a new capitalization of $40,000,000* After th© reorganisation of 
1955 the Sank of C orxiuziic at I on s was mostly government-owned, the National 
Government holding $12,000,000 out of a total capital of $20,000,000*
The special function of this bank is the financing of Industrial enter­
prises, particularly means of communication, such as railways*
The Central Bazik of China, since 1933, has established branches and 
agencies extending as far inland as Kwciyang, Sian, and Lanchow* It 
has scm© twenty-seven branches and offices throughout the country* The 
BanV of c*Hw_ fra# by far the largest number of branches, some 120 in 
all* Agencies of the Bank exist in almost all provinces of the Republic, 
except sow© of the Western border areas* The Bank of Ccmmimications has 
forty-four branch©s throughout the country*
In addition to the governmental effort to put th© banking business 
of the country on a regular and sound basis, the banks had improved 
themselves a great deal* For instance, the Bankers* Associations of 
Shanghai (for the modern banks), organised early in 1915, had developed
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froa six members in 1915 to thirty-thro® members in June , 19SS * Similar 
organisations were also found in practically all Ihrg© cities in th® 
country* The Joint Reserve Board of Chino so banks in Shanghai, inaugurated 
in tbs early part of 1932, had boon supported by over three-fourths of the 
Chinese banks in Shanghai. The Bills Clearing House in Shanghai has been 
in existence since 1933 • Similar organisations have also been founded in 
Hangchow and Chungking* The Credit Information Services in Shanghai have 
bee n supported by a large number of local banks* Th© Institute of Bank­
ing was organised with the object of making a scientific research into 
the various ramifications of the banking business* With regard to the 
native banks, the Union of h&tive Banks was organised and consisted prin­
cipally of the first-class native banks of Ch&ngh®i* the Bills Clearing 
House in Shanghai has been in existence since January, 1933* Similar 
organisations have also been founded in other large oities* The Joint 
Reserve Board of Shanghai native banks and the Research Institute of 
M&hive Banks are of the sesas nature as the modem banks* These develop­
ments, of course, are tha steps necessary for a sound banking system*
They also pave the way for facilitating th© operation of unifying the 
currency system.
B. Central 1-Int at Shanghai— After the armies of th© Chinese Revolu­
tion Party, Kuomingtang, reached banking and Shanghai in 1927 , the Shang­
hai ISint (with the Hangchow I int) started to turn out th© Sun-Y&t-seii
4dollars with a weight of 2<5*902h grams of pure silver* After th©
Rational Government was moved to Rankings in 1928, the Shanghai Mint 
continued to coin the Sun-Yat-sen dollars. In five yours, from 1927 to
^V* supra, p* 129 of Chapter IV said p. 160 of Chapter IV•
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1932* over 500 million of* those Sun—Y&t—sen dollars w©r@ minted .■for th© 
account of tli® National Ooversment* The existing Tuan Shib~kai dollars 
were gradually melted down after the appearance of the Sun Tat-sen 
dollars*
As to the establishment of th® Contra Mint of 1933 in Shanghai* 
it say to said that after the decision of 1928 to abolish the taels
ereached in She Bconomic Conference in Nanking* the Central Government in 
Ranking began preparations for the opening of the new governmental 
Central Hint at Shanghai* which succeeded the original Shanghai Mint*
The whole equipment of the Shanghai Hint as a Central Mint ms 
completed, and early in March* 1933 there began the minting of a new 
standard national dollar according to the now law regarding China’s 
Standard dollar* passed March 5* 1933 (this law is shown in detail in 
Hie following pages)* By th© end of 1935 about $100*000,000 of the new 
standard dollars «wd th© 11,000 bars* worth of about 150*000,000 had 
been minted by the Central Hint in Shanghai • These dollars were coined 
only by the Central Mint in Shanghai and were distributed over th© country 
by the banking facilities of th® new Central Bank and tie two s®Ri-govem«* 
mental banks*
Although the Central Hint started work in Shanghai in 1933, for 
specific reasons (certain war lords still controlled 3 am© provincial 
mints and the civil war still raged in some provinces) until 1936 th® 
provincial mints wore ordered to ship to Nanking th© dies for mint!ng 
the old copper and silver coins* no that th© uniform policy of th® mint 
mi$it be Insured*
supra, p. 163 of Chapter IV.
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C. The abolishment of "likin”—  Th© existence of th© "likia” is an 
exouse by which the He stern Powers and Japan prevented China frcm ob** 
tainlng control over her own tariff policy♦
After th© Opium ftar (1842), under the pressure of force China was
driven to accept a oust oris rate based upon a uniform five per cent* ad 
valorem, both fo r imports and ©sports, as part of the Banking Treaty 
of 1843, which marked the beginning oi Chinars woonv®ntional tariff” 
system* Immediately upon the heels of Great Britain, other powers 
stepped in and made China include a "most favored nation” clause in 
their treaties with her* Consequently, the unifora five per cent*
tariff was applied to the goods of America, franco, and other countries*
By the same Hanking Treaty China was also obliged to exempt British goods 
from all internal dues en route (this treaty was available even to the 
"11 kin11 which was created by the Chinese Government after XS52), when 
British subjects had once paid a light duty* By operation of the same 
"most favored nation" clause, China was made to extend th® obligation 
to other powers*
Since the beginning of th® "conventional tariff” in 1843, to the crea­
tion of China*s National Government In 1928 (a period of some eighty-five 
years), only four revisions had been made in the conventional tariff 
owing to the difficulties of obtaining the unanimous consent of the 
treaty powers, which was required for any revision.
In November, 1925 the Special Tariff Conferanoe provided for by 
the Nine-Power Customs Treaty of 1922 unanimously adopted th© following 
Resolution on the subjects of tariff autonomy and "likin” abolitions
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Th© Contracting Power* other than China hereby reoognim  China's 
right to enjoy tariff autonomy! agree to remove the tariff restric­
tions which are oontaiuod in existing treaties betwean themselves 
respectively and China % and consent to the going into effect of th® 
Chinese National Tariff Law on January 1, 1929.
Th® Government of the Republic of China declares that nlikin.M 
shall be abolished simultaneously with the enforcement of th© 
Chines® National Tariff Lawj and further declares that the aboli­
tion of *likinn shall be effectively carried out by the First Day 
of the First Month of th© Eighteenth Year of the Republic of 
China (Jan. 1, 1S29).
In December 1923 , China's National Government put into fore® a new 
import tariff, ^ith a u and ate in February, 1930 and a subsequent on® 
on January 1, 1931 the abolition of wlikin" and other internal transit 
duties was effectively car red out first in -th© six provinces of Kiangsu, 
Chekiang, Anwei, Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwang-tung. Gradually the aboli­
tion was soon effective over all of the provinces.
The policy providing, for the abolitbn of th© Mli3cinn by China's 
Central Government is a double—edge tool designed to meet th© financial 
difficulty in that confusion of circumstances* By the abolition of th© 
"likin* the Central Government ©an automatically control th© Customs 
duties in such a manner as to provide considerable revenue, and some 
protection as well, t'ith adequate revenue the Central Government can 
treat the national currency frocz a monet^ry point oi view rather than 
as a means of raising revenue. By th© abolition of th© wlikin,which 
was th© main source of financial revenue of provincial war lords, the 
Central Government can centralize the financial power in order to in­
crease the centralisation of th© political power. From past ©xporieno© 
the provincial mints, th© mother of the confusion in th® recent record
%bs Chinese Year Book, 1935-36, p. 12*91,
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of China*s ourramy, wore abused by the military leaders in th© provinces* 
Th®refer© It is safe to say that the abolition of the wlikin" directly 
weakened the financial strength of’ the provincial warlords and indirectly 
contributed to the uniformity of the national currency* it is also true 
that if the financial strength of the provincial warlords is weakened* 
their power will be destroyed*
Furthermore* if th© tariff autonomy of China had not been recognised
by the Western Powers and Japan, it would have been impossible for her
7to set up the Custom Gold Unit, the significant step in the reform 
of China9 s currency*
D* The establishment of th© Custom Gold Unit (1930) and the abolish­
ment of the haikwan tael (1933)— The Chinese Government has contracted 
foreign loans sinoe 1865 to a huge amount* The foreign loans added to 
th© indemnities, turned into foreign loans, were in a very large measure 
gold debts* Around 1925, the foreign debt of the Chinese Government was 
approximately 1,205,000,000, or #1,947,000,000 in Chinese currency.^
QAccording to the debt contracts most of the foreign loans call for pay­
ment to foreign banks in Peking, Shanghai or other Chines© centers with
fry* infra, p. i?«f,
®A* G* Coons, The Foreign Public Debts of China, Philadelphia, 1930,
P * 102•
§Xn the Tariff Commission agreements of 1858 and 1908, the Inspector- 
general of the Chines© Customs had to be a British subject as long as
British trad© exceeded that of any other stab© and the Chines® Government
would appoint any British subject considered fit to administer th© customs 
revenue azxd a number of other matters connscted with ooKiiaerc© and naviga­
tion* When in 1911 th© involution interrupted th© repayment of certain 
foreign loans, th© fb reign diplomatic corps demanded, on the protext of 
safeguarding the®® loans, that thereafter all customs revenues should b© 
deposited with th© Inspect©r-gener&l e»X Customs, who wats to have charge 
Of the appropriation of the s© funds for th© service of foreign loam® •
?h© result was that th© Inspector-general withheld from th© Customs suf­
ficient receipts to meet th© principal and interest payments of foreign 
loan® and remitted to the Chinas© Government only what was loft ovor*
im
exchange rates to be arranged on or near the day of payment. When a
large payment of interest or amortisation is doe, the demand for foreign
exchange beoua.es strong. The rate of foreign exchange rises and more
silver or Chinese currency must be given fox* the same amount of foreign
money• Furthermore, "the foreign banks have been known to change their
10rates arbitrarily on a day when a large payment was to be made.” The
financial burden of the Chinese Government was increased still more by
the sharp decline of the price of the silver in terms of gold in the
world market, for instance, in 1930 and 1931.
The gold payments made by the Government are over nine million 
pounds sterling (i*9,000,000) yearly..».The foil owing table show® 
the cost of remitting £7,850,000 at the average rates of exchange 
obtained in various yearst^
Rate, I local currency, Approximate cost in 
per “t approximate $ load currency
1925 Average $ 8.90 $ 70,000,000
1929 " 11.70 92,000,000
1930 " 16.66 131,000,000
1931 * 21.30 166,000,000
1932 " 15.50 121,678,000
Because of the continued decline of silver after 1329, China*® 
financial situation went from bad to worse. It v/as necessary for the 
Government to take raeasires to safeguard itself against furtlier losses. 
In China, import duties in most oases were specifics that is, so many 
h&ikwan taels of silver per picul (133 pounds) or other unit of' quantity 
of goods imported, but were intended to yield a certain percentage on 
normal prices. **'Alien the price of si Ivor declined, fchs silver price of 
imported commodities rose, while hli® duty yielded th© saxa© amount of 
silver currency, and thus represented . decreasing percentage of the
t
price."12
>A. G* Coons, The Foreign Publio Debts of China,, p. 105. 
llfhe Chinese Year Book. 1935*36. p. 1271.
1 ̂Dickson H* Leavens, Silver lioney, i> 1 oomington, 1933, p. 001»
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For the double purpose of increasing the revenue ard of remedying; 
the decreasing percentage rate of import duties on account of th© do— 
d imng price 0 1 silver in tones of ^old, China1 s Government set up the 
system of Customs Gold Unit (known as £?♦ G» C. or Q, 0«). On February 1, 
1930 it began to collect import duties in terns of the n©wly«cre&b©d 
C* G. U*, & theoretical token consisting of a gold content of 60*1866 
centigrams of fine gold and with a fixed equivalent in terns of the 
existing, foreign gold currencies, as required by the order of the 
existing Ministry of Finance of China’s Governments
On and after February 1, 1930, the U&ikwan tael will he dis­
continued as the unit of calculation of duties on imports from 
abroad* instead a new gp Id unit will be used* This unit will be 
equal to 60*1866 centigrammes of pure gold end will, 'therefore, 
be equivalent to gold dollar 0*40 or 19*7265 pence sterling, or 
0*8025 gold yen* From February 1 to Farch 15, 1930, inclusive, 
specific duties on imports from abroad now expressed in Haikwan 
taels will be converted into the now unit on the basis of Haikw&n 
tael one equal to 1*50 of the new unit 5 and beginning with March 
16, 1930, on the basis of Kaikwan tael one equal to 1*76 of the 
new unit*
As heretofore, dollars, taels and other currencies will be re­
ceived in payment of duties* The rates at which such, currencies
will be accepted in payment of duties expressed in the new unit 
will be officially announced from time to time . At least three 
days' public notice will be given in the ©vent of change in rates* 
chile for obvious reasons no attempt will be made to folio?;- daily 
exchange fluctuations, these rates will closely approximate market 
rates between the respective local currency and goId-standard cur­
rencies*
In subsequent tariff revisions, import duties war© set directly in 
gold units (C. G. U*)* Beginning in 193£ statistics of imports -ere 
reported in gold units (C. Cr* U.)» while exports continued to be reported
In taels, or in Chinese standard dollars after the abolition of
the tael is 1933*
The Chinese Year Book, 1935-56, Shanghai, pp. 1270-71.
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It Is a matter of record that a considerable part of th© Customs
revenue mas earmarked for th® service of foreign loans In gold ourroii™
oies, and because of the continued decline in the price of silver in
terns of gold, 14m  collection of import duties in the new go Id unit was
of great importance* But th® import duties assessed in gold units
(C* G. U*) were actually paid In silver currency at the rate of the
day, which was set and noted by the Central Bank of China on th© basis
of th© exchange rates with gold-standard countries* For the convenience
of importers, the bank undertook to sell oashier3s check® in tom® of
gold units, to open current accounts in th© gold units, to make forward
contracts in the same units, and to sell ths units for gold or sterling
telegraphic transfers at parity, plus a small charge* Th© Bank also
14issued bank notes in gold units*
In ajzoardance with instruction received from the Ministry of 
Finance through th© Inspector-General of Customs the public is 
hereby notified that beginning May 1, 1931, the Central. Bank of
China will bo prepared to sell Customs Gold Unit notes, in de­
nominations of C* G. tf. 10*00, C* G. U* 5*00, C. G* U* 1*00, 20 
cents and 10 cents, at rates ascertainable from the Central Bank 
of China upon application* Such bank-notes, the issuance of which 
is by Government order confined to th© Central Benk of China, will 
be accepted in duty end other charges payable in Customs Gold 
Gaits.
It was reported that in 1930, th© first year of’ the creation of 
the new gold units (C. G* Tj.), only 12*18 per cent, of the total import 
duty of China was received by the Ouetoroo in such notes and drafts*
The figure in 1931 rose to 63*02 psr cent*, in 1932 to 75*27 par cent*, 
and in 1933 to 07.82 per cent* Owing to the fact that ths gold units 
received exceeded the requirements of the foreign loan and Indemnity 
services, tin® Government had a surplus of the 0. G* ii**s to b© sold for
14Ibid*, p. 1272
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loeal dollar currency for -the purpose of covering tha domestic obliga­
tion* • During 1955 thi» kind of soiling reached an average of 6,000,000 
C* fi* U* monthly on the looal market*^**
On March 10* 1983, the h&lkwan tael need for the account unit by 
China*a customs for ninety year* was abolished and duties on exports 
began to be collected in term of the new standard silver dollar con­
st et lag of 53*495448 grans of pure silver* The haikwam tael was fixed 
at one halkwaa tael to 1*558 silver dollars*16
B* The abolishment of the * tael‘’— The taels* the indefinite and 
un-uniform units of silver in China* bad added more confusion to China’s 
wrreney system for centuries* The fall (in 1911) of the Menohu Empire 
brought an end to the kuping tael formally* and the Republican regime 
established the dollar as official currency* but in both the interior 
and in the sea-ports the system of taels existed until 1988* For in­
stance* in the interior some local tax-collectors (the land tax and 
"likin,8 etc.) still kept the local taels and In the trade ports all for­
eign exchange transactions took place via the tael* Almost all foreign 
currencies first were converted into Shanghai taels* and then Into 
silver dollars if so desired* Both the rate between taels and silver 
dollars and tha rate between taels and foreign currencies fluctuated 
daily* Furthermore* there was a spread between the bankfs selling and 
buying rates* so that an extra profit oould be made for banks on their 
exebange transactions.
The attempts to abolish the complicated tael system and tc adopt 
Instead of it the dollar for the purpose of a money unit had occurred
15lbld*I~p. 1272* 
l^Ibid * * pp* 1272-75.
from tis» to tia«• On “th® Gqver cment sId®, the regulations of currency 
is 1910 and 1914 had directly provided the dollar, yuan* as the unit o f  
standard mossy* On the public si do, asms petitions to the Government 
had occurred, urging the abolishment of the taels* For instmce, in 
1921, a petition frma several Chinese banking groups eud another one 
on October 5, 1921 put the abolishment of the tael as the most important 
of the petitioned items* However, until 1928 the situation still had 
not been improved*
Of course, there were other reasons for the active existence of 
the tael* As the following summary of Mr* Leavens showst
(1) The sycee prepared and assayed by private organisations 
with no Governmental control, has been found to be entirely re­
liable* (2) The record of Chinese Mints has not been so good*
(5) In the ease of provincial dollars, small silver, and copper, 
there have been many instances where the content of the coins has 
been reduced to the profit of the mint officials* (4) About ten 
years ago the foreign banks agreed that they would change from the 
tad to the dollar if the provincial mints were closed, and if all 
dollars were coined in a national mint in Shanghai with a few 
foreign-officials to cheek and certify the work* Chinese opposi­
tion to foreign control* (&) The continued civil war prevented the 
carrying out of this plan, although a mint was built in Shanghai 
and machinery obtained*
Under the National Government of China, the first step to?/ard 
abolishment of the tael system was the provision for abolishing the 
Inylqg tael at the Economic Conference of 1928* At that conference 
it was decided to abolish the tael and replace it with the dollar* 
Contracts, taxes and payments of all kinds, government and private, 
expressed in taels, were to be converted to a dollar basis at the rate 
of 0*65693 kuping tael to one dollar* On February 1, 1930 the first
^D* H* Leavens, "Chinese Money and Banking,” Annals, Sov* 1930, 
pp* 207-208*
100
*t*p in the elimination of* the tael by the National Government was ac­
tually taken* The haikwan tael was replaced by the newly-established 
Customs Gold Unit • In 1932 the plan of abolishing the tael and unify­
ing the dollar currency was enacted* This policy of abolishing the 
tael was announced definitely on December 30 of the same year* Mean­
while in March* 1933 the new type of Chinese standard dollar was started 
in the mint (the coinage was actually begun in Hay* 1033) * The Chinese 
Government suddenly announced on April 5* 1933 that the tael would be 
abolished as of April 3* Chinese bonks and merchants perforce obeyed 
at once. The foreign banks and merchants at first ignored the order of 
China** Government, but at last accepted the situation* From April 10 
the foreign exchange bank* began quoting exchange rates in terms of the 
Chinese standard dollar instead of the old Shanghai tael* Bank accounts* 
contracts* securities* and outstanding accounts expressed in taels were 
converted into standard dollars at the regular rate of Shanghai taels*
71*30 per $100*
F* The new law of China's stanfiard dollar— On March 3, 1933 a new 
law was passed which established a new monetary unit* the standard dollar 
with 36*6971 grams gross weight* eighty-eight per cent* pure silver and 
twelve per cent* copper alloy* or 23.493443 grams fine silver* This 
lor (see Appendix A) la the last relatively complete on© in the history 
of China* s currency* It included the following important points a
1. The Standard Silver Unit (or yuan) shall be exclusively coined 
by the Central Mint in Shanghai*
2. The Standard Silver Unit shall be legal tender in all transactions*
S* The old one-yuan silver pieces of good appearance may be used in
191
the sana manner as the standard Silver Unit within a certain period 
fixed by the Ministry of Finance*
4* Fare silver of 23*493448 grams may ho presented in exchange 
for each Standard Silver Unit plus a minting charge of 2.25 per cant, 
from the mint*
S* ^he Central Mint may produce *mint bare** with a finen©ss of 
999 thousandths for people by charging the 2,25 per cent* minting fee* 
6* The rate of exchange for a Standard Silver Unit is fixed at 
0*716 Shanghai tael*
Some distinctive features in this act* which are different from 
the preceding regulations, ares
a* An official rate between the new currency unit and the Shanghai 
tael was declared in order to pave the way for the effective execution 
of the policy of the abandoment of the Shanghai tael, the last of the 
surviving taels*
b. Prior to 1933 China was on a silver standard with quasi*free 
coinage (smelting shops for a small charge transformed bar silver im­
ported into syeee fo r the purpose of circulation)* By the new act, 
China was on a silver standard with free coinage of silver by the
Government only. MTh© 2^—per—cent coinage fee was more properly
ISbrassage than seigniorage*
c* The Z \  p e r cent• fee is charged in order to widen the distance 
between the silver import and export points* The new dollars weighing 
26*3971 grams or 412 grains eighty-eight per cent* fine silver is one- 
half grain lifter and contains about 2*33 per cent* less silver than 
the American dollar* The silver import point is about 3^ per cent.
XBp. h * Leavens, Silver Money, p. 206.
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above this parity (the cost of importing si Ivor combining with the
fcj-per-oent• coinage fee}* The export lit about five or per cent
below parity. thus the total spread is eight or nine per eent* as
compared with & spread of about fire per cent, for the tael .1S As to
the existing silver bullion, the Government took another step* mien the
tael was declared abolished, the Government imposed a 2£-per-cent ♦ export
tax on shipment a abroad of bar silver, sycee, and other forms of silver
bullion, except the bare manufactured by the Shanghai Central Mint at a
chfrge of 2• 26-par cent.
Like the other old acts, the new law had its defects* One of
them was its failure to settle the serious problem of disorder and
the excess ire varieties of subsidiary coins in circulation which needed
immediate readjustment*
Coinage of the new dollar began in May, 1932 and continued steadily*
By the end of 1935 about #100,000,000 of the new coins had been minted,
and in addition the mint had manufactured over #50,000,000 In #1,000
20bars, to be used for bank reserves*
II* China's fiationallzation of Silver (1935) and the managed cur­
rency system i
A* The silver situation in China and Shanghai in 1934— It was well 
Viiafw that China was one of the most important consumers of silver in 
the world, but China had not imported silver continually or in any con­
siderable amount until after 1918* Generally speaking, the low price of 




silver. T h ere fo r#  except fo r  a few oases, nin  the main Chinese s e t
imports and exports of silver move is the opposite direction to the
21price of silver* There does exist some correlation between the 
import of silver into ^hina and her merchandise balance• But this cor­
relation is always modified by influences of other items in China’s 
balance of payment • It can only be said that when exports increase 
for two consecutive y i ars relative to imports, more mid more silver
tends to be imported, and that when exports decrease continuously for
22two years, more and more silver is exported* The silver that has 
been imported into China is largely located in the coastal cities and 
treaty ports* In China, silver gradually came to serve the functions 
of money from the coastal cities to the interior and for wholesale and 
retail transactions* Silver became the standard of value, the medium 
of exchange, and the store of value* Furthermore before 1936, China*s 
exchange with foreign monies is dictated by the price of silver* There* 
form the fluctuation of the price of silver directly influences the 
movement of silver from or into China and indirectly influences China*s 
currency system and the whole economic life of the country* If the 
price of silver in the world market goes up or if currencies are de* 
valued in the foreign countries with which China trades, it is believed 
tint China * s imports from foreign countries will be stimulated and 
exports of merchandise the imports of silver will be discouraged* 
Unfortunately there are no available statistics on hand to be cited*
21 y . S. Leong, Silver (an Analysis of Factors Affecting Its Price), 
Washington, 1933, p* £4*
22Ibi&*, p. SO.
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If this ease continues long enough., th © excess-lmport of merchandise 
fbr a long period may rasa It is an unfavorable b&lBnoo of payment*
This is especially true in the case of China which already had unfavor­
able balaaoes in normal years* If China’s internal development of ooia- 
®*ro® •39̂  industry grows rapidly, the stopping of an appreciable emount 
®f imports of silver may indues China to a formal deflation of its cur­
rency • If the rise in the pries ©f silver in the world market comes
very suddenly and in a higi degree, the import of silver Into China m y  
not only be stopped, but it may also be exported to a great extent. 
Onder these cireusietajaees a sudden and deep deflation of China’s cur- 
renay may threaten China's whole economic life. If the prise of silver 
in the world market goes down, the fbreipt exchange will be against 
China, the advantage of her increasing exports, stimulated by the
decline in foreign exchange, cannot offset the disadvantage of the in*
creasing burden from the heavy foreign loans in terns ©f foreign cur­
rency* Thus in the case of China, both the public and the Govensnefit 
emphasise the need for stabilisation of the price of silver in order to 
avoid, as far as may be possible, silver fluctuations, especially arti­
ficial fluctuation.
In order to understand China's nationalisation of silver in 1936, 
it is also necessary to understand China * s situation at that time with 
regard to silver wtkI currency and the world economic situation which 
has inflnemeed China’s economic life*
1* World economic oris is— He acting to the world economic crisis 
(1929), every country began to resort to various forms of monetary 
policy designed to reduce imports and stimulate self-sufficiency.
Among these monetary policies there were the management of currency,
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th® policy of devaluing money, control of foreign exohange, tariff* 
policy, quotas and other limitations. The not result of these policies 
adopted by numerous countries was a great increase of economic disloca­
tion and® continued decline in international comm©roe# From the point 
of view of China, these monetary policies of foreign countries raised 
doubt as to the merit of the gold standard which had been proposed as 
the final goal for Chinese currency reform ever since the latest years 
of the last century*
2* The influence of the priee of silver on China--During the past 
half-century (from about 1884 to 1931) prices of commodities in China 
rose steadily (except in & few cases}* The rising prices of goods have
23undoubtedly stimulated many lines of production*
After 1925, the rapidly declining value of silver in the world 
market following the World War improved the opportunity for Chinese 
exporters, by creating a favorable exchange* This process reached its 
maximum in 1931, in spite of the world economic crisis which broke in 
1929* The depreciation of silver, on one hand, increased the export 
total of China, on the other hand led to a change in the nature 
of Chinese exports. The favorable exchange stimulated manufacture for 
export, and some raw materials began to be increasingly utilised by
24Chinese manufacturers instead of being exported in their raw state* 
Daring the period of depredating silver and increasing exports, 
the amount of silver that was imported into China from abroad is a con­
siderable figure*
23^ang Leang-le, China*s Hew Currency System, 1986, Shanghai, p* 44.
Ibid*, p. 45.
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6* China1 a silver centralized in Shanghai— The most important de­
velopments in the situation of" the Chinese silver "were the oontinua— 
tioaa of large annual imports of silver and the slow but steady increase 
1b  the stock of silver held by the Shanghai banks. From 1925 until 
1954 this flowing from the inland into Shanghai increased abnormally 
owing to both domestic and international conditions. From the estimated 
figures of one source, the accumulations of silver in Shanghai are as 
follows*^6
Dec., 1925 44,850,000 ounces
Oct., 1926 134,270,000 "
June, 1928 102,680,000 *
June, 1954 449,840,000 n
Dec., 1954 522,590,000 *
Among the factors leading to centralisation of China’s silver in 
Shanghai, an important one was the depression of prices for agricultural 
products, as compared with the greater success of industrialists in 
maintaining the prices of industrial products* (Before 1928 China1® 
government took almost no steps to take care of the faming and indus­
trial policies and let the farmers and industrialists take care of 
themselves.) Under this circumstance the relatively organised indus­
trialists found it easier to obtain their own benefits than did the
farmers. Shanghai had a favorable balance of inter-region trade with
26the interior. The following table shows this tendency*
Year Prices received by farmers Prices paid by them
1926 100 1001927 93 1041928 98 11|
1929 122 1361030 126 1421931 118 1521932 117 1541953 57 108
~ 25prask Whitson Fetter, "China and the Flow of Silver," Geographical
t£5«19o¥'3ifoJL*i. ThaBe fl6Ur9B only ?ho atoot
2%a»g teaag-le, IfiS Currency System, p. 107.
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Th» rapidly growing disparity between agricultural and industrial 
prices after 1930 especially was the main cause of the aeoumul&tion of 
silver in Shanghai, because Shanghai was tbs center of China*® indus- 
tries* It paid the interior for the price of raw material less than 
the fund received from the Interior for the price of the manufacturing
Furthermore, because of the political disorder in the interior, 
a considerable amount of funds also cams to Shanghai, the largest center 
of China’s commerce and industry, for local investment* Of the oversea 
remittances to South China, a large amount had come to Shanghai both in 
payment for purchases of goods and for purposes of investment.
The following figures show the movements of silver between Sh&ng- 







































*The sudden shift in August 1934 was due not to internal condi­
tions, but mainly to external ones* Most of the silver shipped 
from Shanghai to the interior found its way out of the country, and 
was ultimately purchased by the United States Ooverament*
The silver flowing from the interior to the Chinese banks in 
Shanghai was very largely cover for the increasing volume of bank note 
issues circulating atftre widely than ever before in the Interior as well
I fIbid*, p. 109*
i m
as is Shanghai. The silver is the stock of the foreign basks was sot a 
baeking for bank notes, but rather for deposits. Many of these deposits 
represented funds tfeioh were being kept in China by foreigners and 
Chinese, who waited for a favorable chance to send it abroad.^ The 
stocks of silver in Shanghai reached $272,000,000 in Chinese banks 
and $276,000,000 in foreign banks at the end of 1933.29
4* The banks* condition in China— Before the reorganisation of the
Central Bank in 1935, China*s Central Bank, either from the viewpoint
of financial resources or from that of the art of central banking, was
net in & position to assume the financial leadership in the money market
as well as is usually expected of it in the modern countries. The
foreign banks still ignored the requirements provided by China's banking
law for the basis of a policy of sound banking. As a matter of fact,
commercial banks were still permitted to increase their liabilities la
ihe form of deposits without at the same time increasing their capital.
The average ratio of banks1 capital to their deposit liabilities in
Shanghai, was 19.2 per Oont., 12.3 per cent, 7.7 per cent., 7.6 per
seat., 7*1 per cent, in 1921, 1926, 1931, 1932, and 1933 respectively,
30awd the ratio declined to 7.0 per cent, in 1934. The native banks, 
particularly those in Shanghai, always served as the "bi11-brokers” 
in investing the surplus funds for the commercial banks. The average 
cash ratio of banks declined from 13.3 per cent* in 1926 to 10.2 per 
cent, in 193*.31 The average fixed loans made by banks have increased 
both absolutely and relatively.
h. Leaven*, Silver Money. p. 217*29|bid., p. 217.
SOwTy. Lin, The Mem Monetary System of China. 1936, p. 50.
31Ibid.
^Xbld> i p* 63*
Before 1932 the circusBtnness in Shanghai encouraged* the commercial 
banks to offer their funds far long-term industrial capita! and long- 
torn loans* The rapid decline of the prices of real estate led to bank- 
ruptcy of the real estate companies and then the closing of some banka*
Because of the easy money, the founding of real estate companies 
to promote the flotation of land shares and the sale of real es­
tate •..making possible the provision of long-term industrial capital 
from the commercial banks rather than from the capital market*** 
with the Sine-Japanese conflict in early 1932, the real estate 
prices began to fall, at first slowly but later mors precipitately 
.**.It had become necessary for banks to adjust their portfolios by 
calling in their outstanding credits, restricting their advances, 
etc• • • • Consoquently, the rapid decline of prices* Many factories 
were farced to shut down* Many business concerns have: failed or 
were reorganised* The price of shares has fallen, and the volume 
of shares transactions has fallen too* the volume of bank clear­
ings has naturally fallen since 1932*
Furthermore, the banks supplied their funds to China's Government
as a means of balancing the budget apart from the flotation of govern-
mental bonds* The following figures show the amount which the Central
3dGovernment borrowed from the banks from 1929 to 1934s
In millions of dollars
Fiscal Total amount Total amount Set borrovr-
year borrowed liquidated *3L1929-30 111.7 106.6 5.1
1930-31 165*6 152.6 32*9
1931-32 108.1 105*0 5*1
1932-33 225*8 138*1 87.7
1933—34 396*1 303.7 91*4
The took the governmental issues as a reserve against note
Issues and was more particularly attracted by the high yields on these 
obligations averaging between twelve and fifteen per cent* per annum*
The purchasing of the governmental bonds and treasury notes and tie loans
SSlbld., pp* 57-36. 
^*Ibid*, pp* 45-46*
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to the Government began steadily to increase. thus tha liquidity of 
the banks became to a Urge extent dependant upon tha public credit 
end tha general confidence in the stability of the Government*
rapid accumulation of deposits of banka on the one hand and* 
on tha other, tha lack of oorpor&tiie securities eed oommereial paper 
1b which to invest* pressed the banks to seek employment for their 
surplus funds in nays which wars not always free from criticism.
B* The causes which led to the nationalisation of 1955— China* s 
nationalisation silver in 19S6 was the inevitable policy for China’s 
Government to meet the emergency situation involving the external drain 
of silver* The serious drain of silver was then due to the sudden rise 
of silver prices in the world market* In August, 1234 the Gaverment 
of the United States, beginning the nationalisation, of silver held in 
the United States and purchasing the additional silver from abroad at 
a higher priee than the current market quotation, influenced the rising 
prioe la the world market a great deal* It is necessary then to trace 
the silver policy of the Government of the United States and the inter* 
national silver situation*
la Ueeomber, 1931 the Young Plan Advisory Committee, because many 
countries were feeling the world crisis, besides its main objects, paid 
more attention to the unparalleled economic die location. The Lausanne 
Conference which followed was to have dealt not only with reparations, 
but also with ^measures to solve th@ other economic and financial dif» 
ficulties which are responsible for the world crisis.* Owing to no 
delegates sent from the Government of the United States and other 
reasons, there were me visible measures reached by the Conference.
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The World Economic Conference called at London in July, 1933, vae in- 
toad ad to deal with various effects of the world crisis, the positive 
result of the Conference regarding the- silver problem was the agreement 
®  silver| with an aim to increase tb value and purchasing power of the 
white racial• This proposal, mainly to the advantage of silver mining 
interests, was brought forward by the American delegation. The general 
resolution on silver was adopted by the silver subcommittee on July 20 
and approved by the Conference on July 27 which was, briefly?
It recommended that? (a) an agreement be sought between the 
ohief silver producing countries and those countries which are 
the largest holders or users of silver with a view to mitigating 
fluctuations in the price of silver***.(b) th© Governments* 
parties to this conference shall refrain from new legislative 
measures which would involve further debasement of their silver 
coinage below a fineness of SQO/lQOO.*.*(c) that they shall sub­
stitute silver coins for low value paper currency insofar aath© 
budgetary and local conditions will perait. (d) ...The require­
ment of such provisions shall lapse on April 1st, 1954, if the 
agreement recommended in paragraph (a) does not come into force 
by that date, and in no ease shall extend beyond Jan. 1st, 1958*
Meanwhile, on July 22 and 26, agreements were signed between the 
delegates of the countries with large holdings of silver, and tbs prin­
cipal countries producing silver. India agreed not to sell more than 
an average of 35,000,000 fine ounces of silver per year; Spain, net 
more than an average of 5,000,000 fine ounces per year; and China, 
none. On the other hand, the producing countries (the United States, 
Canada, and others) agreed to purchase or otherwise withdraw from the 
market 36,000,000 fine ounces per year, and make use of it for currency 
purposes——either coinage or reserves— or otherwise keep it off the
^ ^ emorandum of Agreement between the United States of America, 
Au stralia. Canada,~~UhTna, India, Mexico, Peru, and Spain,Executive 
Agreersa’nt Series, So. 63, Washington,1931, P• TT~
market,56
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Th* chines© Gcvernmenfc, in ratifying th© London Agreancnt oa 
March 21* I9SifSadi th® following reservation*
In ratifying this agreement* the National Government of China 
declares that as silver is the basis monetary standard of China* 
th© National Government will consider itself at liberty to take 
whatever action it may deem appropriate, if, in its opinion* changes 
in the relative values of gold and silver adversely affect the eco­
nomic condition of the Chinese people* contrary to the spirit of 
stabilising the price of silver as embodied in this Agreement*
the agreement was ratified ia effect by the United States by the
President’s siIver-purchase proclamation, December 21* 1933. further-*
more ia this proclamation he gave the unique may by which the silver
mined ia the United States mould be treated*5^
The mists should receive for coinage into silver dollars any 
silver thereafter mined in the United States; that with the con­
sent of the owner t&e mint should retain 50 per cent of the sliver 
as seigniorage* and should coin the other 50 per oent into silver 
dollars to be delivered to the depositor...*
The method adopted by this proclamation can be looked at in the 
following way t
The 50-per cant seigniorage meant in effect that for every two 
ounces of fine silver which the producer deposited at the mint* he 
got beck one ounce in the form of standard silver dollars; that is* 
he was paid $1.29-^ for one ounce; but as he got nothing back for 
the ether ounce* his net return was 64*5-4-cents per fine ounce.
...The cost of the measure to the Government was worth consider*- 
lag. from one point of view* the cost was nil. The Gove rum© nt 
would we rely place its dollar stamp on & piece of silver worth* at 
the market value on December 21* about 35 cents* and turn it back 
to the depositor* »«d at the same time tha Government would receive 
another S3 cents9 worth of silver* or about @0 per cent above the 
ctrrent market. Thus 34 cents profit for the miner, and a poten­
tial #1.00 profit for the Government were created on the basis of 
every 66 cents' worth of silver to be mined in America*
3Up. H. leavens* Sliver Money* p. 250. 
s7Ibid.» p. 252.
^Ibid* * p. 253.
zm
For many m s o s s , but especially influenced by tha result of the 
London -Agreestent* the price of silver can be sho^n to have gone up, ah 
idle end of 1951* Ihe price of silver bed risen from 24^ cents in 
January* 1953 to a high ©f 4S dents per ounce in Bovsmiber* The Sold 
Be serve Act of 1934 did not affect in any manner "the weight of th© 
silver dollar in the United States* During February* 1934 the advocates 
of silver legislation were active* The ideas of two schools of thought 
an the price of silver have circulated among the people of the United 
States who are interested in the problem of silver* One is that an in­
creased price tor silver will mean increase in the purchasing power of 
silver* China and India both using silver money* in this case* will 
buy more goods from America than they usually buy* The other is that 
if tlieprico of silver is increased, China end India may* by every 
possible way* protect themselves by curtailing their imports from the 
Baited States* The Government of the United States sent a mission 
wader the leadership of Professor James Harvey Bog era of Tale Uni­
versity* eas of the Presidentre monetary advisers in the United States* 
to China to study the silver situation there in March* 1934* Professor 
Rogers also visited Japan and India* Although his report of this in­
vestigation has not been made public * it was very clear that the general 
opinion in China was against any artificial rise in the price of silver* 
Tbs silver purchase act of June* 1934 of the United States providedt
The proportion ©f silver in the monetary stocks should be im- 
creased with the ultimate objective of reaching one-fourth of the 
total of silver end gold together* To reach this end th© Secre­
tary of the Treasury was 'directed to purchase silver until it made 
up one-fourth of the total* with discretion as to times and terns 
of purchase, but with the limitation that no silver was to be pur­
chased for more than Its monetary value and that no silver situated 
ia the continental Unltsd States on May 1* 1934 was to be purchased
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for more them 50 cents per fine ounce* If the market price of 
silver should exceed it® monetary value, or if the monetary value 
of the stock of silver should exceed 26 per oent of the total 
stock of silver and gold, the Secretary of t)» Treasury oould sell 
silver* fie was authorised end directed to issue silver certificates 
to an amount not less than the cost of the silver purchased; a re* 
serve of silver coin or bullion of equivalent monetary value was 
to be maintained against the certificates. He also was given 
authority to regulate the movement of silver* The President was 
authorised to nationalise silver, that is, to require its delivery 
to the mint In return fbr the payment of its fair value ia any 
United States currency* Profits made on sales of silver were to 
be taxed 50 per cent.
As to the purchase of the silver* the act provided these words* *at 
hone and abroad” and "for present or future delivery*® By the terms of 
the Act of 1954* silver in the United States on Slay 1 would be purchased 
at net over 50 certs per ounce and subject to a fifty per cent* tax on 
profits* and might be national! asd if the President should b o  order* 
Therefore the holders of silver in the United States might consider It
worthwhile to send their silver abroad and wait for good selling terms*
To fit this ease* on June 28 th© Secretary of the Treasury issued an 
order placing an embargo on exports of silver* except under license from
the Treasury. On August 9, 1954 the President of the United States
issued a proclamation and an executive order requiring the delivery of 
all silver held in the United States to th© government, according to the 
provision of the Silver Purchase Act* The price paid for th© Silver 
thus delivered was equivalent to a net price of 60*01 cents per fine 
eunee.^ After the nationalisation of silver in th© United States the 





First half of 1934— fluctuat ing in th® general neighborhood of 
46/ per outetj
The price of silver nationalised August 9— 49.96/ for silver at 
0*999 fine| 50.01/ for silver at 100 fine#
Mar feet price of August 9— 49/)
August-September—  neighborhood of SO/*
October— ever 55/j
Sovombe r-December— b rtween 55/ and 56/.^
(The market price of silver in the world ma rket was fb 11 owing the 
trace of the price of foreign silver ia the United States.)
At beginning of 1956— rising to 95/ per ounce;
About the aiddle of February began to rise and on April 10 reached 
64 1/Q/j
After the President's proclamation of April 10 to reduce the 
seigniorage from 50$ to 45$, reached 71 5/8/ (April 24) j
After the next p roc lama ti on to reduce the seigniorage from 45$ to 
40$, jwped to 77/ (next day), and to 81/ (the day after).
After the flurry in April and when it became apparent that the 
government of the United States was not going to follow the original 
polioyfurther, the price of silver remained above 70 cent s per ounce.
At the end of Jane, it began to fall again. From July 15 to August 12 
It fluctuated around 67 6/4 cents per ounce. In December, 1955 a modi­
fied American policy was inaugurated. The American Government reduced 
its buying prlea for silver. Consequently the white metal dropped at 
Sew York from 60 3/4 to 51 3/4 cents per ounce In oh* week (from Decem­
ber 14 to 21). In the meanwhile the American Government reduced its 
purchases from London and started to buy from China's Government directly.
41ibid.
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C* The process of nationalisation of silver ia Chine.— As to the 
silver situation in China since 1921, it may be summarised that the 
oontlanatioa of largo annual imports of silver and th© slow but steady 
increase In the stock of silver held by the Shanghai banks has been 
going «a* In 1933 and early is 1954 the flow of silver from the interior 
still ocatinued, but beginning in April, 1953 there was an export of 
silver from Shanghai to foreign countrie a* After the Silver Purchase 
Act of the United States was passed in June, 1934, these silver exports 
continued sad were operated on a much larger scale*
As to the price of silver, opinion in China by the end of 1933 
generally was against any artificial rise* At the beginning of 1934 
when the argument of the silver problem went up sky-high in the United 
States Congress, there was serious concern in China over the prospects 
of American legislation on the subject* The arriml of Professor Rogers 
to study the silver situation was thought by tha Chinese people to be a 
sigh that tbs American Government would consider the interests of China 
in this matter* But in order to be prepared is the event of American 
silver legislation which might tend to draw silver out of Chine, China*s 
Government on April 29, 1934 announced that special permits should be 
required from China's Government for the shipment of silwr from Shang­
hai to foreign countries or to foreign ports* Rumors arose from time 
to time that the Government was considering an embargo on the export 
of silver and also a reduction of the silver content ©f China's dollar* 
Tbs Govermnent of China denied these rumors and gave these special per­
mits freely bo the applicants*
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In June, 1934 th# exports of* silver from China amounted to C• S* 
(Chinese standard) $13,000,000 and in July to C. S. #24,000,000* In 
August of the sane year the exports rose to C. s. $79,000,000*42
On August 19, 1934 China* s Government sent a message to the Presi­
dent of the United States which stated?
In order that China may properly safeguard her currency (China), 
which has recently been flowing out of the country to a degree that 
is potentially alarming, China would appreciate an indication of 
the probable policy of the United States in the future purchase of 
silver.
The United States Government, on September 22, 1934, replied and 
eoneluded that
The Government of the United States appreciates that the great­
est care must be exercised in carrying out the policy. *. .Should 
the Government of China at any time find it necessary, in order to 
protect its coinage, to adopt a policy of di soouraging the export 
of silver, this Government will be glad to receive the view of the 
Chinese Government of the manner in whiob the purchasing program 
may be carried forward .in co-ordination with such policy of the 
Chinese Government...•
This answer was not received until October 2.
On September 8 the Ministry of Finance of China issued this order#
Until further notice purchases or sales of foreign exchange shall 
be prohibited except for the purpose of financing
1. legitimate and normal business requirements*
2. Contracts entered Into on or before September 8, 1934.
3* Reasonable travelling or other personal requirements*
On September 23, 1934 the Chinese Government communicated with the
United States and pointed out that
Since 1931 the rising value of silver in terms of foreign cur­
rencies has involved severe deflation and economic losses to China 
and has dislocated China's balance of payments in part at least by 
hampering exports* Recently stimulation of the silver price abroad, 
to which exchanges have not fully responded, has caused a serious
dglbld.. p. 296.
d^Prese Release* of the Deoartment of State of the United States. Ko. eeiTScf- W;"O T 4 , p. 26o*
**Ibid., PP* 260-261.
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drain of silver creating great alarm* Silver exports of this year 
to date have been over three times greater than in any previous 
full year* A further material silver price increase would cause 
very serious injury to China, possibly severe panic****
China*• .would appreciate assurance that th© American Government 
will refrain from any action that might cause continuation of th© 
present silver drain from China and accordingly would co-operate to 
prevent further rise and to maintain stability of silver which the 
London Agreement contemplated* Indeed, from China * s viewpoint, the 
stabilization level should be somewhat lower than the present 
price.45
In the same message the Chinese proposed a practical solution as 
fellows*
The Sational Government feels obliged actively to seek means of 
avoiding further hardships of silver fluctuations. It considers 
that China should not alone maintain the silver standard, and is 
considering gradual introduction of a gold-basis currency which 
would necessitate acquiring gold* Sine© the American Government 
desires as increasing proportion of silver in monetary reserves, 
the National Government desires also to ascertain in principle 
whether the American Government would be willing to exchange with 
the Chinese Government gold for silver*
On October 12 Secretary of the United States replied:
This Government is desirous of so carrying out the programme as 
to produce the general benefit that would result from enhancement 
and stabilization of the price of silver, and to avoid, so far as 
may be possible, disturbances to the econca&y and public finances 
of China*
To China’s proposal to exchange silver for gold, th© reply read as 
follows (in the answer of October 12. 1954):
Free markets in which gold or silver could be acquired by pur­
chases arermfw open to all nations, and therefor © direct inter­
governmental transactions have not been undertaken* The availa­
bility of such markets in the future is open to friendly di sc us - 
sion*





Chino se i»ov©rument a w  had no other recourse except independent action.
On Ootober 14 , 1954* the Chinese Government announced a tax on th© export 
of silver from China by the following, orders
In view of the undue rise of silver out of relation to the level 
of general commodity prices, the National Government, in order to 
safeguard China's economic Interests and protect its currency* ha®
fixed the customs duty on exports of silver, effective Ootober 15,
as fbllowst
On silver dollars and mint bars* 10 per cent, less per cent
minting charges paid* i.e.* 7 3/4 per cent net.
On other forms of silver 10 per cent (in lieu of per cent) •
In addition* an equalisation charge will be 
imposed on exports of silver* equal to th© deficiency* if any, 
existing between thee theoretical parity of London silver and a 
rate of exchange officially fixed by the Central Bank of China* 
after making allowance fbr the export duty.
Keanwhile the Government decided to restrict the free movements
of silver by requiring a license on coastal shipments of silver and by
limiting the smouat of silver carried in person while traveling* in
order to out the extension of organized smuggling of silver. The export
duty on silver may be said to have taken China off the silver standard*
The laek of a free movement of silver between China and the rest of the
world divorced the value of the Chinese dollar from the world prices
of silver. A few days after the export duty was levied the rat© of
exchange went below the parity with the London and Hew York prices of
silver. It Is obvious that the levy of the export duty on silver and
the equalisation charge48 is only a transitory arrangement, and will
enable the Government to gain time to work out a more permanent solution.
As a matter of fact, the equalisation oharge did not give much help to
the serious situation* owing to the absence of its intended flexibility
in foreign markets. For examplet
4b"Equal!sation oharge is a device which* in effect, puts the export of silver dollars on the same basis as If the exchange rate were always exactly at parity with the silver price in the foreign market j such a basis made the export of silver unprofitable to the extent of the cost® involved. Xa the case of silver in fpirns other than standard silver dollars (of China) there was the additional 2^-per-oont duty." (For an example see pp. 300-301 of D. H. Leavens* Silver Money.)
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The market opening rates of exchange on London were about 22 
per cent below parity during tha last week in October, which would 
have Indio a tad an equalisation oharge of about 14 per cent* Ac­
tually it was set at about 8 per oentj this left a 8 per cent 
margin, Just about sufficient to cover shipping and other costs*
Severtheless, after the imposition of the duty and the equalisation 
oharge, exports of silver fell off sharply. In October the exports 
amounted to C. S, (Chinese standard) #87,000,000 but dropped to about 
C. S. $12,000,000 per month in November and December.
The year 1S34 ended with a recorded net total of 0. S* 1260,000,000 
(the figure does not include the twenty million dollars of silver smug­
gled from China) exported from China. Of this figure, some C* S. #221,- 
000,000 omee from foreign banka.
Since the Chinese exchange rate was divorced by duty on its export 
and by equalisation charge from the price of silver in the world market, 
the spread between the rates and bullion parity has been large* For 
exasple, on December 1, 1934 when the bullion parity of the Chinese 
dollar, based on the price of silver ia Sew York, was forty-two Costs, 
the Shanghai dollar was quoted on the exchange at only thirty-four cents* 
Bv April 26, 193S this difference had risen to twenty cents* that is, 
the bullion parity was sixty—two cents and th© actual exchange rate 
fofty-two cents* This difference made it highly profitable to smuggle 
the white metal out of China* Southward from Hong Kong and northward 
from Menehoukuo estimates of silver smuggled from China during 1934 and 
1936 were put at about twenty and 230 millions of Chines© dollars respec-
to prevent smuggling, China9s Government took various measures*
4®B. H. Leavens, Silver Money, p. 302.
50Ibid., p. 303.
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But tha difficulties in the way of effective control were several* such 
an tha operation of foreign banks under tha protection of extraterri­
torial Jurisdiction* the Japanese military influenoe Xu certain parts 
of northeast China* the war lords in certain provinces* the matter of 
foreign settlements in several sea ports* and others*
The immediate result of the loss of a tremendous quantity of 
silver through exports and smuggling was reflected in the following 
factst
1* Monetary stringency in Shanghai — The great drain of silver from 
Shanghai left the financial center of Shins with an inadequate supply 
of cash upon which to base its oredit structure* For example, in the 
latter part of 1934 interest rates rose rapidly and bank loans were dif­
ficult to secure at almost any price* During the summer of 1933 the 
Shanghai exchange market showed uncertainty, which was reflected in the 
wider difference between rates fo r cash and for forward delivery, or 
the equivalent of very high interest rates for funds employed in legitimate 
operations in the course of ordinary business* Th© Central Bank 
at one time attempted to out down this spread, but found its resources 
insuffic lent •
2* Speculation in foreign e xohange— Humors in current circulation 
resulted in the fligit of silver dollars abroad and the purchase of 
foreign exchange for speculation purposes* In the latter part of 
October 1935 there was heavy speculative buyirig of foreign currencies* 
Everyone was buying foreign exchange* few wanted to sell* This situation 
worse* Humors circulated widely that the Government would soon
2X2
tata* *©tion to promote a lomr exchange level independant of the world 
prloo of silver and to abandon the expensive and difficult struggle to 
maintain a striot silver standard within the country.
The differences between the cash and forward exchange rates were 
equivalent to as high A® thirty-five per cent* per anmsa some of the 
time in 1935. The exchange rates in Sew York dropped from 37 5/l6 cents 
an October 1 to 30^ cents on October 31 and in London from Is* 6^d* to 
Is* 2 3/4d* during the same period* The following table^* shows tbs 
fluctuating exohange rates
Prioe of Silver, Exchange Rate in Shanghai
Date Price of Silver
























Feb*—Oct* 44*8 (average) 29.8 (average)
Bov- 46.4 29.5
Dee* 46*4 29.4
p. H* Leavens, Silver Money, p* 306*
21$
5* The falling price of general eosunodities— All Chines© pries index 
ambers had declined fro*r about th© middle of 1931 to about th© middle 
©f 1934* by an average of around twenty-five per ©eat* In the next year 
th© pries© did not show any decided movement, but fluctuated in the 
neighborhood of the 1954 average*
4* Bankruptcies of several banka— It le a habit in Shanghai, 
especially among foreigners, to think of the prices of real estate in 
terms of American dollars or sterling* The increase and the expected 
further increase in the exchange value of the Chinese dollar acted to 
lessen the value of Shanghai real estate* Most banks had loaned heavily 
on real estate• In this ease they were anxious to reduce old loans and 
checking to make new leans* Since there were no purchasers, banks and 
individuals found themselves with fro sen assets on their hands* In 
the spring of 1955 several Chin©se banks and real-astate companies 
closed* It increased unrest in the stringent financial market In 
Shanghai.
In this ease of economic emergency, first In Shanghai, and then 
in other ports inland, the rumors such as th© nationalisation of 
silver or the devaluation of the silver dollar, led to official denials 
from time to time* But China's Government never lessened its untiring 
attention to the development of the silver situation, both internal and 
external* (hi February 2, 1935 th© Government appointed a Monetary 
Advisory Cossmittee of some fifteen prominent bankers Hto study end devise 
meastxes for the Improvement of the our re® y situation and th# readjust- 
memt of monetary affairs In various parts of the country." This Committee
ezTaag leang—la, China*a Sew Currency, p. 75*
214
n B  advise the Government on the stabilisation of exchange, the improve­
ment of international payments of China’s balance, the financing of in­
ternal trade and industry, and other matters*
In karoh rumors hinted that some negotiations between China and 
other governments had been in progress* In April the Grovemment took 
steps for the reorganization of the three principal banksi the Central 
Sank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications*^
These changes to increase tha Government's shares in the capital of 
the latter two banks were intended to insure the fullest cooperation 
between the Government and the banks*
Towards the end of April; a gentleman's agreement was reached by 
the Bank of China with the local foreign bankers with the view of re­
fraining from making shipment 8 of silver abroad by placing a virtual 
but voluntary embargo on the export of silver* In addition, the smug­
gling of silver was made an offense punishable In accordance with the 
Emergency Law governing the punishment of crimes endangering the Republic 
by the Government • At the seme time the native banks found themselves 
in embarrassing difficulties, end began to limit withdrawals from the 
deposit accounts at the beginning of June to 500 dollars on each ao count * 
On the Government side a Native Banks Supervisory Committee was set up 
in order to examine the balance-sheets of the fifty—five native banks 
and to assess the value of securities held by the banks* The severance 
of foreign exchange from the price of silver since Ootober, 1934, and 
the voluntary embargo on silver exports between the Bank of China and 
the local and foreign bankers since April, 19S6 have as a matter of fact
supra, p. 178.
215
already impaired tha silver standard*
In 1956 it was sanouaoed in London that Sir Frederick Leith*
Rose , chi« f Economic Adviso r to the British Go veram© nt, would leave for 
China to inquire into all relevant quest ions affecting the Chinese 
financial situation. Ho arrived in Shanghai on September 21* In the 
eloud of rwort regarding his conclusion ho only said that China needed 
peace, stability, sad trade, and that an efficient administration would 
restore prosperity to the country.^
When in the summer of 1956 the Shanghai exchange market showed un­
certainty, a political group of speculators came to play cards with 
foreign exchange for their o m  benefit* A speech by the Minister of 
finance on October 10 gave the impression that the Government was work* 
lag toward some plan of lowering the rate of foreign exchange* Thus the 
exchange rates continued to drop, with minor reactions. While rumors of 
Government plane increased, the situation of exchange rates showed more 
abnormality*
(ha the eve of the nationalisation of silver in China the serious 
situation concerning the Chinese dollar is shown in the followings
The uncertainty as regards the future of the currency and the 
crops of rumors to which it gave rise led in the middle of October 
to a renedwed and more vigorous attack on the dollar* The specu­
lative operations in gold bar and foreign exchanges and feverish 
purchases of standardised commodities bore witness to the extensive 
flight from the currency that endangered the stability of the entire 
financial structure* The value of the do Her began to weaken ir­
resistibly in terms, first, of foreign exchange and gold bar and, 
later, of the more sensitive commodities*
from the following table, it is apparent that the exchange and 
related market were dominated by feverish speculations®®
B4p* H* leavens. Silver Mousy, p. 311.
s5ff* Y* bin, The lew Monetary System of China* 1936, p. 76* 
s*Ibid., p. 77*
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Index no. of the retea of exchange on London, the prices of
Bate
gold bar and other sensitive commodities 
hai (Oct. 14, 1035 = 100)




Oct. 14 100 100 100 100 10016 99.3 99.6 99*6 101.9 100*716 98.9 101.8 100.6 101.2 98.1IT 98.6 103.4 100.1 100.2 97*718 97.2 104.3 101.3 100.8 98.719 96.6 103.7 100.8 101.4 98.4
21 96.5 104.4 100.5 100. 8 10022 96.5 106.6 101.4 100.5 100
25 92.4 109*1 102.6 101*2 101*324 89.6 116.8 105.5 102*5 101*5
25 88.2 120.9 106.8 103.2 103.6
26 88.2 126.8 tmemm 106.9 109*7
28 89.6 125.3 — 114.8
29 88.9 129*2 112*0 110.2 112.9
50 84.8 127.6 — 112.7 118.1
31 81.3 — 115.3 ee«*.
lev. 1 82.0 128.7 m . i 111.6 113.4
2 82.0 127.9 115*3 113.2 118.4
III. The Managed Currency:
At last, on S o m b e r  3, 1935, the Chinese Cover ament announced the 
nav currency policy— the abandonment of the silver standard and the adop­
tion of a managed currency. The provisions are as follows (see Appendix 
6 for complete text)*
A* BfpV notes exclusively issued by the three Government banks shall 
be fbll legal tender, and the reverves of these bank notes shall he placed.
loader a unified control#
B. Created a Currency Reserve Board to hold reserves of banks.
C. All debts expressed in terms of silver shall be discharged by 
the payment in legal tender notes.
p. To prohibit the use of silver dollars and bullion for currency 
purposes in China all holders of silver were required to exchange their
217
silver for Id gal tender motes.
s* exchange value of the Chinos© dollar was to b« kapt stable 
1̂ "® existing level* and for this purpose tho Government banks would 
buy and sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities.
5h© Gove nament-owned Central Bank would be reorganised as the 
Central Reserve Bank of China. It would hold the reserves of, the bank* 
lag ays tea and act as depository of all public funds and would provide 
centralised rediscount facilities for the other banks, the Central 
Reserve Bank of China was not to undertake general ©oaaBereial business* 
and after a period of two pears was to enjoy the sole right of note 
issues.
According to the regulations* banka* firms* and all other public 
and private parties holding silver dollars or bullion were required to 
hand it over to the Currency Reserve Board (see Appendix 0)* (It was 
specially created in Hovember, 193b by the Ministry of Finance of China 
for the purpose of centralising the issue and retirement of legal tender 
notes to keep custody of reserves against outstanding notes) or its 
agent banks* for legal tender notes. Silver dollars exchange for paper 
ones at their face value* The Currency Reserve Board consisted of 
eighteen, members* ion.lndS.ng the representatives of the Government and banks 
ether ccmmercial organisations* The Governor of the Central Bank of China 
Is concurrent 1 y the Chairman of the Board* This Board designated the 
three Government banks as depositories for the custody of reserves* 
wader control of the Board* against legal tender notes. A special regu­
lation governing the exchange of silver for legal tender notes (see 
Appendix I>) end others governing the use of the metal for silverware, 
were provided* With regard to subsidiary silver and copper coins, no
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national decree was issued at that time, this matter being complicated 
by the fast that various silver and copper co ins of widely varying ex** 
change rates were circulating in various provinces and districts• 
Provincial and looal government s and local banking associations tem­
porarily dealt with these matters* For both foreign and domestic 
reasons, it was announced on November 13 that the Government had decided 
to establish a branch of the Currency Re serve Board in Tientsin* Other 
branch beards were set up at Hankow and Canton to exercise jurisdiction 
ever their respective areas and the silver is serves there.
As to the foreign exchange, under the new currency system, a kind
of managed currency, the Chinese dollar unit no longer was based on
silver, but was kept fixed in terms of foreign currencies. The rate 
anaouaeed from the Central Bank of China on Sovember 4 wasi
14^ pesee sterling - C. 5. (Chinese Standard) $1.00 or 
29.5 cents United States currency s C. S. $1*00 ”
The Central Bank of China on the same day stated its willingness to peg
the price of the Chinese Standard dollar by selling in any amounts at
the fixed price of Is. 2 6/8d. or thirty cents of the United States
dollar, and buying the Chinese Standard dollar at the fixed price of
la. 2 3/8 d. or 29^ cents. But it was not mdde clear whether the
Chinese dollar was to be pegged to sterling or the American dollar.
Fortunately, *tbe cross rate between Hew York and London fluctuated
within limits narrow enough So that the Chinese Government did not have
58to decide which currency to follow•"
After the nationalization of silver, the Government was able to
STyorelga Affairs, Vol. 18, 1939, p. 350.
B00# s. Leavens, Silver Money, p. 315.
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collect & siseable hoard of the white metal * For instame, in Shanghai
alone the bank stocks on Eovamber 1 amount©d to 326,640,000 yuan, or
about 250,000,000 ounces* With this stock the Government wi 11 have some
funds for management of the yuan on the foreign exchange market* After
tfae nationalisation of silver, the Central Bank took over large amounts
foreiga exchange which had been overbought by the speculators during
October, end so accumulated a fund of around €10,000,000 in foreign our*
rensies, against which it could sell exchange*
To keep the exchange value of the currency down to the fixed 
rate, the banks had only to be ready to buy foreign exchange 
when it was offered* This could always be done by the issuance 
ef new notes, since the exchange itself would be ample reserve*
The notes of the government banks had been backed by a reserve 
of 60 per east in silver and 40 per cent in securities* The cur* 
rent price of silver was 65 S/8 cents U* S* currency per ounce, 
a level which had been maintained since August and which had come 
to be looked on as fairly stable; at least there was little expec­
tation that the American treasury could allow it to drop without 
vigorous protests from the silver bloo* At that price, the Chinese 
silver dollar of about 0*76 fine ounces had a bullion value of about 
SO cents U. S* currency* The 60-per~c©nt metallic reserve against 
a #1*00 note was, therefore, worth 0*60 x SO cents s SO cent a 0* S. 
currency, or approximately the level at which exchange was pegged* 
Thus the metallic reserve was raised automatically from 60 per cent 
to 100 per cent, while the remaining 40*per*confe reserve in seouri* 
ties was an extra safeguard* China, in effect, made a considerable 
book profit in the revaluation of her currency, just as the United 
States did in reducing 'the gold content of the do liar *^®
For the purpose of maintaining the fixed rate, China's Government
started selling silver to America* On December SO, 1635 not less than
10,000,000 euzmes of silver were shipped by the “President Lincoln,"
sad on Deesmber 25 another 10,000,000 by the "President McKinley1' by
the Chinese government banks to the Chase Bank and the National City
Bank of Kew York in order to provide additional reserves ibr exchange
stabilisation* This gave the "managed currency* of China a backing of
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seme 118,000,000 or about $500*000,000 (Chinese Standard) ifi foreign 
exchange (particularly sterling and American dollars) in addition to
grtits silver and other reserves. the sailing of silver by China to 
ths lMiie& Government kept on* According to the report of the 
United States Government on February 13, 1956, wthe total silver pur- 
abases of the United States Treasury from China amounted to 50,000,000 
eunoes at the priee of 65 cents per ounoe •“
The priee of silver fell about thirty per cent • between December 9, 
1955 and January 20, 1956* This depreciation, of the silver priee in 
the world aarket means that the Chinese Government, controlling some
500,000,000 ounces of silver, lost about $100,000,000 (United States 
Currency) on the value of the silver reserve behind the bank notes, 
which was the result of China's large sales in the short period*
To nationalise silver in China, where more then half of the silver 
was in circulation and seme of.lt hoarded, was much more difficult than 
to nationalise gold in the United States, vhere most of the gold was 
in the banks and in the Treasury* Furthermore, for reasons such as 
the favoring of hard silver for hoarding purposes, lack of confidence 
in the Government by the people, come difficulty was experienced in 
the way of reaehix^ the expected goal of governmental policy*
Another difficulty came from the foreign banks* Since American, 
British, Japanese, and several other nationalities in China are still 
under the extraterritorial Jurisdiction of their own officials and 
subject to their own national laws. It was a question whether the 
Chinese order concerning nationalisation of’ silver on November 3, 1955 
would be obeyed by these foreign banks, firms and people. On November 4
°Tang Leang-le, China*a 8«w Currency System, p* 91.
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the British regulations forbade a British subject to make payments in 
silver, under penalty of imprisonment for a period of not exceeding, 
three months, or a fine not exceeding £20, or both. But these regula­
tions did not extend to requiring delivery of silver to the Chinese 
Government. British banks o on tinned for a time to hold th? ir stocks* 
Other foreign governments having extraterritorial Jurisdiction in China 
did not even immediately fellow the British example to forbid their 
people in China to make payments in silver. But later on foreign wil­
lingness to co-operate with the Chinese Government was almost unpre­
cedented in the relationship between China and foreign countries. Only 
the rirfcitude of Japan, -which saw the closer relationship in finance 
between Great Britain and China— engendered by Sir Frederick leith* 
Bose— as a potential threat against her interests in China, was the 
exception. However an import edit progress was made in January, 1936.
The foreign banks in Shanghai, with the exception of the Japanese ones, 
agreed to tuna over their silver holdings to the Government banks. This 
was done under an arrangement by which the Chinese Government banks 
would pay interest to the foreign banks for two years. In Maroh, 1937, 
the Japanese banks, at last, consented to a similar arrangement *
Six and a half monts after the starting of the new system, the 
Government made public the following statement (on Kay 17, 1936) which
61throws some ligfet on the governmental policy regarding the new system*
1. It will continue to be the governmental policy at all times to 
maintain adequate reserves against note Issues consisting of gold,
S. Teao, "Currency Hefora in China, w Info mat ion Bulletin,
Yol* I* August 11, 1936, Council of International Affairs,"
Hanking, p* 16*
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foreign exchange, and silver, and the silver portion of the reserved 
to hove o value equivalent to at least twenty—fiv& per cent• of the 
note circulation.
2* The Government will issue silver coins of fifty cents an** one 
dollar denominations, for the purpose of completing the reform of the 
Chinese coinage system.
S. For the purpose of further strengthening the position of the 
Chinese currency, definite arrangements have teen made to Increase the 
gold and foreign exchange portions of the note issue reserve*
The silver coins of fifty cents and one dollar denominations men­
tioned above had not been put in circulation before the outbreak of the 
China-Jap an War. Only some information about it is available t
The Sinister (of the Department of Finance of China) stated 
that silver coins of §0/ and $1.00 denominations would be issued 
with a silver content below that of the former standard. •*.Nothing 
more was heard of it for two years, until a Treasury press release 
announced that the San Francisco Mint had coined 345,032 one-dollar 
silver pieces and 3,240,000 half-dollar silver pieces for China 
during May, 1930. So information was given as to the weight and 
fineness of these coins. It seems unlikely that they will come 
into circulation under war conditions.
IV. The Sew Subsidiary Coins— Rumors of replacing the old un-uniform 
and depreciated silver and copper' subsidiary coins had been circulated 
from time to time. For several reasons a new system was never suoooss- 
fhlly set up. After the event of the nationalisation of silver on 
Movanber 3, 1935 it was announced (on December 3) that a new subsidiary 
coin was under way. Later on the dies for minting the old copper and 
silver coins in all provincial mints were ordered to be shipped to 
the Centre! Government so that no more of the old coinage shell be
62D. H. Leavens, Silver Money, p. 320.
22 3
issued* On January 9, 1936 K dr aft11 regulations (see Appendix B) con­
cerning subsidiary oo inage irere aooepted by the Finance Commit toe of
63the Legislative Tuan* These provided for the minting by the Central 
Government and issuance by the Central Bank of China of nickel and copper 
coins * The nickel coins are in denominations of 20, 10, and 5 cents, 
neighing respectively 6, 4*5 and 3 grams, and containing nickel of XQ0 
per oent fineness} they are legal tender for payments up to C. S* (Chinese 
Standard) $20* The copper coins are in denominations of one and one-half 
cent (respectively, 6*6 grams, of 95 per cent- copper and 5 per cent* 
tin-xinc alloy) and are legal tender far payments up to $5« The "draft* 
regulations also provided for the withdrawal of subsidiary silver coins 
from circulation* This was confirmed by a mandate issued by the National 
Government on January 19*
The new coins were placed in circulation in Shanghai on February 10, 
1936* Down to the end of June, 1937 the Central Mint produced and de­
livered to the Central Bank 814,770,000 pieees of th® new coins of a 
total value of nearly C* S* (Chinese Standard) $26,190,000*^
V. Summary— A bird's-eye view of China’s new system, the managed 
ourreney, oen be presented as follows*
A* All silver in China, the silver coins, syoee, and others, is 
nationalised and no silver coins are circulated for the purpose of cur­
rency*
B# The banknotes Issued by the Central Bank of China, the Bank of 
China, the Bank of Ccnmuni cat ions were full legal tender* Other
65it is one of the five Tuans constituting the Chinese National 
government* Its function is to pass laws*
64D. H. Leavens, Silver Money, p* 320.
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banknotes were permitted to remain in circulation, but the total amount 
outstanding was not to exceed the total for each bank of November 3,
1936. After a period of too years, the Central Bank of China (after 
reorganisation it was to be known as the Central It® serve Bank of China} 
will be the only institution having the sole right to issue bank notes*
0* The Cwrrenoy Reserve Board controls the issue and retirement of 
legal tender notes and is to keep custody of reserves against out stand* 
lag notes. (It began functioning on bovembar 4, 1936*)
IX* The Central Bank of China peggs the priee of the Chinese Standard 
Seller by selling the Chinese Standard Dollar at the fixed price of Is*
2 $/8d* or thirty cents of the United States dollar* and buying the 
Chins so Standard Dollar at the fixed priee of Is. 2 3/sd. or 29*6 cents.
5* The new and uniform subsidiary coins, nickel and copper cents* 
take the place of the existing un-uni form copper cants. The depreciated 
*i 1 ver-ooIns, the old subsidiazy coins, have been withdrawn.
In order to maintain the fixed exchange rate, up to 1936 the Chinese 
Central Government sold fifty million ounces of silver or more to the 
United States Government to add further strength to China's adequate 
holdings of foreign currency. The exchange-rate fixed by the Central 
Bank was the average rate of exchange for the Chinese Standard Dollar 
for the period from 1930 to 1934. With the stability of exchange, 
the gambling nature of international trade in the past many years of 
China's record can be improved, the speculation of foreign exchange can 
be cut, the budget of the payment for the heavy foreign loans can be 
controlled, the Internetlonal movement of short-tem credits owi be 
expected to |3ay its normal role in case of a temporary dislocation of 
China's International equilibrium, and other benefits which result from
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stability ia foreign, exchange oan be expected •
la order to facilitate th© functions of the Currency Reserve Board 
and then consolidate the credit of the national currency, some regional 
branch beards have been created in Tientsin, Hankow, Canton, Tsinan, 
aad Tsingt&o* Sever the less a virtual centralis ati on was kept in Bhang- 
hai, the greatest commercial center of China.
In order to complete the refom of the banking system, in addition 
to the reorganisation of the Central Bank, the immediate establishment 
ef an institute to deal exclusively with mortgage business was put into 
effect, and a Banker's Acceptance House under the auspices of the Joint 
Reserve Board of the Shanghai Bankers' Association was started In the 
middle of March, 1956.
It is apparent that after the abandonment of the silver standard 
and the establishment of the new managed currency by pegging China's 
money unit to sterling or the American dollar, the dishamony between 
the internal prices the world prices ceased to exist with “the more 
sensitive reaction of the internal prices to the world prices.
Changes in the level of world prices will be more rapidly and 
more fhlly reflected in our (China's) price structure, otherwise 
the disequilibrium between the internal and external prices, if 
permitted to continue, would make the existing rate of exchange 
artificial and difficult to maintain.
Y* Lin, The Mey Monetary System of China, 1936, p. 88.
CHAPt m  VI 
StHKAKT AND CONCLUSION
Ffosi tla Tiwpolnt of th© deve lopment of thd siQBet&ry syston in 
China, the whole currency history may well be divided into four periods* 
The first period will include the years fro® the unrecorded age to the 
beginning of the Chow dynasty; the second from the Chow dynasty to the 
Tang dynasty; the third from the Tang dynasty to the eve of the crea­
tion of the new managed currency system of 1935; and the fourth from 
the establishment of the new system to the beginning of the war (1957)* 
During the first period the spade-shaped money (chan), the bell­
shaped money (pu), the knife-shaped money (tao), and the round money 
were used as the media of exchange, the standard of value, and the 
storage of value* Meanwhile, the use of cowries, tortoise-shells, 
pearls, gems and tin for the purpose of currency continued side by side 
with the metal money of different shapes* The political boundaries 
resulting from feudalism, the accompanying limitations upon interregional 
trade, the fact that there was no adequate supply of a suitable substance 
Bfta»ftn to all regions that could be used as a common medium of exchange, 
may all be advanced as causes for the adoption of different shapes and 
kinds of money by different regions.
During the second period, the round ooins with engraved inscrip­
tions gradually spread over all the country and took the place of other 
media of exchange. The Chow dynasty was the first to turn out coins
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with an inscription. Later, the Tsin dynasty prohibited the use of 
cowries, tortoise-shells, pearls, gems and tin as currency, improved 
the more convenient bronse coinage, the "Ban-liang* (meaning half a tael 
in weight) • Then c erne another improvement of the copper coinage during 
the Tang dynasty, in A* B* 618, which is sued the new copper coin with 
'Use modern square character s. The Tang coin remained as the standard 
of coinage for many succeeding centuries# During this period paper 
money was invested to function as the medium of exchange, hut it was 
not used to any considerable extent* The importation of silver through 
the channels of foreign trade started to add to the supply of China's 
silver* But owing to the inadequate quantity in storage, silver was 
not able to play an important part in the monetary system*
The third period can be further divided into two partss the first 
part from the Tang dynasty to the beginning of the Taiping Rebellion 
(1851-1864) during the Tsing dynasty, and the second part from the 
Taiping Rebellion to the establishment of the new managed currency 
system in 1985* During the first half of this period a considerable 
amount of silver continued to be imported into China through the channel 
of foreign trade* By the accumulation of huge amounts of silver, the 
shite smtel gradually spread throughout the country and was widely 
employed for ths purpose of money* The copper coins, however, still 
maintained their dominant position 4s the main medium of exchange in 
both the interior and the coast ports* As far as the quantity and 
quality of the copper coins are concerned, the copper money was fully 
controlled by the Central Government • They were relatively good and
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uniform in appearance. They were turned out quite uniformly according 
to the regulation* of the Government both as to the amount and the 
fineness of the coins•
After the outbreak of the Taiping Hebe I lion, a wholesale and sudden 
change occurred affecting every phase of the life of the Chinese people* 
old systems, political, economic, social, and. moral, were all upset• 
People lost confidence in the monarchy and triad to break it. They 
began to reeogni*e the weakness of the guilds, the old-family system, 
and the handicraft syetmn. They attempted to do something about those 
weaknesses. People were enticed by the lovely machine-ibade merchandise 
ani rapidly expanded thsdr list of wants. This sudden expansion in 
some respects amounted almost to a social revolution. China’s social 
system, based upon & philosophy inherited through generations, and 
laboriously built up by scholars over the centuries, was violently 
disturbed* Because of the vast amount of territory, the great number 
of people affected and the oonfliot with deep*rooted tradition, the 
Chinese people had no opportunity to plan for the change; in fact they 
eeuld net even rationally follow the tide. They doubted, broke, and 
threw away the old systems and mores without any hesitation. But on 
the other hand, they never had the chance to build and consolidate the 
new ones*
Furthermore, during the transition period of reform in China, the 
Western Powers, wad later on Japan, became obsessed with their policy 
of eolonial expansion and were looking at China fiercely as a tiger 
does at fat meat* Their activities in the direction of political in­
vasion, economic invasion, end culture invasion, added directly and
tz%
indirectly a great daal of trouble to the already serious situation in 
China.
It is a logical and inevitable result that the money system of 
China during this unusual period was made more abnormal end chaotic *
The depreciated and counterfeit copper coins circulating, throughout 
the country were nob'uniform is quality and appearance* The provincial 
mints, ignoring the regulations of the Central Government, looked at the 
issue of eurrency as an important moans of raising revenue for the pro- 
vimeial warlords* Several kinds of the non-uni form silver dollars, 
silver subsidiary coins, and copper-cont pieces turned out from the 
provincial mints were circulating in different provinces and In dif­
ferent sections of the same province, at different discounts on dif­
ferent days or at different hours of even the seme day! The uncoined 
silver, ayeee, and the pieces of silver, with different shapes and dif­
ferent fineness were used as the medium of exchange, the standard of 
value *»d the storage of value* Different scales in different 
places, sad even in the seme place, were used as the weight standards 
of the uncoined silver* Foreign coins, bank notes issued by foreign
according to different foreign regulations circulated everywhere 
1b the sea ports trade centers side by side with the domestic coins 
and paper money* In short, during the second part of the third period, 
the whole Chinese currency system, reacting to the whole situation of 
the country, fell into a most dark, confused, and complex situation*
After the third period came a new era which has added a new record 
aad a new page to the history of China's currency system* That was the 
saw managed currency systoa established in 1935 by China’s National
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Government • In this paper this now era was treated as the fourth period 
An the course of the development of China’s currency system*
Unfortunately, having been established for o n ly a short time, the 
a n  system has not given us final proof of its ability to stabilise 
either the internal price level or the rates of foreign exchange* In 
the first place, this war, beginning in 1937, killed the infant moae- 
taiy systma at two years of age and gave it no chance to grow up* 
Secondly* the managed currency system was a new invention of the 
countries in the world after the abandonment ©f the International gold 
standard in 1931* The success or failure of a managed currency system 
is not the concern of China alone, but Is a problem of many other coun­
tries as well* However, it is apparent that by means of the new system 
some of the previously existing confusion has been gradually eliminated# 
buring the period of some eighty-five years (from 1851 to 1935) 
immediately preceding the establishment of the row managed currency 
system, the currency problem in China was not a pure monetary problem, 
but a produst of many complex factors, such as political, social, and 
financial, as well as the difficulties from foreign invasion* As to 
the political angle, from 1851 to 1911 a series of wars against both 
internal rebellions and foreign invasions kept the Central Government 
so busy that there was left no time for it to plan other things* 
formal govemaental functions, among them the administration of a 
monetary system, were allowed to lapse* Afterwards (from 1911 to 1935), 
unfortunately, came a succession of civil wars which broke the whole 
political machine* The war lords played the war game between provinces 
or the different sections of the some province just as collegiate teams 
play the game of foot-ball In the United States* Each year the game
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sttst be repeated* Someone loses and someone wins* Next time the loser 
may become the winner* Under this terrible situation, it is sot sur­
prising that a permanent and uniform system of currency, issued only by 
order from the weakest kind of a Central Government, could not be put 
into offset* Furthermore, many thinking that the ” uni form” system might 
be a bad thing for them, the local military leaders did their best to 
break the existing system* For instance, one warlord who controlled 
ease whole rioh province for many years was afraid that some day some 
ether warlord might come from another province much more easily if the 
transportation facilities were good enough* With this worry in his 
mind, he built the railroads in that province, but adopted a special 
plan with a special narrow track in order to make it different from 
other railroads in other provinces* He expected that the special narrow 
tr&ok would not be usable by the trains and the locomotives of other 
provinces, ***d therefore other warlords from other provinces could not 
easily invade his territory* This condition is ^ust one example*
As a result of the political confusion, each provincial mint tended 
to follow its own policy an3 issued its own special forms of currency* 
Sane time one province prohibited or put some restrictions on the cur­
rency issued by other provinces* Also, with the outbreak of civil war, 
the eoncgueror always flooded the conquered province with bad money* 
Sometimes oxse provincial mint sent by either public or secret ways token 
messy issued at a discount to another province in order to make profits* 
It was not uswoannon for the succeeding warlords to refuse or depreciate 
tbs money issued by the former warlords* In short, the long civil war 
ftnA the political disorder were among the most important causes leading
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to the serious situation of* China's currency system.
In addition to the currency problem in this period there was also 
a fiscal problem* The series of civil wars and wars with foreign coun— 
tries had exhausted the wealth of the nation* furthermore, owing to 
the abandonment of* the old finanoial arrangements and the lack of* new, 
direct taxation, the provincial governments were forced to look at the 
ourrenoy policy as the easy and possible means of raising the funds 
which they needed badly for their war expenditures and the increasing 
ordinary expenditures.
During this time the Central Government was almost wholly depend­
ent on foreign borrowing to finance its war expenditures, the repayments 
of its old foreign loans, and even for ordinary expenditures* The ao- 
eweulation of the heavy gold loans really formed a very difficult and 
serious problem for the Central Government to finance* The Central 
Government which found no new financial resources, had already lost 
almost all of the important revenues originally raised through the 
provincial «***? local governments* The Central Government could not get 
help from the issue of domestic loans* By reason of the conventional 
tariff and the fact that the administrative authority of customs duties 
was in the foreigners' hands, it could not control either the customs 
duties or the revenues from the sale tax (the two main financial re* 
sources of the Central Government)* In this kind of finanoial strait, 
how could it adopt any monetary reform without hesitancy? It seems to 
he obvious that the ereatlon of either the gold standard or the gold 
exchange standard would have to be financed by foreign loans, if China's 
Government was to expect its plan to be successful*
It is true, too, that the ourrenoy problem la China was also a 
social problem* Local guilds, local collectors of taxes and the 
various institutions handling foreign exchange, covetous of small 
gains "which the confusion of the various tael systems made possible, 
wasted to maintain the old non—unifona tael system in China* China*a 
poor modem—banking system could not assist society and the nation to 
settle and smooth out the difficulty occurring from the creation of a 
new ourrenoy grstem. China did not have adequate means of transporta­
tion sad ccmmvaaioation for the distribution and moving of coins to 
various parts of the country in response to changes in demand and supply 
for funds* la China there were no available statistics or economic 
records ia either public offices or private organisations which could 
bo used as a just guide for both the adjustment of existing systems 
sad the creation of a sew system* This lack of records makes it dif­
ficult to throw sufficient light on the following problems: how many
new colas, legal tender, and subsidiary coins, China should have and 
what should be the ratio between the standard coins and the subsidiary 
coins Mid between the several kinds of the subsidiary coins* Ho one 
could guess how many more coins, both newly Issued and re—issued, China 
would need to finance the development of industry and ocsameroe, and to 
keep the existing system in good shape* China needed many economic 
experts and well-trained officers to run the new monetary system, to 
watch the existij^ system, mad to save it both from internal crisis and 
from external attack* The masses of people in China lacked the minimum 
knowledge of banking and money to understand the various steps in the 
governmental money policy* A wide knowledge of money and banking prin­
ciples Is necessary to install and make effective a new system*
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^bis lack of understanding was unfortunate. Fraudulent practices could 
bo carried on in the name of progressive change. Furthermore those 
with advanced knowledge or more complete information were able to take 
advantage of those less well infonned. Questionable practices oarried 
on during the transition period tended to b© translated into criticsm 
of the new system itself. The distances involved and the lack of com­
munication facilities prolonged the transition period so that for a 
time the various sections of the country were in different stages of 
the transition process. From 1851 to 1935 this gradual transition 
was underway, but by the latter date the process was about finished.
Unfortunately, China was not as favorably situated for changing 
over to gold as were a number of other countries when they reformed 
their monetary system. China did not possess any large stocks of gold. 
Also* she did not receive any considerable amount of funds through pay­
ments of indemnities or through payment for shipments of merchandise 
to foreign countries. By way of contrast it can be shorn that the 
adoption of the gold standard in other countries tended to be made at 
a time when considerable quantities of gold were available from mining 
operations, as for example the United States. Britain was receiving 
funds from her colonies and from other foreign countries; Germany and 
Japan ware in possession of funds received as war indemnities after 
the Franco—Prussian war and the Sino—Japanese war, respectively.
The chenge in India and the Philippines was supported by the British 
aw*? A m e r i c a n  government s. Furthermore, the movement for reform of 
Chinese currency took place in the very period when the price of silver 
i n  terms of gold fluctuated very muoh, and when the monetary systems
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O’ch^r countries were rapidly changing*
The ourrenoy problem in ^hina m s  also a problem of foreign affairs#* 
Under the system of extra-territorial jurisdiction, the Chinese govern­
ment cannot control or prohibit the counterfeiting of coins in foreign 
settlements at the trade ports* Unless the government could efficiently 
control or prohibit the counterfeiting of coins, the system of token 
coins could not .-e maintained aocording to the governmental plan* This 
m s  one of the sain handicaps of China in establishing a gold exchange 
standard* Counterfeiting also added further confusion to the existing 
©Id copper cash and the subsidiary silver coins* The paper notes issued 
by foreign banks in accordance with the regulations of their mother 
country and circulated in the trade centers, even in the interior, had 
destroyed the control of the Chinese government regarding the issue of 
bank notes* The competition between foreign countries in supplying 
funds to finance the re/orm always increased the difficulty of monetary 
reform* The potential pc-itlcal ambitions of the Western Powers and 
Japan have made the Chines© people hesitant to accept the necessary 
assistance from foreign experts* It even has influenced unfavorably 
some useful plans which were made on the basis of pur© eoonomio co­
operation and pure mutual benefits by foreign experts or foreign 
financial institution*
The serious confusion of the monetary situation in China had been 
existing since 1851 and became worse and worse from year to year* But 
China’s government never gave much attention to tie steps necessary for 
general reform until the year 1895, when China was beator by Japan.
From 1895 to 1957, the eve of the present war, the movement for monetary 
reform and the legislative creations of China’s government can be briefly
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atara&Skrigdd a* to llowst
I* The period around 1895— After the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, 
with the modern reform movement of the governmental administration,
•one preliminary monet&iy proposals were offered by a group of the 
of fleers in the Central Government, such as Mr, Hu Chu—fen’s uniform 
coinage syst«n in 1895, Mr. Wang Pan-yuan’s coinage of silver in 1893, 
Hr. Sheag Esuan-huai’s Chingping tael unit in 1896, Mr. Chan Chi-ohang's 
modem cash machinery in 1897, and Mr. Yang Yl-oM’s English go Id-pound 
unit in 1897* In this period, in reaction to these proposals, the 
Central Government did not provide any valuable creations of monetary 
reform.
II. The period around 1904— After 1900 same factors (such as the 
Increasing foreign gold loans, the declining priee of silver, the 
urgency for China’s currency reform from foreign countries, the de­
preciating nee copper cents, the example of currency reform given by 
neighbor Ing countries, and the over-product ion of the local subsidiary 
silver coinage) led to the following governmental action: A* the
edict of depress Dowager in 1901 to elose the provincial mints j 8. the 
Joining of China, Mexico and the United States in an international 
inquiry into the silver question; C. the acceptance of the monetary 
reform plan proposed by Professor J. W. denies. During this period, 
la reaction to the plan drawn up by J. W. Jenks, there came some 
criticism and new proposals, such as Mr. Jamiession’s criticism in 
1903, Sir Hobert Hart’s silver coinage on a gold basis In 1903, Mr.
Hu Wei-tl’s gold coinage. In 1905 the Central Government issued the
"Ten Regulations," the Act of "coinage of taels” and the Act of "frac­
tions ©f the tael in silver*”
III* The period around 1908— la 1908 the monetary reform movement 
started by Mr* Tong Shao-yi * e proposal for silver tael coins* Then 
earns the proposal for the go In of $1*80 from Mr* Sheng Henan—hwai in 
the same year* Prince Tsai Tse suggested the establishing of the 
Bureau of Currency Reform and tbs one "yuan" silver coin. The Board 
of Pi nance of China* s Government suggested the national silver coins 
and silver notes*
IV# The period 1910-13— The "Regulations for the Rational Coinage" 
consisted of eleven articles, and thirteen supplementary articles were 
created in 1910* On April IB, 1911 the monetary reform loan from 
foreign countries was signed* Dr* Vissering's plan for a gold-exohange 
standard for China was proposed In 1912* Mr* Hsu Un-yuan1 s suggestion 
ef a "huan" unit and Mr* S. EL. Wagel's proposal for a silver tael unit 
were given in 1913*
V# The period 1914-28— In January, 1914 the "Rational Currency 
Regulations" and the "Regulations for the Enforcement of the Currency 
Law" were passed* In 1916 the "Regulations of Gold Currency Rotes" 
were granted* From 1918 to 1928, a long period of almost ten years, 
either government creation or reform movement entered into a silence 
period#
VI* The period 1928-35— In 1928 the Economic Conference in Ranking 
r e c o m m e n d e d  some fundamental principles for the later monetary reform 
of the Central Government • In 1929 Dr* Kemmerer proposed a compara­
tively complete plan for a gold exchange standard for China* Curing 
this period China*e Government really devoted its time to preparing
258
to reach the goal of monetary reform. For instance, in 1923 the Central 
Bank was set up, in 1930 the system of ’’custom gold unit1* was established, 
the abolishment of the haikman tael began in 1930 and was completed in 
1933, the abolishment of the taels system occurred on April 6, 1933, the 
Central Mint was created at Shanghai in 1933, the abolishment of the 
"likin* system was completed in 1931, an£ China's standard dollar law 
was passed cm March 3, 1933. These were the necessary steps for the 
completion of a uniform national monetary system.
VII. The period 1935-37— In April, 1935 the reorganization of the 
three banks, the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank 
of Communications was initiated by China's Government* On Movsmber 3,
1955 the Chinese Government announced the new ourrenoy policy, abandon* 
want of the silver standard, and set up the managed currency system.
In January, 1936 the regulations concerning subsidiary coinage were 
accepted by the Legislative Yuan. A new monetary system suitable to 
both the internal and external circumstances of China was just begin­
ning sod then oams the war in 1957 between China and Japan.
In addition to the reforms of China's monetary system mentioned 
above, it is wise to summarise briefly the most important proposals 
as being the silver standard, the gold standard, and the gold exchange 
standard.
The proposals for China's ourrenoy reform, drawn up by both 
Chinese foreign individuals end governmental officers, accumulated 
into a pile mountaln-high. Among them were some doirmon featurees they 
pointed out some partial truths in the whole picture, but none indloated 
that they understood thoroughly the uhole situation at the time the plans 
were made. For many reasons these proposals had been filed without getting
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a ehaoee to be put into effect*
Among the proposals for a uniform silver standard, the ones drawn 
up by Mr, Chang Chi-tung, Tong Shao-yi (Chinese) , Mr, Wagel, and Sir 
S» Bart (foreigners) might be accepted as representative* Among those 
advocating a geld standard were Mr. Hu Wei-te and Tsao Ju-lin (both 
(kinase)* Among the group of advocates of a gold exchange standard. 
Professor dunks', Dr* Viesering' s and Professor Kemmcrerfs plans (all of 
these men are foreigners and Chinese Governmental advisers for the 
reform of Chinese ourrenoy) made the only proposals which China re­
ceived*
The silver standard group emphasised ChinaTs internal situation 
and held one general idea; that is, that before China could adopt a 
gold standard, she would first have to settle her existing troubles 
sad unify her existing currency system* They pointed out the following 
eases* The copper-using area in China is many times larger than the 
silver-using area from the viewpoint of ourrenoy* In the ease of the 
collection of the governmental taxes, the fractions are carried to a 
millionth part of a tael* The gold-exchange standard would be dif­
ficult to enforce in China* The token coins would be continually 
fluctuating in terms of silver bullion again* Under the go Id-exchange 
standard, coins might depreciate through over-issue for the seignior­
age* China has not even had a silver money with & uniform weight and 
appearance* People were accustomed to the use of the tael system.
needed a silver currency of a uniform weight and fineness, and 
in quantities sufficient to meet the needs of the whole Emptfce.
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Uniformity in eopper currencie 8 was also needed immediately* Owing to 
the enormous extent of territory, the looseness of the political system 
and the existence of the leased territories, the government could not 
successfully prevert the counterfeiting operations in Chinese terri­
tory* A Central Mint and a Central National Bank ware at once neoes- 
eaiy is China* Among this group, there was a common idea that any 
reform in China *s ourrency system must start from the establishment 
of a uniform ooin first*
All proposals in this group failed to mention the effeet on the 
stabilisation of the Internal prioe level that might be brought about 
by the fluctuation of the price of silver*
Another omission for which this group should be held responsible 
is that they furnished no solution for the problems of the stabilisa­
tion of China4 s foreign exchange rate and the fluctuating burden caused 
by China*s foreign loans in terms of gold money*
Regarding the unit of silver coins, some different opinions have 
been existing among them* Some, from the viewpoint of tradition, main­
tained that the tael system, either kuping tael or Shanghai tael, should 
be made the uniform unit of money in the new system* Some, from the 
viewpoint of the low living level of the masses of Chinese people, 
held that the unit of a dollar which is about 0*72 of a kuping tael 
tad is about the same weight as a Mexican dollar, should be much more 
eonvenient for the purpose of circulation* Still one of them recom­
mended a new silver unit of MHuan° with a weight about 0*56 of a kuping 
tael, because it would be worth exactly 1,000 cash of the existing 
copper cash at the market price* Among this group Mr* Chang Cbih-tung
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k*d contributed * detailed surrey regarding the practical situation 
in China* Among this group, basing his ideas on the theories of 
hanking and money accepted by the economists in Europe and America,
Mr* Ifagel had offered a pains talcing discussion of the practical facte 
of China*
Among the group insisting on & gold standard for China immediately, 
®®ly * Tsao Ju—lin recommended a relatively detailed plan# H© based 
his plan on these reasons: (1) China's foreign loan in terms of gold
la very heavy; (2) the fluctuation of China's foreign exchange is a 
serious hindrance to China's foreign trade; and (3) all nations in the 
world have adopted the gold standard* Based on the reasons mentioned 
above, he drew the following plan* Gold dollars 1 Chin Tuan* contain­
ing 0*732318 kungfun (it may mean the ngrsmn) of pure gold or 0*0201668 
kuping tael of pure go Id and gold currency notes should be issued*
The subsidiary coin in the National Coinage Law of 1914 shall be used as 
fiduciary coins in the gold currency system* The Bank of China and the 
Bank of Communications should perform the functions of a Central Bank 
with which the reserve for the gold notes shall be deposited** After a 
specified date taels will be changed into dollars* Banks with notes 
then outstanding should withdraw them within a fixed period, after which 
period their reserve should be set aside for retirement of the still 
outstanding notes# The Central Mint shall be at Tientsin with the 
policy that the one-dollar coins should be coined less and less by em­
phasising the half dollar* Some foreign advisers shall be seleoted 
for the currency reform* Of course, his plan left many points to be 
eriticised, but from both technique and practice it was a relatively 
reasonable plan in comparison with the other gold-standard plans
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proposed for China* Unfortunately, the plan had connected itself with 
the political foreign loans arranged by Japan for which the Chinese 
people had no liking* The plan was killed by the opposition of the 
people* However, if we understand what the following paragraph means, 
we sight get some idea about the difficulty surrounding the creation of 
a gold standard in the case of Chinas
The gold standard means more than a legal undertaking to redeem 
the currency and credit of a nation in gold***the gold standard 
means a set of practices, a system of procedure, never formulated, 
never consciously thought out, not invented by anybody, but the 
growth of experience of the great commercial countrie s of the 
world, rather than merely the employment of gold to redeem all 
fonas of obligations. 3-
It was said that the currency reform by Britain in 1816 was from 
a weight of silver to a value of gold, (that is the Mint price of gold 
at i>3 17s* lO^d* per ounce), end it was apparent that the success of 
the British ourrsncy policy was due to her ability to maintain the 
"value of gold."
Of the three proposals for the gold exchange standard, the one which 
was recommended by Professor Jenks concluded the main points as follows: 
The standard unit of value will consist of ♦** grains of gold and will 
be worth presumably the gold value of a tael* A standard gold coin 
will be at a ratio of about 32 to 1 to the silver coins* Prom time to 
tine the government will declare that in various provinces the new coins 
will be legal tender for debts incurred after a fixed date* The govern­
ment shall open credit accounts in foreign trade centers and may draw 
geld bills at a fixed rate under the direction of the foreign comptroller 
of the currency who, appointed by China*s Government, shall have general
3-Sir Charles Mor gam-Webb, The Hi so and Fall of the Gold Standard, 
yew York, Macmillan Co*, 1934, p. 16. '
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charge of the monetary system for China* Loans may be made for the 
establishment of adequate exchange funds, and seigniorage profit from 
eoin&ge must be kept as a separate fund*
After Professor Jenka, Dr. Vis soring drew a different plan for 
China• He held that silver does not procure any stability of prices 
for commodities, etc* For the purpose of stability of prices and 
foreign exchange the gold exchange standard is the best one for a 
transitional period from the viewpoint of the existing circumstances 
in China* In his plan the ratio of the gold coin and silver subsidiary 
coin will be It 21 and the gold unit 0*3644633 grams of pure gold and the 
silver unit with 7*66 grams of pure silver* He divided the whole period 
in the movement of currency reform into three parts* Within the first 
period the following steps will be completed* (1) the adoption of a 
future gold unit as a foundation, (2) organization of the Bank of 
Issue, (3) the new gold unit as & money of account for book credits,
(4) the issue of bank notes of new gold units, (6) accumulation of a 
gold reserve against the bank notes, (6) to declare the bank notes the 
legal tender* Within the second period, (1) the establishment and 
issue of the token coins end new subsidiary coinage, (2) accumulation 
of gold reserve against the token coins, (3) the coinage and issue {if 
desirable) of gold coins, (4) to deolare unlimited legal tender of 
silver token coins of 1 unit and 2 units, and the gold coins and then 
the gold certificates. Within the last period, the old silver dollars, 
old syoee, and the copper cash must be gradually withdrawn*
the last foreign expert who proposed a plan of gold exchange 
standard for China is Professor kemmerer from America* According to 
his plan a standard unit (gold
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fine gold sad have a money value of 40 cent* of the United States 
dollar* The value of the gold sun as bullion is 25.7 cents and its 
value as money is 40 cants. The margin is about 35 per cent. The 
silver sun with 16 grams of pur© silver, th© piece of 50 cents with 
7.20 grams, and the piece of €0 cents with 2*88 grams of silver shall 
be Issued} three steps shall be taken, first, a gold standard currency 
circulation date for each province} second, a gold standard legal tender 
dates third, a debt adjustment date for each province after which all 
debt before aad after must be In gold standard currency. A fund shall 
be set up and be never less than 35 per cs&. of the total amount of 
■fee gold standard coins in circulation* The gold coins when presented 
for redemption for gold bar, drafts, eto., shall be witMraim from 
circulation, and paid cut again only against the drafts sold abroad 
upon the fund in China* Bo portion of the gold standard fund may be 
placed on deposit in any bonk: in China, nor shall it be invested in 
China for the reason that tbs fund shall be kept out of circulation*
Professcr Hammerer also proposed conversion steps in detail to withdraw 
the existing coins. Among the plans drawn by these three foreign ex­
perts, the one by Professor Hammerer is relatively complete and much 
mere detailed. Unfortunately, both the internal and the international 
situation permitted no opportunity for putting the plan into effect.
In China it is still the old story Involving the political situation, 
financial difficulty, and all the social problems. Outside of China, 
the situation of tie gold standard was quite different from what it 
was before 1914.
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The w i M  Inflations ©f European currencies after the -war, de­
stroyed confidence on both investments and paper currenoies# an** 
greatly stimulated the hoarding of gold and silver which was a 
legacy from the war# The Central Banks of France and the United 
States# by aooemulating and hoarding enormous and unnecessary 
stocks of gold# were our tailing the supply of currency and increas­
ing the demand for gold to sn extent that greatly affected the 
stability of its value«•##
The Currency policies of France and the United States. ..greatly 
stimulated hoarding in another manner. They forced the debtor 
nations to employ exchange restrictions, gold protection tariffs 
and quotas# and other restrictive measures# in defence of their 
diminished stores of gold#**.
The stabilisation of gold value# the free flow of gold between 
countries# and a free trade policy are the requirements for the main­
tenance of the gold standard* Under the oases described by the above 
quotation# the situation of the gold standard became as follows:
The past seventeen years (1914-1931) had effected a transform­
ation from a commercial world and an investing world# into a hoard­
ing world....On the one hand were frozen credits# frozen accumula­
tions of gold# a frantic greed for gold# not for the purposes of 
currency and trade# but for hoarding....On the other hand were 
frozen hoards of commodities# unsaleable at anything like their 
cost of production# Gold had practically ceased to funstion as a 
currency over the greater part of the world**..®
The goal of abandonment of the silver standard# talked about for 
many years# planned by Jenks# Vissering# Kesnmarer, and others# was
finally brought about as a result of th© changing situation of the in­
ternational standard# tte intensified world depression and the critical 
situation caused by the American policy of raising the price of the 
white metal*
Since 193$# China adopted the managed currency system, under whioh 
system all silver in China was nationalized and no silver coins were
Zjbid*# pp. 111-112. 
®Jbid»# p. 149.
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oireulated for the purpose of currency. For the purpose of a medium, 
of internal exchange, the bank notes of the three Gov©mm©nt banks were 
full legal tender within the first two years after the beginning of the 
new system. After a period of two years, the Central Bank of China was 
the only Inst i tit ion haring the sole right to issue hank notes, the 
fall legal tender* Under the supervision of the Central Government 
the Gurreney Reserve Board oontrolled the issue and retirement of the 
legal tender notes to keep oustody of 1h© reserves against the outstand­
ing notes* For the purpose of the foreign exchange, the Central Bank of 
China pegged the price of the Chinese Standard Dollar by selling the 
Chinese Standard Dollar in any amount at the fixed price of Is* 2 5/8d. of 
BritlA sterling, or 30 oents of the American dollar, and buying the 
Chinese Standard Dollar at the fixed prioe of Is* 2 3/8d., or 29^ cents* 
Under the managed currency system "it can work with full confidence 
in the adjustment of its new national currency to the requirements of 
China's economy. From the viewpoint of the development of the currency 
system In China and the international tendency, the new system may be 
judged from the angle that "for the first time in history, China has 
adopted a truly national monetary polioy* This policy is in accordance 
with the trends of the economic world today,n and ”it brings China intog
elo aer end mo is intimate contact with the modem economic world."





REGULATIONS GOVERNING COINAGE OF THE NSW STANDARD SILVER BOLLA1—  
EFFECTIVE MARCH, 1S55— (from Chines© Tear Book, 1925-26*
pp * 1484-86) *“
Article 1* Coinage of the Standard Silver Unit shall be carried 
out exclusively by the Central Mint*
Article 2 • The Standard Silver Unit shall b® known as th© Yuan*
Its total weight shall be 26*6971 grams, and be composed of BE per ojanb 
silver and 12 per cent oopperi that is, it shall contain 28*495448 grams 
of pur© silver*
Article 8* Th© design of the Standard Silver Unit shall be pre­
pared by the linistjy of Finance and submitted to th® National Govern­
ment for promulgation by official Mandate*
Article 4* One Yuan of the Standard Silver currency shall be 
equivalent to 100 cents (Fen), and one cent shall be equivalent to 10 
Li*
Article 5* The difference between the actual weight of the Yuan
©f the Standard Silver Unit and the legally fixed weight must not in
any case exceed three-thousandths (S/l,000ths)»
Article 6* The difference between the aggregate weight of 1,000 
Than and the legally fixed weight (for 1,000 Yuan) must not in any ©as© 
exceed 5^0,000ths*
Article 7* The difference between the actual fineness of each
Standard Silver Yuan and the legally fixed fineness must not in any case
exceed three-thousandths (3/L,000ths^ •
Article 8* The Standard Silver Unit shall be tendered and accep­
ted in payments to the government or to private persons as well as in 
all transactions# The amount that may be tendered at any time shall be 
unlimited* (That is, it shall be considered as legal tender in all 
circumstances)•
Article 9* All the old one-yuan silver pieces, which conform to 
the weight and fineness originally fixed may be used, within a certain 
specified period, in the same manner as the Standard Silver Unit* Th® 
said period shall be specified In an order of the Ministry of Finance* 
Article 10* The Standard coins, if used for too long, may be pre­
sented to the Central Mint In exchange for new coins of the same amount, 
provided, however, that their weight and fineness shall conform with 
Articles 2, 6, 6 and 7 of these regulations*
Article 11* T*w following provisions shall govern cases in which 
silver or similar matters which may b© used for the minting of coins, or 
old coins, are presented to th© Central Mint for th® ooinag© of th© 
Standard Silver coins*
1 * Whore the silver bullion offered has a fineness of 999 thousandths* 
22#495448 grams of pure silver shall be presented for each Yuan plus a 
minting charge of 2*25 per cent*
2. Old ©ne-yuan silver pieces which conform with the weight and fine­
ness originally fixed may be exchanged for an equal amount of the
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Standard Silver coins without payment of minting charge*
5.- Where the fineness of th© silver bullion offered is less than 
999 thousandths, or where the old one-yuan silver pieces do not conform 
with the weight and fineness originally fixed, they shall be converted 
to th© actual amount of pur© silver they contain* A minting charge of 
2*25 per cent must be paid for each Yuan coined* Where the composition 
of the silver bullion or old coins mentioned above is too complicated, 
an appropriate assay and/or refining fee may be charged in addition to 
the minting charge*
Article 12* The Central Mint may produce "mint bars «w Bach bar 
shall have a fineness of 999 thousandths, and a fin® silver content 
equivalent to the fine silver content contained in 1,000 dollars, both 
of which shall be recorded on the face of the bar*
Article IS* Where silver bullion is offered to th® Central Mint 
for the minting of "mint bars," the foil owing provisions shall governs 
1* Where the silver bullion has a fineness of 999 thousandths, a 
minting charge of the 2*25 per cent shall b© paid*
2* Where the fineness of the silver is less than 999 thousandths, 
it shall be commuted to the amount of pure silver it contains* Be­
sides a minting charge of 2*25 per cent each bar, an appropriate assay 
end/or refining fee may be charged*
Article 14* Where "mint bars" of the Central Mint are presented in 
exchange for Standard Silver coins, the Mint, if satisfied that the bar 
offered retains ita original weight and fineness, must exchange it for 
Standard Silver coins of an amount equivalent to that recorded on the 
bar* If the bar has lost in weight of fineness, it shall be exchanged 
alth Standard Silver coins equivalent to th© actual amount of silver it 
contains*
Article 15* These regulations shall be put into effect from the 
date of promulgation thereof•
& tia between the Standard Dollar and Shanghai Tael
On© Standard Yuan equals 23*4955448 grams of pure silver*
One Shanghai Tael equals 35*599 grams of pure silver*
23*495448 divided by 33*599 equals 0*6992305 *
Hence one Standard Yuan equals 0*6992505 plus 0*0157327 equals 
0.715 approximately; therefore the rate of exchange for a Yuan has been 
fixed at 0*715 Shanghai Tael*
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APPENDIX B 
THE MTIOHALIZATION OF SILVER*
On November 3, 19155 & decree was issued by th© Ministry of*
Finairo©— effect iv© from th© following day, Monday, November 4—  
announcing the new changes in financial and currency policy, aimed at 
effecting stabilisation of the national currency* The decree was issued 
following a series of conferences between representatives of the Ministry 
of Finance and leading Chinese bankers«
In order to conserve the currency reserves of the country and to 
effect lasting measures of currency and banking reform, the Government, 
following the precedent of many countries in recent years, has decreed, 
with effect from November 4, 1935, as follows*
1* The banknotes Issued by the three Government banks % that is, 
the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, and Bank of G©mmunications, 
shall be full legal tender, and the banknote reserves of th© three banks 
shall be placed under a unified control* The notes of all other issuing 
banks will continue in circulation, but will gradually be withdrawn and 
replaced by notes of the Central Bank * No new notes are to be issued by 
these banks and all their unissued notes as well as their banknote re- 
serves are to be deposited with the Central Bank*
2* All debts expressed in terms of silver shall be discharged by 
the payment in legal tender notes of th© nominal amount due*
3* All holders of silver are required to exchange their silver for 
legal tender notes*
4* The exchange value of th© Chines© dollar will b© kept stable 
at its present level, and for this purpose the government banks will buy 
and sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities*
The Government-owned Central Bank is to be reorganized as the 
Central Reserve Bank of China, and will be owned principally by banks 
and the general public9 thus becoming an independent institution, de­
voting itself chiefly to maintaining the stability of th® nation* s 
currency* The Central Reserve Bank of China will hold the reserve of 
the banking system and act as depository of all public funds and will 
provide centralized re-discount facilities for the other banks* Th© 
Central Reserve Bank of China will not undertake general commercial 
business, and after a period of two years will enjoy the sol© right of 
note-issue*
Measures have also been prepared for strengthening th© eommeroial 
banking system and giving increased liquidity under sound conditions to 
the cormereial banks so that they may have resource® available to fineice 
the legitimate requirements of trade and industry* These measures will 
include the creation of a special institution to deal exclusively with 
mortgage business, and steps will be taken to amend th© present legal
*Tang,Leang-lo, China*s New Currency System, Shanghai, 1938, 
Appendix B*
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Codes so as to improve the security of mortgage deeds*
Plains have been completed by •which the National Budget will be 
Balanced within a period of eighteen months® The Government is deter­
mined th avoid inflation, and will take ©nergetio measures to deal with 
speculation and attempts to bring about unwarranted increase in prices * 
Shis constructive program for the rehabilitation of the financial 
' and economic Condition of th© country will be inaugurated immediately 
sad carried through as rapidly as possible® The government is confi­
dent that tfeej nation will wholeheartedly support it in these measures to 
relieve depression and promote national prosperity®
2&Z
APPENDIX C
regulations governing the cuspknct reverts
BOARD (To b© promulgated on Nov* 8, 1935)*
Article 1# Th© Currency Reserve Board is specially created by 
the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of centralizing the issue and 
consolidating the credit of legal tender notes* Branches shall he 
established in the various commercial carters at the discretion of th® 
Board*
Article 2* In accordance with the order of th© government, the 
Board shall have custody of the reserves against legal tender notes, 
and shall control the issue and retirement of such notes*
Article 8* The Board shall be composed of th© following members*
(1) Five representatives appointed by the Ministry of Finance*
(2) Two representatives each appointed by the Central Bpnk of China, 
the Bank of China, and the Bank of Corranunications•
(5) Two representatives appointed by the Native Bankers} Guild*
(4) Two representatives appointed by the Native Bankers*Association*
(5) Two representatives appointed by the Chamber of Commerce*
(6; Five representatives of other banks of issue, specially de­
signated by the Minister of Finance*
Article 4* The Governor of the Central Bank of China shall be 
ex-officio Chairman of th© Board and the Board shall elect a standing 
Conanittee of five to seven of its members for the execution of routine 
SDlt*
Article 5* The Board may invite leading financiers, both Chinese 
and foreign, to serve as advisers*
Article 6* The Board shall designate the Central Bank* the Bank 
of China, and the Bank of Communications as depositories for the custody 
of the reserve funds* The apportionment of the funds to be deposited 
in eaoh shall be determined by tha Board and reported to the Ministry 
of Finance for record*
Article 7* The Board shall inspect the reserve depositories once 
a month and announce to the public and amounts of note—issue, as well 
ae the kinds and amounts of the reserves, and shall report to the 
Ministry of Finance for record*
Article 8* The Board is authorised to employ a staff in order to 
carry on its work *
Article 9* The Board may draw up its rules and regulations, sub­
ject to the approval by the Ministry of Finance*
Article 10* These regulations shall become effective from th© 
date of promulgation thereof*
*The Chinese Year Book» 1936-37, Distributed by th© Commercial 
Press, M m l ted, Shanghai, China, p* 815*
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APPENDIX D 
EXCHANGE OF LEGAL TEHEES NOTES*
Following the decree for the netion&Xization of stiver, regula— 
tions governing the exchange of legal tender notes (fa—pi) were issued 
fey the Ministry of Finance, approved fey the Executive Yuan, and com­
municated to the various Provincial and Municipal Governments for en­
forcement* Following is a translations —
EXCHANGE OF LEGAL TENDER NOTES
Article 1* All banks (both modem and native), shops, business 
houses, public organ!sations and individuals throughout th© country 
having in their possession silver coins, mint bars, raw silver, silver 
ingots, silver bullion, and all other forms of silver and/or silver 
articles, shall turn them over to the nearest local exchange office in 
exchange for legal tender notes (f a~pi) within three months, beginning 
from November 4 of th© 24th Year of the Hepubli© (1935), with the 
exemptions enumerated below*—
(1) Silver absolutely indispensable as raw material for industrial, 
artistic or other lawful purposes, the use of which has been authorised 
fey the government in accordance with the regulations governing th© us© 
of silver in the manufacture of silver articles»
(Z) Ancient coins, rare coins, or ancient silver relics having 
cultural value*
(3) Silver utensils and ornaments manufactured and in possession 
of owners prior to the promulgation of these regulations*
Arfciel© 2* The offices for the exchange of legal tender notes 
consist of the followings —
(1) The Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of 
Coreamieations, their branches and authorized agents.
(2) Banks (modern and native), pawnshops, post-offices, railway 
offices, steamship offices, telegraph offices, and other public organs 
or organizations authorized by the above-mentioned three banks (th© 
Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications)*
(3) Offices for the collection of national and local revenues 
throughout the country*
(4) The District (Hsien) Governments.
Article 3. ?dien exchanged for legal tender notes, all silver 
articles, other than silver coins or mint bars in current circulation, 
shall be evaluated on the basis of the degree of their fineness (per­
centage of silver content) .
Article 4. In districts where no legal tender note© are in circu­
lation, persons in possession of silver dollars, silver bars, raw 
silver ingots, silver bullion or other forms of silver and/or other sil­
ver articles shall have them exchanged for legal tender notes in the 
offices stipulated in sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article 2*
*Tang Leang—le, China*a New Currency System, Shanghai, 1936, 
Appendix C.
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Article 5* Th® offices ©numerated in Sections 2, S and 4 of 
Article 2, after receiving silver do lars, silver bars, raw silver, 
silver ingots, silver bullion, or other forms of silver and/or other 
silver articles (in exchange for legal tender notes), shall immediately 
turn them over to the nearest branch or authorised agent of any one of 
the three banks, vis*, the Central Bank of China, th© Bank of China, 
and the Bank of Communications, in exchange for legal tender notes * 
hoarding, concealirg or using the above-mentioned silver for other pur­
poses shall be construed as criminal acts*
Article 6* Acts of extortion by threat, committed during the 
period of exchange (of legal tender notes for silver), against persons 
in possession of silver dollars, silver bars, raw silver, silver in­
gots, silver bullion or other forms of silver and/or other silver arti­
cles, shall be construed as acts of obtaining goods of value under 
false pretences*
Article ?« In the exchange of silver dollars in current circu­
lation for legal tender notes, no difference whatsoever shall be per­
missible; that is, the exchange shall be dollar for dollar* In case of 
violation of this provision, in accordance with th© degree of the offence 
committed, the legal tender notes or th© silver dollars Involved, or 
both the legal tender notes and the silver dollars involved, ©hall be 
confiscated. Persons receiving, purchasing or exchanging silver coins 
or silver articles at a premium with or without Intent to smuggle the 
same shall be dealt with In accordance with Article 2 and 6 of th© Pro­
visional Hegulations governing Punishment for Interference with the 
national Currency.
Article 8. These regulations, having been referred by this 
Ministry to the Executive Tuan and circulated, shall be observed by all 




SBGULATIONS GOVERNING SUBSIDIARY COINS 
(To be passed on dan* 10, 1956 and promulgated th© next day)*
Article 1# Subsidiary ooias (fu-pi) are t< b® minted exclusively 
at the Central Mint, and circulated by th© Central Bank of China# 
Article 2# Subsidiary coins shall b© classified as follows*
Value Weight Fineness
Nickel coins: '
20 cents 6 grams 100^ nickel
10 cents 4*5 grams 10Q% nickel
5 cents 5 grams lOf# nickel
Copper coins:
1 cent 6*5 grams 95$> copper and &%
tin-sin® alloy 
sf cent 5*5 grams 95$ copper and 5%
tin-sino alloy
Article 5* Subsidiary coins shall be calculated on a decimal 
basis* A #1*00 legal tender note (fa-pi) shall be equivalent to: 
five 20-eent niekel coins, ten 10-cent nickel coins, twenty 5-cent 
nickel coins, one hundred l-cent copper coins or two hundred §--oent 
copper coins*
Article 4* The designs of the subsidiary coins shall be determined 
by the Ministry of Finance, and submitted, through the Executive Tuan, 
to the National Government for promulgation*
Article 5* The niekel coins shall be legal tender for payments up
to the amount of #20, and the copper coins up to the ©mount of #5
National Currency* This provision, however, shall not apply in th® pay­
ment and collection of taxes or in currency exchange at th© Central Bank 
of China*
Article 6* Existing subsidiary coins shall be withdrawn from 
circulation by the Ministry of Finance, and shall b@ destroyed by melt­
ing and recast* However, during a specific period they shall still be 
permitted to circulate at their respective market value* The detailed 
measures for the enforcement of this provision as well as th© aforesaid 
time-limit shall be determined by order of the Ministry of Finance* 
Article 7* Subsidiary coins, which through wsar and tear over a
long period, have lost 5 per cent of their legal weight, may be ex­
changed for new coins at the Central Bank of China*
However, if the coins are intentionally damaged or debased through 
heavy stamping of seals or otherwise, resulting in th© loss of weight 
or the alteration of their original form, they shall become null and
*The Chinese Year Book, 1956-57, Distributed by The Commercial 
Press, Limited, Shanghai, China, p* 816*
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^cid, bo prohibited from circulation, and shall not be exchangeable for 
new co in s*
A r t ic le  8* Any person 'who counterfeits subsidiary coins or iss*- 
p a irs  the c re d it  thereof* shall b® punished in accordance with law*
Article 9* These regulations shall come into force from the date 
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